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Abstract
A increasingly larger percentage of computing capacity in today’s large high-
performance computing systems is wasted due to failures and recoveries.
Moreover, it is expected that high performance computing will reach exas-
cale within a decade, decreasing the mean time between failures to one day
or even a few hours, making fault tolerance a major challenge for the HPC
community. As a consequence, current research is focusing on providing fault
tolerance strategies that aim to minimize fault’s effects on applications. By
far, the most popular and used techniques from this field are rollback-recovery
protocols. However, existing rollback-recovery techniques have severe scala-
bility limitations and without further optimizations the use of current pro-
tocols is put under serious questions for future exascale systems. A way of
reducing the overhead induced by these strategies is by combining them with
failure avoidance methods. Failure avoidance is based on a prediction model
that detects fault occurrences ahead of time and allows preventive measures
to be taken, such as task migration or checkpointing the application before
failure. The same methodology can be generalized and applied to anomaly
avoidance, where anomaly can mean anything from system failures to per-
formance degradation at the application level. For this, monitoring systems
require a reliable prediction system to give information on when failures will
occur and at what location. Thus far, research in this field used ideal pre-
dictors that do not have any implementation in real HPC systems.
This thesis focuses on analyzing and characterizing anomaly patterns at
both the application and system levels and on offering solutions to prevent
anomalies from affecting applications running in the system. Currently, there
is no good characterization of normal behavior for system state data or how
different components react to failures within HPC systems. For example,
in case a node experiences a network failure and is incapable of generating
log messages, the failure is announced in the log files by a lack of generated
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messages. Conversely, some component failures may cause logging a large
numbers of notifications. For example, memory failures can result in a single
faulty component generating hundreds or thousands of messages in less than
a day. It is important to be able to capture the behavior of each event type
and understand what is the normal behavior and how each failure type affects
it. This idea represents the building block of a novel way of characterizing the
state of the system in time by analyzing the properties of each event described
in different system metrics, considering its own trend and behavior. The
method introduces the integration between signal processing concepts and
data mining techniques in the context of analysis for large-scale systems. By
shaping the normal and faulty behavior of each event and of the whole system,
appropriate models and methods for descriptive and forecasting purposes
are proposed. After having an accurate overview of the whole system, the
thesis analyzes how the prediction model impacts current fault tolerance
techniques and in the end integrates it into a fault avoidance solution. This
hybrid protocol optimizes the overhead that current fault tolerance strategies
impose on applications and presents a viable solution for future large-scale
systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The last few years have been a fertile ground for the development of many
scientific and data-intensive applications in all fields of science and indus-
try. These applications provide an indispensable means of understanding
and solving complex problems through simulation and data analysis. As
large-scale systems evolve towards post-petascale computing to accommo-
date applications increasing demands for computational capabilities, many
new challenges need to be faced, among which fault tolerance is a crucial
one [2, 3]. At the scale of today’s large scale systems, fault tolerance is no
longer an option, but a necessity. With failure rates predicted in the order
of tens of minutes for the exascale era [4] and applications running for ex-
tended periods of time over a large number of nodes, an assumption about
complete reliability is highly unrealistic. Because processes from scientific
applications are, in general, highly coupled, even more pressure is put on the
fault tolerance protocol since a failure to one of the processes will normally
lead to the failure of the entire application.
By far, the most popular fault tolerance technique to deal with applica-
tion failures is the Checkpoint-Restart strategy. However, checkpointing and
restarting has a cost in time and energy. Some projections [5] estimate that,
with the current technique, the time to checkpoint and restart may exceed the
mean time to interrupt of state-of-the-art future generation supercomputers.
This new projection means that multiple errors must be handled by current
fault tolerance protocols. Moreover, the current approach is developed to ap-
ply the same fault tolerance method to all types of faults (permanent node
crash, detected transient errors, network errors, file system failures) and for
the whole duration of the execution. However, not all faults require the same
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expensive checkpoint-restart approach.
Since exascale supercomputers, which are expected by 2023-2025, will ex-
hibit much more complexity and many more faults than todays supercom-
puters, it is imperative that we design fault tolerance systems with as low
overhead as possible. Moreover, the instability of exascale systems with their
diversity of faults and the limitations of ”one size fits all” fault tolerance ap-
proaches, creates the need to develop a set of dedicated solutions in addition
to the current general purpose ones.
Currently, there are several fault tolerant methods implemented at dif-
ferent levels of the software stack, from ECC implemented at the hardware
level to more complex application level recovery methods. A complement to
the classical checkpoint-restart approach is failure avoidance, by which the
occurrence of a fault is predicted and preventive measures are taken. Failure
avoidance uses the information received by a failure predictor to facilitate
proactive fault tolerance mechanisms such as preventive job migration or
proactive checkpoint. In general, failure prediction is based on the obser-
vation that there is a Fault-Error-Failure propagation graph as shown in
Figure 1.1 (page 4). The fault generates a number of errors that, frequently,
can be observable at the system level either by generating notifications in the
event and activity log files or by changing values for several performance met-
rics. Some faults, however, might change the function of the system without
being observable in the logs or metrics. The propagation chain ends with
the failure which is observed at the application level and usually is repre-
sented by either a failover, a recovery action or an application interruption.
Or, in some cases, the error could propagate and generate other effects like
performance degradation.
Over the years, different methods have been developed that deal with fail-
ure prediction in the HPC community [6], methods that have been used
extensively on different HPC systems and that present a variety of results.
There are two levels of failure prediction in literature: component level and
system level failure prediction. The first level assumes methods that ob-
serve components with their specific parameters and domain knowledge and
define different approaches that give best prediction results for each. One
example of this type is to compare the execution of good components with
failed ones [7, 8]. The second level is represented by system failure pre-
diction, in which monitoring daemons observe different system parameters
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(system logs, scheduler logs, performance metrics, etc) and investigate the
existence of correlations between different events. There are numerous meth-
ods, starting with simple brute force extraction of rules between non-fatal
events and failures [6] with more sophisticated techniques. In [9], the authors
are using a meta-learning predictor to chose between a rule-based method
and a statistical method depending on which gives better predictions for a
corresponding state of the system. Other research include Support Vector
Machines (SVM) [10], Hidden-Markov chains [11] or Bayesian networks [12].
Our experience with HPC systems has shown me that different system
components exhibit different types of syndromes, both during normal oper-
ation and as they approach failure. Our key observation is errors are often
predicted by changes in the frequency or regularity of various events. For
this purpose, we investigate the integration of signal processing concepts and
data mining techniques in the context of failure analysis for large-scale sys-
tems. By shaping the normal and faulty behaviour of each event, and of the
whole system, we are able to propose appropriate models and methods for
describing the chains of events occurring before failures. The results show
that conventional signal processing techniques can create clear markers for
changes in events behavior. Moreover, machine learning techniques become
much more efficient when applied to the derived markers, rather than to the
original signal.
We develop a prototype implementation of preventive checkpointing cou-
pled with periodic multi-level checkpointing. The preventive checkpointing
save the state of the application in each node’s memory, providing fast check-
point, which is necessary in order to act quickly between the failure predic-
tion and the moment of the failure. Our method improves the performance
of classical fault tolerance techniques when dealing with failures in petascale
systems and the results show the potential of using such an approach on
future exascale systems.
1.2 Focus areas
In order to address the challenges presented in the previous subsection, in
this thesis we address the following research questions:
• Characterizing the behaviour of HPC systems in failure free situations
3
Figure 1.1: Failure Fault propagation
and how different types of failures affect this behaviour.
• Developing efficient methods for online analysis of the data generated
by HPC systems for descriptive and predictive purposes.
• Developing forecasting methods that take into consideration the topol-
ogy of HPC systems for predicting the locations along which a failure
propagates.
• Characterizing failure precursors and their correlation with different
levels of failures.
• Translating the failure prediction at the application level by correlating
system and application events and metrics with application failures and
performance degradation.
• Developing hybrid methods of preventive and proactive fault tolerance
methods dependent of the type of failures affecting the applications.
This thesis introduces a new layer between the system and the fault tol-
erance protocols running beneath the applications. Figure 1.2 on page 5
presents an overview of our contribution. The layer we introduce is able to
characterize the failures affecting the system and crashing applications. By
monitoring the state of the system at all times, our modules are able to find
patterns that lead to failures and to trigger alerts whenever the patterns are
seen in real time. These alerts act as input to fault tolerance protocols that
can then save the application’s state or migrate the application before the
failure actually affects it.
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Figure 1.2: Overview of the research statement
1.3 Outline of the thesis
This section presents an overview of the thesis by presenting a summary of
the contents for each chapter of the thesis. This thesis is structured in 6
additional chapters.
Chapter 2 introduces the context of the thesis, presents the state-of-
the-art in event analysis and prediction methods, as well as in current fault
avoidance theoretical techniques for todays large scale applications.
Chapter 3 presents a thorough analysis of several HPC systems current
and past and introduces a characterization of the behavior of each. In this
chapter we investigate the statistical properties of events and failures and
their propagation behavior and we highlight the underlining differences and
similarities between different HPC systems. Based on this information we
propose new methods based on signal analysis concepts that automatically
extract from log files the behavior of each event and create a universal global
view of the system.
Chapter 4 focuses on proposing an accurate failure prediction method-
ology that includes the time and location of future failures. By combining
signal analysis with data mining we were able to find patterns between events
described in the log files and failures. We investigate the influence of different
parameters on the overall prediction results and we highlight the best pos-
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sible combination. Secondly, we investigate the feasibility of online failure
prediction methods on a petascale machine. We are looking at a completely
online approach based on the hybrid method for the Blue Waters system.
This chapter also presents a location propagation methodology that uses net-
work topology information. Finally, we show the differences between larger
and smaller HPC systems that influence the prediction results and highlight
possible future research directions.
Chapter 5 presents an implementation of a hybrid fault tolerance proto-
col that combines failure prediction with a multi-level checkpointing strategy.
We show the overhead of such an approach and study the system utilization
achieved for several HPC applications. This chapter also studies the bene-
fit of our hybrid implementation on current and future exascale system by
proposing several theoretical mathematical models.
Chapter 6 discusses on-going research related to application level failure
prediction and specific predictors. We analyze the statistical characteristics
of application crashes as well as the effect different failure types have on
applications. We then focus on filesystem failures and the way they propagate
to the applications. We show preliminary results for a new predictor focused
on performance and environmental metrics used to extract patterns related
to filesystem failures.
Chapter 7 is the last chapter of the thesis, it presents the conclusions
of this work and includes a list of thesis contributions. The chapter also
presents future research directions.
1.4 Definition of terms
The absence of consistent definitions and metrics for supercomputer reliabil-
ity, availability and serviceability has been a problem for the community in
the past [13]. In order to avoid this problem, the workshop organized by the
Institute for Computing Sciences on August 2012 proposed a taxonomy of
terms to be used as standard. The definitions that were proposed were based
almost entirely on [14].
We will enumerate the most important ones in this section. For a complete
list of metrics and definitions, consult the workshop’s report [15] or the initial
paper of A. Avizienis at al [14].
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Figure 1.3 shows the propagation chain from faults to failures in a system.
A fault represents the cause of an error, like a stuck bit or alpha particles. An
error is the part of total state that might lead to a failure and the failure is
a transition to incorrect function. Faults can be active or inactive, meaning
actually causing errors or not. In general, a fault is local to one component
while errors and failures may propagate from one component to another. In
case of failures this propagation is called cascading failures. The distinction
between hard and soft faults is not a strict one. Faults may be due to
complex combination of internal state and external conditions that occur
rarely and are difficult to reproduce. Memory errors can be classified into
soft errors, which randomly corrupt bits but do not leave physical damage;
and hard errors, which corrupt bits in a repeatable manner because of a
physical defect.
Figure 1.3: Error propagation and cascading failures
Error identification identifies the presence of an error but does not nec-
essarily identify which part of the system state is incorrect, and what fault
caused this error. By definition, every fault causes an error. Almost always,
the fault is detected by detecting the error the fault caused. Therefore, fault
detection or error detection refer often to the same thing. Latent or silent
errors are errors that are not detected.
There are several means of dealing with faults: 1) Forecast is used to
estimate the future number, future incidence and likely consequinces of faults;
2) Prevention is used to prevent fault occurences; 3) Removal is used to
reduce the fault number and severity; 4) Tolerance is used to avoid failures
in the presence of faults.
Time to Failure (TTF) is the interval between the end of last failure and
the beginning of next failure. Time between Failures (TBF) is the interval
between the beginnings of two consecutive failures. Time to Repair (TTR)
is synonymous with Unscheduled Downtime and it represents an unplanned
service outage or an incorrect service. In current supercomputers, several
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repairs can be done without any downtime for the system. Scheduled Down-
time represents a planned service shutdown during which system upgrades
and configuration changes are taking place. Production uptime is character-
ized by a correct operation service. Formally:
MTBF (Mean time between failures) = TotalT ime
NumFailures
MTTF (Mean time to failure) = Uptime
NumFailures
MTTR (Mean time to repair) = UnscheduledDowntime
NumFailures
We use two metrics for measuring the results of a predictor, namely preci-
sion and recall. Precision is seen as a measure of fidelity and represents the
proportion of correctly predicted failures to the total number of predictions
made. Recall is the ratio of corrected predictions to all the existing failures
in the system and represents a measure of completeness. The lead time rep-
resents the time between when a prediction is triggered and when the failure
occurs. The lead time can be used by fault avoidance techniques to take a
proactive action before the failure manifests in the system.
The components (such as memory, CPU, disk, and the network) of such
systems arguably have different failure dynamics in terms of time and space.
Some components may fail randomly and frequently while others may fail in a
correlated fashion though rarely. Most modern supercomputers concurrently
use multiple heterogeneous types of networks, storage and processors (such
as GPUs, general purpose processors, and FPGAs). This potentially makes
the failure dynamics even more diverse.
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Chapter 2
State of the art on fault tolerance for HPC
systems
Understanding the failure behavior of large scale parallel systems is crucial
for achieving high utilization of large systems. The process requires continual
online monitoring and analysis of all events generated in the system including
normal notifications, performance metrics and failures over extended periods
of time.
The data obtained from such analysis can be useful in several ways. The
failure data can be used by hardware and system software designers during
early stages of machine deployment in order to correct product defects. It
can help system administrators for maintenance, diagnosis, and enhancing
the overall system health (uptime). They can isolate where problems occur,
and take appropriate remedial actions (replace the node-card, replace the
disks/switches, reboot a node, select points for software rejuvenation, sched-
ule down-times, etc.). Finally, it can be useful in predicting failures in these
systems so that different algorithms could take preventive measures.
There is a significant number of research papers and tools in the area of
event analysis in HPC systems that are used for many reasons, from system
characterization to failure prediction or root cause analysis. This chapter
discusses the challenges of event analysis in large scale systems and presents
an overview of solutions proposed in the course of the last several years, while
discussing their advantages and shortcomings.
2.1 Observations
The design of extreme-scale platforms that are expected to become avail-
able in 2022 will represent a convergence of technological trends and the
boundary conditions imposed by over half a century of algorithm and ap-
plication software development. The precise details of these new designs
9
are not yet known. However, there are numerous papers that look at the
configurations and properties of existing systems and make predictions re-
garding the future of HPC systems. Others present statistical information
about failures and events by analyzing generated log files and gathered per-
formance/environmental metrics.
There are several exascale/petascale reports that focus on resiliency and
programming models for future exascale systems. The DARPA white paper
on system resilience at extreme scale from 2008 [16] points out that current
high end systems waste in average 20% of its computing capacity on failure
and recovery. The paper outlines possible research in order to bring this
number down to 2%. The DOD/DOE report issued from 2009 [17] identifies
resilience as a major emerging issue for HPC. It proposes research in five
thrust areas: theoretical foundations, enabling infrastructure, fault predic-
tion and detection, monitoring and control and end-to-end data integrity.
The paper published in the International Journal of High Performance Com-
puting Applications in 2009 [18] describes the challenges resiliency faces in
the exascale era and possible directions in order to address these needs. The
DOD/DOE report [2] issued in 2012 identifies six high priorities: fault char-
acterization, detection, fault-tolerant algorithms, fault-tolerant programming
models, fault tolerant system services and tools. The DOE workshop from
2012 [3] describes the required HPC resilience for critical DOE mission needs
and details what HPC resilience research is already being done at the DOE
national labs and what is expected to be done by industry and other groups.
Also, the workshop focused on determining what fault management research
is a priority for DOE’s Office of Science and NNSA over the next five years.
The exascale report from March 2013 [15] gathered the main points discussed
at the workshop organized by the Institute for Computing Sciences on August
2012. The report analyzes the state of resiliency for HPC and proposes three
design approaches: 1) business as usual where the global checkpoint/restart
is used; 2) system-level resilience where vendors do not provide sufficiently
low SDC rates at an acceptable acquisition and operation cost and a combi-
nation of hardware and software technologies is needed to hide the increased
failure rates from the application; 3) application-level resilience for which
there is an assumption that application codes will need to be modified in or-
der to handle the increased failure rate. The paper makes recommendations
for each alternative in order for them to become solutions for future systems.
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The International exascale Software Project (IESP) Workshop [19], held in
Kobe, Japan on the 12th-13th of April 2012 discusses what will be the major
obstacles that the climate community will face at exascale and proposes
and evaluates possible ways to overcome these obstacles. The focus of the
workshop is on node-level performance, scalability and resilience.
Continuous availability of HPC systems has become a primary concern
with the continuing increase of system size. Understanding the behavior of
failures in current systems is increasingly important in order to design more
reliable systems. To this extent, failure data analysis of current HPC systems
can serve three purposes. First, it can highlight dependability bottlenecks
and might serve as a guideline for designing more reliable systems in the
future. Second, real data can be used to drive numerical evaluation of per-
formance models and simulations, which are an essential part of reliability
engineering. Third, these models can be used to predict resource availabil-
ity, which is useful for characterization and scheduling. The knowledge of
resources reliability can reduce performance loss due to unexpected failures,
and QOS (Quality of Service) either by Reliability-aware Scheduling, where
a system schedules jobs with different sizes on nodes based on the node’s
reliability or by Reliability-aware Checkpointing, where the optimal check-
pointing interval can be computed based on the reliability of a set of nodes.
There are several papers that study the statistics of reliability/failure data,
including the root cause of failures, the mean time between failures, and the
mean time to repair. Work on characterizing failures in computer systems
differs in the type of data used; the type and number of systems under study;
the time of data collection; the system’s maturity (time since installation);
and the number of failure or error records in the data set. Most of these
statistics are based on reliability, availability and serviceability (RAS) data
mainly provided by major HPC laboratories in the USA: Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory(LANL), National Energy Research Scientific Computing
Center (NERSC), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL), Laurence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and
National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA).
Most studies divide failures into two categories: software and hardware,
each having different sub-categories. Reliability monitoring and analysis con-
siders failures that affect a single node; failures affecting a group of nodes;
failures that may affect applications or important services; and operator er-
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Hardware failures Software failures
Failures that affect group of nodes
Interconnect; Power Supply Scheduler; FS; Cluster Management
Software
Individual node failure
Processor; Memory; Mother Board;
Disk
OS; Client Daemon
Table 2.1: Failure categories used in the HPC field
rors. Table 2.1 presents examples of what is used in literature.
Table 2.2 presents a summary of the papers presenting failure statistics
for different machines. Depending on the study and on the analyzed system,
the table shows a wide range of results. There is not a consistent main root
cause of failures among all systems, nor a consistent MTBF or MTTR.
Some of the studies give additional information to what is presented in the
table. Schroeder et. al. [24], demonstrates that the number of failures per
processor in different systems is rather stable over the course of time interval
between 1996 to 2004. They also find that average failure rates differ wildly
across systems, ranging from 20-1000 failures per year, mainly because of
their size. The normalized failure rates show significantly less variability, in
particular across systems with the same hardware type.
In a paper from 2011, Zheng et. al. [25] analyze the Blue Gene/P at
Argonne National Laboratory and by using both RAS and job logs, they
filter out failures that do not affect any jobs. By characterizing only the
failures that lead to application interruptions they make a couple of inter-
esting observations which might influence the fault tolerance protocol used
by different applications. For example they observe the probability of job
interruption is high if there exist historical records of application-related in-
terruptions. Moreover, most application errors tend to be reported in the
first hour. Therefore it is inadvisable to introduce checkpointing early in
the execution period if the job has historical records of application-related
interruptions. The failures remaining after filtering follow a Weibull distri-
bution as do all failures analyzed together. Although both distributions have
decreasing hazard rates, the value of the distribution’s shape parameter af-
ter the job-related preprocessing is much higher than that for all failures.
The MTBF after job-related filtering is about three times larger than that
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System MTBF Root cause analysis Citation
A cluster of 12 SGI Origin 2000
(1500 CPUs)
A PC cluster (1000 CPUs)
A cluster of 162 Itanium dual
CPUs
MTTI of 1
day, less than
1 hour and
about 6 hours
respectively
Software was at the
origin of most outages
(59-84%)
[20]
2005
22 HPC systems including a
total of 4,759 machines and
24k processors from LANL
during 1995-2005
Around 8h
Over 50% of failures
due to hardware, soft-
ware only around 20%
[21]
2007
Blue Gene/L during 6 months More than 10h -
[22]
2008
Blue Gene/L (131k CPUs)
Red Storm (11k CPUs)
Thunderbird (9k CPUs)
Spirit (1k CPUs)
Liberty (512 CPUs)
-
Software caused 64%
of failures, while hard-
ware only 18%
[23]
2007
22 different systems at LANL,
mostly large clusters of SMP
and NUMA nodes, over a pe-
riod of 10 years
-
Hardware is the main
cause of failures (from
30% to more than
60%). Software is the
second largest contrib-
utor, with 5% to 24%
[24]
2007
Blue Gene/P
Job level
MTBF is three
times larger
than that
system level
MTBF
- [25]
2011
Blue Gene/L, Blue Gene/P,
SciNet, Google
-
Over a third DRAM
errors are hard errors,
most commonly in the
form of repeating er-
rors on the same phys-
ical address
[26]
2012
Platium, Titan 6h
Software represent the
cause of most failures
with 84% for Platium
and 60% for Titan
[27]
2013
Table 2.2: Different studies and their results on failure characterization
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without job related filtering.
Tsai et. al. [28] present a study that uses data collected from a population
of over 50,000 customer deployed disk drives to examine the relationship
between soft errors and failures, in particular failures manifested as hard
errors. They observe soft errors alone cannot be used as a reliable predictor
for all hard errors. However, in those cases where soft errors do accurately
predict hard errors, sufficient warning time exists for preventive actions.
In [26], Hwang et. al. analyze data on DRAM errors collected on a diverse
range of production systems in total covering nearly 300 terabyte-years of
main memory. The authors provide a detailed analytical study of DRAM
error characteristics, including both hard and soft errors and show that a
large fraction of DRAM errors in the field can be attributed to hard errors.
The paper also provides a detailed analytical study of their characteristics
and proposes future directions to increase the reliability of systems.
After observing that each node may have a different failure distribution, the
study from [1] uses the failure trace obtained from prominent HPC platform
to study and compare how well they are distributed by different distributions,
such as Exponential, Weibull and Lognormal. Their results indicate that
Weibull distribution results in a better reliability model and that if node
failures possess a degree of dependency, the system becomes less reliable.
Recently, systems have started to have heterogeneous nodes, which may
have different failure rates. The study from 2013 [1] has shown that even
homogeneous nodes present different rates. Figure 2.1, taken from this paper,
shows an average MTTF per node of 7,514 hrs with a variance of 23,110 hours
depending on the node ID that is analyzed. Thus, failure rate and reliability
varies with location.
Most studies that analyze distribution fitting show that the Weibull dis-
tribution to be a good fit [24, 23, 29, 30]. In [24] the authors takes into
considerations two types of view: the first as seen by an individual node
in which they study the time between failures that affect only this particu-
lar node and the second as seen by the whole system in which they study
the time between subsequent failures that affect any node in the system.
They found that failures that affect the whole system best fit the Weibull
(with a hazard rate function decreasing, having the Weibull shape parameter
of 0.78) and gamma distributions, while the lognormal and exponential fits
are significantly worse. Individual node failures are best fit by the lognormal
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Figure 2.1: MTTFs of identical nodes over 4 year time. Image from [1]
distribution, followed by the Weibull and the gamma distribution. Two stud-
ies [21, 31] report correlations between workload and failure rate where [21]
reports a correlation between the workload intensity and the failure rate.
In our work published at SC 2011 [32] we show that the failure distribution
changes depending on the failure type under study. We present some of these
results in the following chapter.
Three of the studies analyze the mean time to repair [22, 24, 21]. In [24]
the authors discovered that the lognormal distribution is the best fit, both
visually as well as measured by the negative log-likelihood. The Weibull
distribution and the gamma distribution are weaker fits than the lognormal
distribution, but still considerably better than the exponential distribution.
As expected the exponential distribution is a very poor fit given the high
variability in the repair times. Both [24, 21] conclude that hardware type
has a major effect on repair times. While systems of the same hardware
type exhibit similar mean and median time to repair, repair times vary sig-
nificantly across systems of different type. Unfortunately the study reports
that repair times has different values for different types of system without
characterizing this difference. In [33] , the authors analyze the Blue Waters
system and show that failures with software root causes were responsible for
53% of the total node repair hours, although they constituted only 20% of
the total number of failures. Hardware root causes, however, despite causing
42% of all failures, resulted in only 23% of the total repair time.
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2.2 Failure detection methods
There are several general methods used in the literature in order to detect fail-
ures, from modeling the hardware system and finding outliers in this model,
to implementing fault detection at the application and programming model
levels. We will briefly present a few examples from each method.
One method used extensively in the past was to measure the system be-
havior and compare it to the expected normal behavior. An event is cate-
gorized as a failure in case of a significant deviation. Most examples from
this category use performance metrics [8, 34]. Zheng et. al. [8] record system
performance metrics every interval from various components in the system,
and then aggregate all system information into a single large matrix. By
normalizing and performing principal component analysis (PCA) they are
able to determine anomalies.
Another similar methodology models the components and their interac-
tions and then monitor the model. Most examples are using pattern recog-
nition [35, 36] algorithms to model the system. Others include context free
grammars [37] and mathematical equations [38]. Yamanishi et. al. [36] fo-
cuses on network failure symptom detection and event correlation discovery
by modeling the system with a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Chen et.
al. [37] uses the runtime paths that requests follow as they move through
the system as their core abstraction based on which they characterize com-
ponent interactions. Automated statistical analysis of multiple paths allows
to detect and put a diagnosis on complex failures. In [38] the authors apply
deterministic function approximation techniques to characterize the func-
tional relationships between the target function and some work metrics as
input data. The focus is to develop deterministic models for approximating
the leading indicators of aging and an automated procedure for statistical
testing of their correctness. They automated modeling can be applied in
server-type applications whose performance degrades depending on the work
done since last rejuvenation, for example the number of served requests.
In [39], the authors present an online failure detection method for clouds
by using metric distributions rather than individual metric thresholds. The
study uses entropy as a measurement that captures the degree of dispersal or
concentration of such distributions, aggregating raw metric data across the
cloud stack to form entropy time series. Their algorithm has three phases:
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metric collection, entropy time series construction and entropy time series
processing: spike detection, signal processing or subspace method in order
to find anomalous patterns which are indications of anomalies in monitored
systems.
A current approach for detecting node failure is to use heartbeats as a way
of constantly monitoring a system. There are hardware health monitoring
methods (e.g., IPMI an open standard hardware management specification
that defines a set of common interfaces to hardware and firmware). For
example, some network failures partition the file system into two or more
groups of nodes that can only see the nodes in their group. These types
of failures can be easily detected through a hardware heartbeat protocol.
Software health monitoring systems [40] are also implemented on several
large-scale systems by using timeouts to detect node problems.
Rani et. al. [40] propose a fault tolerant approach that provides the abil-
ity to detect and self-recover parallel runtime environment in cases of com-
pute node failure. Their solution consists of a lightweight heartbeat protocol
(BHB) that addresses the scalability issues in system monitoring and fail-
ure detection. Their focus are common fault tolerance issues in large scale
systems, especially due to permanent component failure. Varma et. al. [41]
develops a scalable approach to reconfigure the communication infrastructure
after node failures. Their solution is a decentralized (peer-to-peer) protocol
that maintains a consistent view of active nodes in the presence of faults.
The failure detection method is based on a time out mechanism.
Application level failure detection is in general used for large servers or
for large web application. For example, in [42], the authors present an
application-generic framework for using statistical learning techniques to de-
tect and localize likely application-level failures in component-based Internet
services. In the HPC field, Hoefler et. al. [43] proposes a study of generic
fault detection capabilities at the MPI level. The authors implement multiple
detectors at various layers of the software stack: at the MPI communication
layer and a separate one as stand-alone processes across nodes.
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2.3 Prediction methods
Over the years, approaches on failure prediction have been developed in
relation to reliability theory and preventive maintenance [44, 45, 24]. Models
evolved by trying to incorporate several factors into the distribution, for
example the manufacturing process [46] or code complexity [47]. However,
all these methods are tailored to long-term predictions and do not work
appropriately for online failure prediction.
More recent methods for short-term failure prediction are typically based
on runtime monitoring as they take into account a current state of the system.
There are two levels of online failure prediction in literature: component level
and system level failure prediction. The first level assumes methods that ob-
serve components (hard drive, mother board, DRAM, etc) with their specific
parameters and domain knowledge and define different approaches that give
best prediction results for each [26]. One example of this type of approach
is to compare the execution of good components with failed ones. A couple
of studies from different fields that fit in this category are [7, 48]. For the
HPC community, one example is [8] in which matrices are used to record
system performance metrics at every interval. The algorithm afterwards de-
tects outliers by identifying the nodes that are far away from the majority.
Another example is [49], where the authors implement their own data col-
lection module that gathers relevant data across the system and assembles
them into a uniform format. In the second step they apply two feature ex-
traction techniques, principal component analysis (PCA) and independent
component analysis (ICA) to generate matrices with lower dimensionality;
and in the last step the nodes that are far away from the majority are de-
termined and considered potential anomalies. Their data mining algorithm
is specifically designed for HPC systems and the results are different than
previous studies.
The second level is represented by system level failure prediction, in which
monitoring daemons observe different system parameters (system log, sched-
uler logs, performance metrics, etc) and investigate the existence of correla-
tions between different components. In the last couple of years, a significant
number of papers focus on providing predictions by analyzing different HPC
systems. However, most predictors are able to use the information extracted
in the training phase for only short prediction span after which a new train-
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Figure 2.2: Online failure prediction taxonomy
ing phase is required. For example, [50] is using almost 3 months of training
for predicting only half of month of execution. When dealing with real long
time execution of a HPC system, the results of this type of prediction are
unknown and can become unusable for real large-scale applications.
The taxonomy we will be using is presented in Figure 2.2. System level
failure prediction has several categories:
1. Based on Failure Statistics. The basic idea of failure prediction based
on failure statistics is to draw conclusions about upcoming failures from
the occurrence of previous failures. This may include the time of oc-
currence as well as the types of failures that have occurred. The two
sub-categores includes: Probability Distribution Estimation and Co-
Occurrence. Prediction methods belonging to the first category try to
estimate the probability distribution of the time to the next failure
from the previous occurrence of failures. For the second type of failure
predictors uses the fact that system failures can occur close together
either in time or in space (e.g., at proximate nodes in a cluster envi-
ronment). This can be exploited to make an inference about failures
that might come up in the near future.
2. Based on System Models. The motivation for analyzing periodically
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measured system variables such as the amount of free memory or CPU
usage in order to identify an imminent failure is the fact that some types
of errors affect the system even before they are detected. The key no-
tion of failure prediction based on monitoring data is that some errors
can be grasped by their side-effects on the system such as exceptional
memory usage, CPU load, disk I/O, or unusual function calls in the
system. These side-effects are called symptoms. Symptom-based on-
line failure prediction methods frequently address non-failstop failures,
which are usually more difficult to grasp. The following subcategories
are included in this category: function approximation that refers to
mimicking a target value, which is supposed to be the output of an
unknown function of measured system variables as input data (this in-
cludes stochastic models, regression and machine learning); classifiers
where failure prediction is achieved by classifying whether the current
situation is failure-prone or not (this includes for example Bayesian
networks); and time-series analysis where sequences of monitored sys-
tem variables are treated as time series and time-series analysis is used
in order to predict outlier moments in the series.
3. Event Driven Failure Prediction. Failure prediction approaches that use
error reports as input data have to deal with event-driven input data.
This is one of the major differences to system model failure prediction
that uses symptom monitoring-based approaches, which in most cases
operate on periodic system observations. Furthermore, symptoms are
in most cases real-valued while error events mostly are discrete, cate-
gorical data such as event IDs, component IDs, log messages, etc.
2.3.1 Prediction based on failure statistics
In order to estimate the probability distribution of the time to the next
failure, non-parametric methods as well as Bayesian predictors have been
applied. In [51], the authors investigate reliability prediction by analyzing a
decade of field data made available by Los Alamos National Lab. They focus
on investigating the impact of factors, such as the power quality, temperature,
fan and chiller reliability, system usage and utilization, and external factors,
such as cosmic radiation, on system reliability. They observed that some
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types of failures increase the likelihood of follow-up failures more than others
and that this information can be used for creating effective failure prediction
models based on root cause distribution.
Bayesian failure prediction has the goal of estimating the probability distri-
bution of the next time of failure by benefiting from the knowledge obtained
from previous failure occurrences in a Bayesian framework [52, 53]. In [53],
the authors use a mixture model of naive Bayes clusters trained by the using
expectation-maximization algorithm in order to predict disk failures.
Another paper [54] uses Bayesian statistics to develop an anomaly detec-
tion/prediction system that employed naive Bayesian networks to perform
intrusion detection on traffic bursts. Their model has the capability to po-
tentially detect distributed attacks in which each individual attack session is
not suspicious enough to generate an alert.
Due to sharing of resources, system failures can occur close together either
in time or in space (at a closely coupled set of components or computers).
It has been observed several times that failures occur in clusters in a tem-
poral as well as in a spatial sense. Liang et. al. [55] choose such an approach
to predict failures of IBMs BlueGene/L from event logs containing reliabil-
ity, availability and serviceability data. The key to their approach is data
preprocessing employing first a categorization and then temporal and spatial
compression. Temporal compression combines all events at a single location
occurring with inter-event times lower than some threshold, and spatial com-
pression combines all messages that refer to the different locations within a
certain time window. Prediction methods are rather straight-forward: Using
data from temporal compression, if a failure of type application I/O or net-
work appears, it is very likely that a next failure will follow shortly. If spatial
compression suggests that some components have reported more events than
others, it is very likely that additional failures will occur at that location.
Fu and Xu [56] further elaborate on temporal and spatial compression and
introduce a measure of temporal and spatial correlation of failure events in
distributed systems.
Another example of current fault predictor that is using a co-occurrence
method is [57] where the authors compare two failure prediction approaches
and study the influence that the observation window has on the results.
In [9], the authors use a meta-learning predictor to chose between a rule-
based method and a statistical method depending on which one gives better
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predictions for a corresponding state of the system. Another approach for
analyzing the logs is given in [58], where the authors investigate both usage
and failure logs.
A different approach is given in [59] and [60], where the authors investi-
gate parameter co-occurrences between different application log messages for
extracting dependencies among system components. The authors mine de-
pendencies from the tuple-form representations of the log messages looking
for patterns that could indicate a failure in the system that prevented tasks
from completing.
2.3.2 Prediction based on system models
One frequently used method is represented by regression techniques where
parameters of a function are adapted such that the curve best fits the mea-
surement data, e.g., by minimizing mean square error. The simplest form of
regression is curve fitting of a linear function.
In [38], the authors apply deterministic function approximation techniques
such as splines to characterize the functional relationships between the target
function and input data. Deterministic modeling offers a simple and concise
description of system behavior with few parameters.
Pattern recognition techniques operate on sequences of error events trying
to identify patterns that indicate a failure-prone system state. The most
used method for pattern recognition is by far Markov chain models. The
approach is based on the assumption that failure-prone system behavior can
be identified by characteristic patterns of errors.
In [61] the authors propose to use hidden semi-Markov models (HSMM)
in order to add one additional level of flexibility to the theoretical method
proposed in [35]. Two HSMMs are trained from previously recorded log data:
One for failure and one for non-failure sequences. Online failure prediction is
then accomplished by computing likelihood of the observed error sequence for
both models and by applying Bayes decision theory to classify the sequence
(and hence the current system status) as failure-prone or not.
The second step implemented by [62] uses two semi-Markov models that
quantify the reliability of a node in the overall system. In the process the
method identifies nodes that tend to be the source of a large number of
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failures and predicts the reliability of these nodes. The first discrete-time
semi-Markov model is built for each system where state transitions are driven
by functions derived from the distributions fitted to the result of the neural-
gas filtering analysis. The second semi-Markov process computes transaction
probabilities and event arrival rates directly from event observations.
[56] built a neural network to approximate the number of failures in a given
time interval. The set of input variables consists of a temporal and spatial
failure correlation factor together with variables, such as CPU utilization or
the number of packets transmitted by a computing node.
Murray et. al. [63] have applied the Support Vector Machines (SVM)
method in order to predict failures of hard disk drives. In the case of hard disk
failure prediction, five successive samples of each selected SMART attribute
set up the input data vector.
Several time series models are employed to model stationary as well as
non-stationary effects. One example in this category is Sahoo et. al. [9]
where the authors applied various time series models to data of a 350-node
cluster system to predict parameters like percentage of system utilization,
idle time and network IO.
2.3.3 Event driven prediction
Failure prediction methods in this category analyze the events generated by
the system and derive a set of rules/patterns/correlations between different
events. In general, the rules express temporal ordering of events in the form
”if errors A and B occur within x seconds, then error C occurs within y
seconds with probability of P%”. Several parameters such as the maximum
length of the data window, types of error messages, and ordering requirements
had to be per-specified.
The event-set method has been applied in [57], by using a three-phase fail-
ure predictor for the Blue Gene/L systems: event preprocessing where the
raw RAS log is cleaned and categorized; the base prediction phase where dif-
ferent base learning methods are applied on the preprocessed log to identify
fault patterns and correlations; and the meta-learning phase where meta-
learning is explored to adaptively integrate multiple base predictors to boost
prediction accuracy. Similarly, [9] uses a filtering system close to [57] in that
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it uses a fixed time window for event grouping. The method consists of 2
steps: a preprocessing step that converts syslogs into a data set that is ap-
propriate for running classification techniques by extracting a set of features.
These features can accurately capture the characteristics of failures. In the
next step it applies different classifiers on the data (a rule-based classifier,
Support Vector Machines and a customized Nearest Neighbor method).
In [31] the authors propose to cluster failure events based on their cor-
relations using an in-depth understanding of the cause of failures and their
empirical and statistical properties. The authors use a failure signature that
captures the system performance metrics associated with a failure event.
The papers presented in this category have one major characteristic in
common: they all cluster the events in classes through different methods by
incorporating a training phase. Most of the papers use a predefined number of
classes; usually that number is defined by the system administrator. Since log
files can change during the course of a system’s lifetime and novel errors may
appear, the number of classes may need to change in time. In [62] the authors
propose a more realistic clustering method that groups events automatically.
After the clustering phase, many papers use different filtering techniques. All
the presented methods obtain good result for their own validation set.
Extensive research has been focused on using system logs, scheduling logs,
performance metrics or disk usage logs in order to extract a correlation be-
tween events generated by any component of a system. There are numerous
methods, starting with simple brute force extraction of rules between non-
fatal events and failures [6] with more sophisticated techniques. In [9], the
authors are using a meta-learning predictor to chose between a rule-based
method and a statistical method depending on which one gives better pre-
dictions for a corresponding state of the system. Other research include
SVM [10], hidden-Markov chains [11] or Bayesian networks [12]. A slightly
different approach is given in [59] where the authors investigate parameter
correspondence between different application log messages for extracting de-
pendencies among components.
In general, current state-of-the-art research is using some kind of data
mining algorithms extracting patterns that might lead to failures [57, 50, 9,
58, 55]. Most of these algorithms are using the same workflow: they group the
messages in the log file into categories, filter redundant events both in time
and space, extract correlations between events based on the small filtered set
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System Method Precision Recall Lead time
(s)
Ref
BGL Rule-based 0.7 0.3-0.4 5 min [55]
BGL Statistical 0.5 0.48 - [9]
BGL Multiple 0.9 0.7 - [9]
BGP
Rule-based
different
lead time
0.4/0.4/0.35 0.8/0.7/0.6 0/300/600 [50]
BGP Rule-based 0.5 0.5 30 min [57]
Table 2.3: Prediction results for different state-of-the-art related work
of log messages and in the end use the correlations to predict future events or
failures. Each workflow step introduces imprecision or noise that influences
the accuracy of the prediction.
Table 2.3 presents the prediction results for the most successful studies
in literature up to date. At a first glance, the results presented in this ta-
ble seem good enough to be used for the construction of failure avoidance
techniques. However, these results are obtained either by using long train-
ing phases for only a couple of days of prediction, or not considering the
lead time between when the prediction is done and when the failure occurs.
Considering some preventive actions could take several minutes, the execu-
tion time of acting upon a prediction could sometimes exceed the lead time
provided. Moreover, all the presented methods do not provide any location
information. This makes it impossible for proactive methods to know which
application processes should be migrated. Predictions with location informa-
tion will enable checkpointing data only on those failure-prone components,
thereby avoiding application-wide checkpointing which is significantly time
consuming.
2.4 Checkpointing challenges
Most predictive methods offer small lead time windows for proactive actions
to be taken. To be compatible with short term prediction, checkpointing has
to be significantly improved. One promising direction is multi-level check-
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pointing. There are currently two environments providing multi-level Check-
point/Restart: SCR (Scalable Checkpoint/Restart) [64] and FTI (Fault Tol-
erance Interface) [65]. Recent results show that a process context of 1GB can
be saved in 2-3 seconds in local SSD (i.e. 2 SSD mounted in RAID0). Such
checkpoint speed is orders of magnitude faster than checkpointing on a re-
mote file system which requires tens of minutes in current petascale systems
and may require several hours in projected exascale systems. An experiment
with FTI on a large scale execution (1/2 million GPU cores) of an earthquake
simulation on a hybrid system composed of CPU and GPUs demonstrated
very low overhead on the execution time (i.e. less than 10%) when using
such checkpoint strategy, compared to no fault tolerance. Other research re-
sults demonstrate that checkpointing on remote node memory is even faster
than on local HDD or SSD [66]. These results demonstrate that proactive
checkpoints can be taken even with a few seconds before the predicted failure
happens. However, proactive checkpointing introduces a whole new dimen-
sion with several challenges:
• To decrease the checkpoint size and maximize efficiency many appli-
cations rely on user-guided checkpointing, in which domain experts
specify points in the code where to checkpoint, so that the amount of
data that need to be saved is minimal. However, upon a failure pre-
diction, the checkpoint is triggered by the prediction runtime and the
application may be in the middle of a complex kernel execution that
requires a high memory footprint. Thus, how to combine user-guided
checkpointing with proactive checkpointing?
• Furthermore, it is important to remember that the application still
needs to restart after the failure and produce correct results. This is
the classic checkpointing coordination problem that may imply the use
of a fault tolerant protocol. In application level checkpointing, the co-
ordination is implicit, while in system level checkpointing capturing the
state of the execution is explicit and relies on a fault tolerant protocols.
If the approach relies on coordinated checkpointing or on hierarchical
fault tolerant protocols [67], the coordination (global or partial) should
be fast enough to store the state of the application before the failure
occurs.
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Any proactive checkpointing implementation that does not provide high
performance solutions for of these two problems will not work efficiently for
large HPC systems. In chapter 6 we will present the solutions we propose
and how we implement them in order to create a runtime framework that
efficiently couples online failure prediction, ultra-fast proactive checkpoint-
ing and periodic multi-level checkpointing. As far as we know, this is the
first implementation of such a hybrid protocol to date. On the other hand,
there are several theoretical studies that propose to combine classic periodic
checkpointing with proactive fault tolerance actions in order to study the
theoretical benefit of such approaches.
One such example is presented in Aupy et. al. [68], where the authors
propose a fault tolerance strategy that uses the prediction alerts to compute
an optimal checkpointing interval. In their follow-up work [69], the authors
assume that the fault-prediction systems that do not provide exact prediction
dates, but instead time intervals during which faults are predicted to strike,
with different probabilities at each moment of time.
Li et. al. [70] consider a different prediction model that provides a prob-
ability of failure when the application ask for a prediction. Moreover, They
consider a specific application model where proactive checkpoints or migra-
tion can be performed at a predefined location during the execution.
Cappello et. al. [71] proposed two proactive fault tolerance strategies, both
relying on a perfect prediction mechanism. The perfect prediction mechanism
is supposed to have a 100% recall, 100% precision and enough lead time to
perform either checkpointing or migration. Even though the scenario is not
realistic since there is no prediction method that can offer these results, it
shows the trade-off of combining prediction either with checkpointing or with
migration.
In chapter 6, we will use the model in [72], as well as create our own based
on [71] with the actual data from our hybrid protocol implementation in
order to study the benefit of our approach.
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Chapter 3
HPC systems description
The main focus of our analysis are logs generated by previous and current
large scale systems. In chapter 7 we also incorporate performance metrics
into our analysis. We analyzed several HPC systems: Mercury, a previous-
generation cluster at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications
(NCSA) [73], several systems from the Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) [24], a Blue Gene/L machine [74], the Blue Gene/P system [50]
deployed at the Argonne National Laboratory and Blue Waters [75], cur-
rently the biggest supercomputer at NCSA. Mercury and Blue Waters logs
are owned by the NCSA and are not available to the public because of pri-
vacy issues. The LANL and Blue Gene traces are open and are downloaded
from the USENIX Computer Failure Data Repository [76]. Details regard-
ing the system’s characteristics are shown in Table 3.1. Additionally, details
about the sources that generate notifications for the Blue Water system can
be found in Table 3.2.
Log messages generated by all systems contain two separate parts, a mes-
sage header and body. The header contains information on the component in
the system that generated the notification, the timestamp and the affected
location in the system. Different systems have different header information.
For example, Blue Gene systems contain a severity field that is not present
in the any of the Cray systems. We manually created an entry pattern for
System Events/Day Total Event Types
Blue Waters 15GB (88mil events) 10,499
BlueGene/L 5.76MB (25,000 events) 186
BlueGene/P 8.12MB (120,000 events) 252
Mercury 152.4MB (1.5mil events) 563
LANL systems 433,490 in 5 years 53
Table 3.1: Log file statistics
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Source Events/Day Total Event Types
Syslog 8GB (50mil events) 3,852
HPSS 1MB (900,000 events) 358
Sonexion 3.5GB (10mil events) 3,112
Moab 500 MB (15mil events) 725
ESMS 3GB (12mil events) 2,452
Table 3.2: Log file statistics for different sources for the Blue Waters system
Resource Phase 1 Phase 2
Production Jan 2004 2Q 2004
Number of Nodes 256 635
Processors 2x Itanium II @ 1.3 GHz 2x Itanium II @ 1.5 GHz
Memory
4 or 12 GB DDR1600
ECC RAM
4GB DDR2100 ECC
RAM
Filesystem GPFS (60TB) GPFS (170TB)
Storage
1x18GB, 1x73 GB Ul-
traSCSI drives
2x73 GB UltraSCSI
drives
Network
Gigabit Ethernet, Myrinet, Management Net-
work (Ethernet)
Table 3.3: Characteristics of the Mercury System
each system stating the type of data and where in the message the body
begins. We modify all the logs for each system into a common format. This
new structure log contains the message timestamp, location, facility for the
header information and the message description in the body.
3.1 Mercury
The Mercury cluster was a production high-performance computing system
at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications used for scientific
applications as part of TeraGrid over a 5-year period, from January 2004 to
March 2010, with roughly 98% uptime over its lifetime. During its operation,
it ran millions of parallel computing jobs for hundreds of researchers in fields
ranging from molecular and fluid dynamics simulation to DNA and gene
expression analysis.
Detailed technical information regarding the cluster is shown in Table 3.3.
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The cluster started with 256 compute nodes, half having large amounts of
memory (12GB). In the second quarter of 2004, an additional 635 compute
nodes were added with faster processors. Over time, system components
were replaced due to failure and nodes repurposed to/from computing or
storage purposes. We tracked between 936 to 1050 nodes actively reporting
log messages over the lifetime of the cluster - this includes compute, login
and storage nodes.
We analyzed logs generated by 10 months of production in the second
Phase of the machine from February 2006 to December 2006. Each compute
node consisted of two Itanium processors running at 1.3 or 1.5 GHz with
4 or 12 GB ECC protected memory. Login and storage nodes had roughly
similar specifications. Storage was a combination of a network file system
and local hard disks serving as mount and scratch devices, as well as a wide-
area file system using AFS. The AFS system was generally not used directly
by applications, so we omit it from our analysis. High speed I/O was han-
dled by a GPFS file system connected by fiber channel. The Mercury system
contained three separate networks - a Gigabit Ethernet network for computa-
tion, a high speed Myrinet network for latency sensitive parallel applications,
and a management network for node maintenance and software updates. By
default there was no checkpointing or fail-over mechanism for applications
running on the cluster. Each application was responsible for managing its
own fault tolerance.
Logs from each node were collected centrally with each log message being
sent as a single packet to avoid truncation. Some events generated multiple
messages which could be interleaved in the logs with messages from other
machines. These logs contain the time of the message, node on which it
occurred and possibly details regarding the application which generated it.
3.2 Systems at LANL
Los Alamos National Laboratory has collected data for 22 of their supercom-
puting clusters, for the duration of 5 years. They publish data from system
logs and also information regarding failures that occurred in the system’s
lifetime. This data has been intensively analyzed in different papers in or-
der to extract data statistics for failure distribution and root cause analysis
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[25, 24].
Most of these systems are large clusters of either NUMA (Non-Uniform
Memory Access) nodes, or 2-way and 4-way SMP (Symmetric Multi Pro-
cessing) nodes. In total all systems together include 4,750 nodes and 24,101
processors. The data provided does not include vendor specific hardware
information. Instead it uses capital letters (A-H) to denote a systems pro-
cessor/memory chip model.
In general, systems vary widely in size, with the number of nodes ranging
from 1 to 1,024 and the number of processors from 4 to 6,152. Different sys-
tems presents different hardware architecture and might not contain identical
nodes. While all nodes in a system have the same hardware type, they might
differ in the number of processors and network interfaces (NICs), the amount
of main memory, and the time they were in production use.
A failure record contains the time when the failure started, the time when it
was resolved, the system and node affected, the type of workload running on
the node and the root cause identified manually by the system administrators.
Most workloads are large-scale long-running 3D scientific simulations, hav-
ing long periods of CPU computation, interrupted every few hours by a few
minutes of I/O for checkpointing and for visualization. A complete descrip-
tion of the system can be found in [24]. The clusters represent the oldest
machines analyzed in this thesis and are used in comparison to the other
systems to understand how HPC machines evolved over time.
3.3 Blue Gene systems
In this thesis, we looked at the fastest deployment of a Blue Gene/L machine
and a Blue Gene/P system.
The Blue Gene/L system located at Lawrence Livermore National Lab-
oratory (LLNL) boasts a peak speed of over 596 teraFLOPS and a total
memory of 69 tebibytes. It is composed of 106,496 dual-processor compute
nodes, produced in 130-nm copper IBM CMOS 8SFG technology. Each node
is very simple, consisting of a single ASIC containing two processors and
nine double-data-rate (DDR) synchronous dynamic random access memory
(SDRAM) chips.
The nodes are interconnected through five networks, the most significant
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being configured as a 32x32x64 3D torus where each node is connected in
six different directions for nearest-neighbor communications. This network
handles the bulk of all communication. There are virtually no asymmetries
in this interconnect; the nodes communicate with neighboring nodes that
are physically close on the same board and with nodes that are physically
far removed on a neighboring rack, with the same bandwidth and nearly the
same latency. This allows for a simple programming model because there
are no edges in a torus configuration. In addition, a global reduction tree
supports fast global operations such as global max/sum, and multiple global
barrier and interrupt networks allow fast task synchronization.
Each node contains two processors, which allows the system to have several
running modes. For example, each processor can handle its own communica-
tion (which called virtual node mode), or one processor can be dedicated to
communication and one to computation (communication co-processor mode).
Out of the total 212,992 PowerPC cores, 67% contain 512 MB RAM and
33% contain 1 GB. The first-level caches (L1) are contained within the
PPC440 core macro. The second-level caches (L2R and L2W) are very small
and basically serve as prefetch and write-back buffers for L1 data. The third-
level cache (L3) is large and is expected to provide high- bandwidth, low-
latency access. It is shared by instructions and data.
All Blue Gene machines present the same architecture design, as shown in
Figure 3.1 for LLNL’s Blue Gene/L and ANL’s Blue Gene/P. In the case of
Blue Gene/L, each node contains 2 chips of 2 processors each, 16 nodes and
up to 2 IO cards create a node card and a rack is composed of 32 node cards.
Blue Gene/L consists of a total of 104 racks.
RAS (Reliability, Availability, and Serviceability) events are logged through
the Central Monitoring and Control System (CMCS), and finally stored in
a DB2 database. The logging granularity is less than 1 millisecond. If an
individual node on the system fails, the primary RAS strategy is to isolate
and replace the failing node while restarting the application from a check-
point on a set of racks that does not contain the faulty node. Specifically,
each 512-node rack is on a separate power boundary, with a separate power
domain for the link chips, enabling it to be powered down without affecting
any other racks. Once powered down, the card containing the faulty node
can be replaced, and the rack can be restarted and brought online for the
job scheduling software. Thus, a node failure can temporarily bring down a
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(a) Blue Gene/L at LLNL
(b) Blue Gene/P at ANL
Figure 3.1: Blue Gene architecture
512-node rack.
More information about the system can be found in [74]. In this thesis,
we analyzed a six month period from the system’s production time, from
June 3rd, 2005 to January 4th, 2006. During this time, there were 4,747,963
messages sent to the log for a total of 207 different event types. The system
at LLNL went into production mode starting with June 2004, so our analysis
is done outside the infant mortality phase.
The Blue Gene/P system that we analyzed, called Intrepid, is a 40-rack
machine (40,960 nodes, 163,840 processor cores) deployed at the Argonne
National Laboratory. The design of the Blue Gene/P represents an evo-
lution from the Blue Gene/L system. Each Blue Gene/P Compute chip
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contains four PowerPC 450 processor cores, running at 850 MHz. The cores
are cache coherent and the chip can operate as a 4-way symmetric multi-
processor (SMP). As for the Blue Gene/L system, the memory subsystem
on the chip consists of small private L2 caches, a central shared 8 MB L3
cache, and dual DDR2 memory controllers. The chip also integrates the logic
for node-to-node communication, using the same network topologies as Blue
Gene/L, but at more than twice the bandwidth.
In the Blue Gene/P case, a compute card contains 4 cores and 32 compute
cards form a node card. A midplane contains 16 node cards, 4 I/O cards
(containing the I/O chips), and 24 midplane switches (through which differ-
ent midplanes connect). Each rack consists of 2 midplanes, and a midplane is
the granularity of job allocation. Intrepid has a total of 40 racks, each with
a total of 1024 node cards. The system utilizes a total of 640 I/O nodes,
contributing 7.6 PB of total disk space.
A compute card contains a Blue Gene/P chip with 2 GB DRAM. A single
compute node has a peak performance of 13.6 GFLOPS. 32 Compute cards
are plugged into an air-cooled node board. By using many small, low-power,
densely packaged chips, Blue Gene/P exceeded the power efficiency of other
supercomputers of its generation, and at 371 MFLOPS/W Blue Gene/P
installations ranked at or near the top of the Green500 lists in 2007-2008.
Blue Gene/P integrates some degree of fault tolerance in the torus network
by ensuring that packets are injected in a manner that forces them to avoid
failed nodes; this requires non-minimal routing and can handle up to three
concurrent failures in a partition provided they are not collinear. A bad node
that still has a viable torus network interface can be left in the network. This
provides a good solution for a system that has a high node-failure rate.
Additional error-detecting mechanisms that allow monitoring and isolat-
ing faults include the power-supply monitor module and additional link cyclic
redundancy checks. A extended approach for fault isolation has been devel-
oped that allows the ability to detect and isolate failed components. More
details about the Blue Gene/P system can be found in [77].
Intrepid was in production mode starting with June 2008 until it was
decommissioned in December 2013. We analyzed nine months of activity,
from Jan 2009 to Sept 2009, for a total of 1.9GB of generated events and 252
event types.
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3.4 Blue Waters
The Blue Waters system is a Cray XE/XK hybrid machine at the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications composed by a combination of XE6
nodes (two AMD Interlagos CPU modules - four processor chips) and XK7
nodes (one AMD Interlagos CPU module and one NVIDIA Kepler K20X
GPU) connected by the Cray Gemini torus interconnect. Divided into 237
Cray XE6 and 44 Cray XK7 cabinets, Blue Waters contains over 25 thou-
sand computing nodes, reaching a peak performance of 13.2 Petaflops and
offering a total system memory of over 1.66 PB. The online storage gives
26.4 PB of total usable storage with an aggregate I/O bandwidth of over 1
TB/s. We used 5 major sources of logs: syslogs that contain usual RAS in-
formation, HPSS (High Performance Storage System) which is the near-line
storage designed for moving large files and large amounts of data, Sonexion
storage system used for storing the Lustre filesystem, Moab job scheduler
and ESMS, the data system manager. Table 3.2 presents these sources and
their characteristics.
Blue Waters high-speed network consists of a Cray Gemini System In-
terconnect. Each blade includes a network mezzanine card that houses 2
network chips, each one attached on the HyperTransport AMD bus shared
by 2 CPUs and powered by 2 mezzanine dual-redundant voltage regulator
modules (VRM). The topology is a three-dimensional (3D) 24x24x24 reen-
trant torus: each node has 6 possible links towards other nodes. Mapping
location ids on the torus of a Cray system follows the algorithm described
in figure 3.2. Every cube in the torus represents a Gemini hub (consecutive
nodes). Two neighbor Gemini hubs on the OY axes create a slot, multi-
ple consecutive slots on the OZ axes form a cage and multiple consecutive
cages on the OZ axes create a cabinet. The cabinets are divided into two
dimensions, first on the YOZ plane and then on the OX. For the Blue Waters
system, there are 2 Gemini hubs in each slot, 8 slots form a cage and 3 cages
create a cabinet. Each cabinet is as wide as the OZ portion of the torus, so
the entire Gemini hub set is divided into 24 cabinets on the OX axes and 12
cabinets on the OY for a total of 288 cabinets.
Every node in the system is checked and managed by the Hardware Su-
pervisor System (HSS). This system contains the HSS network, blade and
cabinet controllers in charge of monitoring the nodes, replying to heartbeat
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Figure 3.2: Cray system 3D torus network
signal requests and collecting data on temperature, voltage, power, network
performance counters, runtime software exceptions. The system also con-
tains a HSS manager in charge of collecting node health data and executing
the management software. Upon detection of a failure, represented in most
cases by a missing heartbeat, the HSS manager triggers failure mitigation op-
erations. These mitigations include: i) warm swap of a compute/GPU blade
to allow the system operator to remove and repair system blades with tem-
porary performance differences of the workload; ii) service node and Lustre
node failover mechanisms; and iii) link degradation and route reconfiguration
to enable routing around failed nodes in the topology.
Compute and GPU nodes execute the lightweight kernel Compute Node
Linux (CNL) developed by Cray. The operating system is reduced to mini-
mize the overhead on the nodes and includes only essential components, such
as a process loader, a Virtual Memory Manager, and a set of Cray ALPS
agents for loading and controlling jobs. Service nodes execute a full-featured
version of Linux, the Cray Linux Environment (CLE), which is based on the
Suse Linux Enterprise Server 11 kernel 3.0.42.
All blades are diskless and use the shared parallel file system for IO op-
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Figure 3.3: Lustre filesystem architecture
erations. Blue Waters hosts the largest Lustre installation to date. The
parallel file system consists of Cray Sonexion 1600 storage modules. Lustre
is designed as a client-server architecture, with many clients communicating
with multiple I/O servers and one or more metadata servers. Figure 3.3
shows the architecture of the filesystem used by the Blue Waters system.
Compute nodes are stored in a 3D torus with IO nodes being distributed
among them. Applications use the closest IO node in order to access the
data on different disks. The communication between the IO nodes and the
disk is done through an Infiniband network. Blue Waters provides three dif-
ferent file systems: (i) /u storage for home directories; (ii) /projects storage
for project home directories; (iii) /scratch high performance, high capacity
transient storage for applications.
All three filesystems on Blue Waters are built using Cray Sonexion 1600
Lustre appliances that provide the basic storage building block for the Blue
Waters I/O architecture and are referred to as a ”Scalable Storage Unit”
(SSU). Each SSU is RAID protected and is capable of providing up to 5.35
GB/s of IO performance and around 120 TB of usable disk space. The
/scratch file system uses 180 SSUs, each SSU containing 4 OSTs (Object
Storage Target), each with 10 RAID disks. Blue Waters is using one MDS
(Meta-Data Server) for each filesystem that is interrogated each time a file
is created, opened or closed.
A Sonexion module has 2 SSD of 2 TB in a RAID 1 configuration for jour-
naling and logging, 22 disks of 2 TB for metadata storage, and 80 disks of 2
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TB for data storage, organized in units of 8 disks in RAID 6. All disks are
connected to two redundant RAID controllers. In each unit, two additional
disks serve as hot spares, which automatically provide failover for a failed
drive. Each Lustre service node and Sonexion module is configured as an
active-passive pair connected to a shared storage device. In this configura-
tion, the passive replica node becomes active when the HSS detects a failure
of a Lustre node; the shared storage device is then mounted in a read-only
mode to avoid data inconsistency until the failed node has been replaced with
the standby replica. After failure recovery, clients reconnect and replay their
requests serially in order to reconstruct the state on the replaced node. Until
a client has received a confirmation that a given transaction has been written
to stable storage, the client holds on to the transaction (waiting on a time-
out), in case it needs to be replayed. If the timeout is reached, all the jobs
waiting to reconnect fail. The recovery process can take up to 5-30 minutes
(60 for MDS), depending on the number of clients using the file system at
the moment of the failure. More information about the system’s architecture
can be found in [78] as well a study about we the impact of this architecture
on application I/O performance. Moreover, [79] presents the experiences
observed during the deployment of Blue Waters, involving several steps of
preparation, delivery, installation, testing and acceptance.
For the Blue Waters system, we had access to the job logs as well as system
and failure logs so we were able to follow the propagation of failures from
the hardware to the application level. There are numerous applications that
are running on Blue Waters. Examples include earthquake engineering for
which simulations want to capture seismic waves in 1Hz range, which is 256
times more computationally demanding than current simulations; cosmology
applications that desire to model the first billion years after the Big Bang;
epidemiology applications that model local and global disease outbreaks;
tornado simulations where forecasters can identify conditions that make a
tornado likely, they can pinpoint when and where they start, their path, and
strength.
Information about failures is kept into a distinct failure log where Cray
system administrators document the approximate timestamp for each failure
and the possible cause. At the same time, system administrators from NCSA
inspect the logs generated by the system and decide which messages represent
failures. We correlated the two sources and only kept entries that appear in
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both. Since the Cray failure files are manually written, we correlated these
failures with events from the logs by using a rather large window of 6 hours,
starting 3 hours before the manually written timestamp occurrence. All
messages from the log that were marked as suspicious in this timeframe were
gathered in a file, after which, together with system administrators from
NCSA, we filter out those that were not referring to the same problem. We
mention that the Cray failure file has been already analyzed and validated
by NCSA staff and their observations were published in [33]. For each failure
entry, a failure type has been identified by using one of the following exclusive
categories: hardware, software, missing heartbeat, network, environment,
and unknown (failures for which the cause could not be determined). We
use these categories when analyzing the results of our prediction. Overall,
we analyzed 7 months of activity since September 2013, to February 2014.
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Chapter 4
Analyzing the system behavior
Event logs are a rich source of information for analyzing the cause of failures
in cluster systems. Together with performance metrics, they represent the
main method used by system managers to understand the behavior of HPC
systems. However, the size of these files has continued to increase with
the ever growing size of supercomputers, making the task of analyzing log
files a hard and error prone process when handled manually. The most
common method used by system managers for searching through the log
data is pattern matching, by comparing numerical thresholds or doing regular
expression matching on vast numbers of log entries looking for each pattern of
interest. By using this method, only those faults that are already previously
known to the domain expert can be detected. Moreover, there is not a
consistent normal behavior of system state data or how different components
react to failures, within the system. For example, once a fault is triggered in
the system, it can generate multiple events, that propagate within the system
and that, consequently, generate multiple notifications in the log [32, 24].
Conversely, some components have the opposite behavior and stop generating
events when a failure occurs. It is important to be able to capture the
behavior of each event type and understand what is the normal behavior
and how each failure type affects it. Systems experience software upgrades,
configuration changes and even installation of new components during the
course of their lifetime [80, 24]. This makes it difficult for the algorithms to
learn patterns since the system will experience phase shifts in behavior.
There is considerable research on analyzing log files, for different purposes,
from detecting outliers in the system [8] and being able to filter events re-
ferring to the same problem [81] to offering prediction for the state of the
system [57, 9] or analyzing the root cause of a failure [82]. A widely used
strategy for extracting information for all these algorithms is to correlate
events. However, the correlation is most of the time a statistical observation
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about the occurrence of different messages. They do not take into consid-
eration the diversity of events’ behavior, and treat all notifications in the
same way. Furthermore, most of the studies build their analysis on a pre-
processing step where events are filtered to decrease the total size of the log.
As shown in [83] these methods have limitations and can affect the overall
performance of the analysis module.
We proposed, implemented and verified a novel way of analyzing the char-
acteristics of each event described in the log file by considering its own trend
and behavior. For this purpose we introduce signal analysis concepts in the
context of HPC system. We present novel methods for shaping the normal
and faulty behavior of each event and of the whole system in this chapter
and used them to propose appropriate models for descriptive and forecasting
purposes in the following chapters. After having an accurate model for each
event we create a global view of the whole system by merging the informa-
tion and correlating events. We will show that events are different one from
another, and faults affect them in a different way.
4.1 Preprocessing
An event’s notification message is constructed by using variables and constant
words in order to describe a specific event. Constants are words that carry
crucial information since they are in charge of describing the event type,
while message variables identify manipulated objects or states for the event.
For example, the notification ”Connection from 192.168.10.6 port 25” has
3 constant words: ”Connection”, ”from”, ”port”; and 2 variables: the ip
address and the port number.
Extracting the message types from log files makes it possible to abstract
the contents of event logs and facilitates further analysis and construction
of computational and correlation models. Message type descriptions are the
templates that preserve the constants in a message and replaces the variables
with wildcards. For example, the line of C code that generates a network no-
tification: sprintf(message, ”Connection from %s port %d”, ipaddress, port-
number); produces the following entries in the log file:
Connection from 192.168.08.1 port 25
Connection from 192.168.08.2 port 25
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Connection from 192.168.08.1 port 80
We want to be able to retrieve the template ”Connection from %s port %d”
by just inspecting the log lines.
For this purpose, we developed HELO (Hierarchical Event Log Organiser),
a tool for preprocessing log files. HELO parses event logs and identifies fre-
quently occurring messages with similar syntactic patterns that represent
different message types. These patterns are called templates and are basi-
cally regular expressions that try to mimic the source code that generated
each notification. These templates can be used by system managers to set
alerts for the occurrence of different message types. At the same time they
can be used by analysis methods to find anomalies and detect failures. Ta-
ble 4.3 presents several templates from different systems and the event they
represent. The two template examples in the table that refer to the Blue Wa-
ter system are used by the alert mechanism at NCSA to trigger notifications
to system managers and others whenever these failures occur.
The tool has two different components: an oﬄine classification part where
message lines found in historic log files are used to create the initial template
set by dividing them according to their description patterns; and an online
clustering part that classifies each new event and dynamically reshapes the
previous found templates accordingly.
As mentioned, a template represents a line of text where variables are
represented by different wildcards. HELO uses three types of wildcards:
d+ represents numeric values, * represents any other single words, and n+
represents strings of words that have a value for some of the messages and
do not exist for others.
The current set of templates is kept in a radix tree [84] which makes
the classification process efficient and capable of dealing with the messages
generated by supercomputers even during storms of events. A radix tree,
which represents a compact prefix tree, is a space-optimized structure in
which each node with only one child is merged with its parent. The classical
radix tree implementation was modified to deal with wildcards and partial
matches.
Figure 4.1 presents a radix tree for 6 templates from the Blue Waters
system. Special nodes have been introduced to accommodate the 3 wildcards
HELO is using. The tree is constructed after the HELO’s online phase and
it is searched for a match each time there is a new message generated in the
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system. The matching phase uses the classical radix tree search algorithms
for nodes that do not contain wildcards. For the * and d+ wildcards, the
algorithm jumps the parsing string to the next space character and continues
the matching from there (with an extra step for d+ to check if the skipped
string represents a numerical value). The n+ wildcard is always a leaf in
the tree, so the search can be stopped and a match returned. All leaves
have an additional information that represents the ID number given to each
template. The IDs are used to describe the signal and the correlations in an
easier format.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of how HELO oﬄine finds structure in a
subset of logs and how the online phase updates the radix tree for every
template that is not a match.
HELO considers that different type of words have different priorities depen-
dent on their semantics. There are three types of considered words: English
words, numeric values and hybrid tokens (words that are composed of letters,
numbers and symbols of any kind). Numeric values have the lowest prior-
ity since the algorithm considers that these words have the most chances of
becoming variables in the clusters. Hybrid values are represented by tokens
like check..0. The algorithm extracts and considers only the English words
incorporated in the hybrid token. For our example both check..0 and check..1
are considered as the word check.
HELO starts with the whole unclustered log file as the first group and
recursively partitions it until all groups have cluster goodness over a specified
threshold. The cluster goodness characterizes how similar all messages in
Figure 4.1: HELO radix tree implementation
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one group are and is defined as the percentage of common words in all the
messages over the average message length. We will analyze in the following
paragraph the influence of this parameter over how general and specific the
templates become and how this affects the prediction results.
In each partition iteration, HELO chooses the best splitting column by
identifying the word position that contains the minimum number of constants
when looking at all entries in the log. For example, in figure 4.2, the splitting
column in the first iteration represents all words that occur at the beginning
of each log entry, and in the second iteration all words on the 3rd position.
We consider that words with a high number of appearances on one position
has more chances of being a constant in the final template, so HELO searches
for the column where most unique words have a high appearance rate.
More details about HELO can be found in the 2011 paper [85]. The tool
was integrated in NCSA’s Blue Waters monitoring software and is the foun-
dation of the failure alert system used by Blue Waters managers to quickly
handle system failures. The HELO version used by NCSA has a few of op-
timizations that the initial version did not contain, a couple of which are
described in [86].
Figure 4.2: HELO methodology
The number of events generated by the Blue Waters system is two orders
of magnitude larger than previous generation systems (Table 3.1). The in-
creased number of event types creates complex patterns that need longer
training phases to be discovered. HELO did not require any modification,
but the correlation and prediction modules needed to become lighter in or-
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der to be applied on the Blue Waters system. We present the changes in the
following chapters.
Monitoring each event type separately is important since information re-
garding the events of interest might be hidden when the analysis is made at a
lower granularity. For example, when looking at all types of failures at once,
the logs show close to no spatial propagation. However, when analyzing only
a certain type of filesystem errors only around 20% of failures affect only one
node, the rest propagating on a variable number of locations [32]. In the
following paragraph we will show such an example for the Mercury system.
4.1.1 Propagation analysis on the Mercury system
We analyzed all failures and then separately 6 individual failures given after
inspecting the templates generated by HELO. The individual failures are
described in table 4.1. We assume that failure events are instantaneous, and
focus on modeling the time between two consecutive failure events.
We derive statistical distributions of failure rates over the whole system.
Table 4.2 shows the mean and median rate of each failure over the entire
system across all epochs. Among all types of failures, there was an average
of between 1.8 and 3.6 failures per day. Assuming an equal probability of
failure over all nodes, this is a per-node mean rate of between 248 to 484 days
to failure. This table also shows there is a wide range in inter-event times for
different types of failures. For example, failure type F1 has a mean inter-event
time of 77 hours, while failure type F3 has a mean of 20 hours. Inter-event
times can also vary significantly between different epochs in the system for
the same failure. For example, mean inter-event time between F1 failures
increases from roughly 35 hours in Mercury’s second year of production to
78 hours in the third.
We also examine the number of nodes affected by a failure. We observed
that F1, F3, F5 and F6 rarely occur at close intervals on separate nodes.
Therefore we consider each of these as affecting only a single node. However,
F2 and F4 can occur simultaneously on multiple nodes. A plot of the CDF for
the number of nodes affected by a failure over all epochs is shown in Figure 4.3
with the black line indicating the actual data and the red line showing the
fitted distribution. For example, with the combined failure model, 91% of
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Code Message Error type
F1
scsi error: * status=02h
key=4h (hardware error);
fru=02h asc/ascq=11h/00h ””
Hardware reported error in a
device on the SCSI bus
F2
rpc: bad tcp reclen * (non-
terminal)
NFS related error indicating
unavail- ability of the network
file system for a machine
F3
pbs mom: sister could not
communicate * in xxxxxx,
job start error from node
xxxxx in job start error
Failure of a PBS (Portable
Batch Sys- tem) daemon to
communicate
F4
ifup: could not get a valid in-
terface name: -> skipped
Node is restarted but could not
connect to either the Gigabit
or management networks
F5
+ mem error detail: physical
address: * address mask: *
node: d+ card: d+ module:
d+ n+
Error in the memory
F6
processor error map: *
processor state param: xxx
processor lid: *
Error in the processor cache
Table 4.1: Mercury error templates
failures affect just one node, 3% affect two nodes, and 6% affect more than
two nodes. We model the number of nodes affected by the combined failure
as a Weibull distribution, by an F2 failure as a log normal distribution, and
by an F4 failure as an exponential distribution.
These properties can be used to optimize fault tolerance protocols depend-
ing on what components the applications are using. The failure distribution
used by Daly’s formula depends on two factors, namely the specific compo-
nents and number of nodes used by the application. Analyzing the specific
failures extracted by HELO allowed us to notice that this distribution is
different depending on the failure type. We will further analyze how this
observations can influence fault tolerance protocols in chapter 6.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
All
Mean
Median
0.39
0.21
0.54
0.23
0.37
0.15
0.27
0.08
0.28
0.1
F1
Mean
Median
1.45
0.98
2.72
1.01
3.27
2.23
12.7
3.46
14.9
9.08
F2
Mean
Median
31.2
34.6
7.9
7.9
6.9
0.77
12.2
14
12.4
14
F3
Mean
Median
-
-
1.1
0.07
0.82
0.31
0.42
0.09
0.4
0.11
F4
Mean
Median
1.45
0.12
1.45
0.06
1.5
0.12
1.21
0.07
1.8
0.09
F5
Mean
Median
1.18
0.84
5.11
2.89
9.88
5.42
7.95
4.41
3.39
1.51
F6
Mean
Median
1.52
0.9
2.65
1.74
2.68
1.82
4.27
3.25
4.09
2.7
Table 4.2: Failure inter-event statistics (in days)
4.2 Extracting the normal and faulty event behavior
Large scale systems experience a large variety of events during their lifetime
and they output notifications for each of them. Once an error is triggered for
one component, either software or hardware, there is not a consistent way of
recording how the system will behave. For example, in case a node experience
a network failure and is incapable of generating log messages, the failure is
announced in the log files by a lack of generated messages. Conversely, some
component failures may cause logging a large numbers of notifications. For
example, memory failures can result in a single faulty component generating
hundreds or thousands of messages in less than a day.
At the same time, some errors are notified by a single message. For example
on NCSA’s Mercury system, NFS related errors that indicate unavailability
of the network file system for a machine, need a single instance of the gener-
ated message to notify a potentially fatal failure to an application using this
resource. However, this is not always the case. Memory errors, for exam-
ple, are often correctable by the ECC capabilities, so only when the system
generates a large numbers of these errors in a short time span, it is likely to
have a permanent failure of a component.
Each failure type behaves differently and affects the systems differently.
It is important to be able to model the normal behavior of the system for
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of nodes affected by failures
each of the events that might be generated and characterize the way a failure
affects these models. We use HELO to extract all the event types and then
treat the number of occurrences per time period for each event type as a
separate signal. Each event type has occurrences at different times in a
system lifespan. By choosing a sampling rate and mapping the number of
messages generated by the system in each time period and for each event
type, we extract a time series for each template. The obtained time series
are regarded as signals and can be analyzed with signal processing methods.
The sampling rate is chosen differently depending on the characteristics of
each signal type and we will discuss the implications of the choice in the next
sub-paragraphs.
After extracting all the signals for all the analyzed systems, we observed
that there are three types of time series: periodic, silent and noise. An
example of each of the three types can be seen in figure 4.4. Usually, periodic
signals are generated by daemons or by events that deal with monitoring
information. Examples of these signals are presented in Figure 4.4c. We call
the second type silent signals because most of the signal is a flat line around
the zero value, and only from time to time there is a burst of messages.
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System Template Event type
BGL
failed to configure resourcemgmt sub-
system err = d+
Processor cache error
Blue Waters * panic - * syncing: * LBUG
Blue Waters
Lustre: * @@@ Request sent has failed
due to network error: n+
MDT Failure
BGQ component state change: component *
is in the * state *
Info notification
BGQ
ECC-correctable single symbol error:
DDR Controller d+, failing SDRAM
address *, BPC pin *, n+
DDR single symbol error
Table 4.3: Examples of templates and their event types
This type is presented in Figure 4.4a and is usually characteristic for error
messages, for example in case of PBS errors. Noise are verbose signals that
send notifications very often. Two examples of such events are presented
in Figure 4.4b. This type of signal are usually warning messages that are
generated both in case of normal behavior and failures, usually preceding
error messages or when a problem is corrected. We observed that even some
failure events can experience this behavior, for example in the case of memory
errors that could be corrected by ECC.
In the next paragraphs we will look at the three types of signals that we
identified previously.
4.2.1 Periodic events
Periodic events generate messages regularly having, in general, a fixed occur-
rence frequency (for example in the case of daemons) but they could also have
multiple frequencies. We extract periodic events in two distinct steps: first
we parse the data to find the best sampling rate, and then use the frequency
spectrum to find all frequencies that represent the signal. The second step
is computational expensive, so after the first step we create a list with only
the periodic signals, and apply the expensive second process only to those.
Also, the second step gives good results for periodic signals, but is not very
accurate when dealing with non-periodic events.
For extracting the correct sampling rate we use the Nyquist theorem. The
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(a) Silent signals
(b) Noise signals
(c) Periodic signals
Figure 4.4: Different signals generated by HPC systems
theorem states that, if a function x(t) contains no frequencies higher than
B hertz, it is completely determined by giving its ordinates at a series of
points spaced 1/(2B) seconds apart. In the first step we test if the signal has
a periodic behavior while still respecting the Nyquist theorem. We want to
choose the smallest possible time sample rate, however, as stated previously,
faults triggered in the system might create more messages or might make
notifications disappear, so choosing the minimum lag between adjacent events
is not realistic and inefficient.
We implemented a recursive process, where we start with an initial low
sample rate and keep increasing the rate until either it exceeds the maximum
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time lag between two adjacent occurrences or the extracted signal is periodic.
We stop the process if the signal is periodic only if the ratio between the
sampling rate and the period of the signal respects the Nyquist theorem [87].
The initial value used for this process is the mean time delay between two
event appearances of the same type. The value increases exponential, in each
step being doubled. After extracting the signal, we use the auto-correlation
function for determining if a signal is periodic or not. The auto-correlation
function is used to compute the similarity between a signal with itself, for
different time lags. When applied to signals, if the similarity value is over a
threshold than the signal can be considered periodic.
Examples of the auto-correlation function, for a periodic and random sig-
nal, can be seen in Figure 4.5. The random signals have only one peak for lag
0, which means that the signal has a high similarity only with itself. Periodic
signals have multiple peaks, visible in Figure 4.5b.
In the second step, only for signals that show a periodic behavior, we ex-
tract the frequencies that make up the event. A clean view of the signal’s
fundamental frequencies is given by looking at the signal in the power spec-
trum. The periodogram is computed from the FFT (Fast Fourier Transform)
and it is used to highlight the periodic behavior of a signal. By transforming
the signal into the power spectrum, periodic signals of low frequency have a
smooth appearance whereas those of high frequency have a irregular behav-
ior. If a time series has a very smooth appearance, then the values of the
periodogram for low frequencies will be large relative to its other values. For
a purely random series, all of the sinusoids should be of equal importance
and thus the periodogram will vary randomly around a constant.
(a) Random signals (b) Periodic signals
Figure 4.5: Auto-correlation plots for different signals
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If a time series has a strong periodic signal for some frequency, then there
will be a peak in the periodogram at that frequency. In case of faults that
modify the signal, the periodogram might present some picks of lower values
that must be filtered out. The idea behind the filtering method is that only
the highest peaks are the periodic frequencies and for all cases these peaks
represent a very small number from the total frequencies in the periodogram.
We are performing a recursive filtering method, in each step leaving only 5%
of the values from the periodogram, until we are not eliminating any of
the peaks in two adjacent steps. The process is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
The signal in the figure has a period of 10 time units, but due to failures
affecting this event, the initial image presents a various number of peaks.
After filtering them, the last image shows only the peak corresponding to a
period of 10.
Figure 4.6: Filtering the power spectrum
4.2.2 Noise and silent signals
All the signals that are not periodic are analyzed separately. When we extract
the time series, we use a fix sample rate of 10 seconds. We extract the
timestamp of the first and last occurrence of any of the log messages and
create a signal for each template, for this interval. This makes the size of the
signal to be the same for all the event types, and makes it easier to correlate
them in the next step. We classify the signal as noise or silent by looking at
its behavior in the majority of its lifespan. Silent signals have a high number
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System Mercury LANL
Periodic signals
Number 11 2
Percentage 2.7% 3.8%
Silent signals
Number 338 39
Percentage 82.6% 73.6%
Noise signals
Number 60 12
Percentage 14.7% 22.6%
Table 4.4: Statistics for different signal types
of sampling intervals with zero or a low number of messages compared to
the noise signals that are formed in general by high number of notifications
for the whole length of the signal. Table 4.4 presents the percentage of each
type of signals found in the Mercury and LANL system’s logs.
In [88], the authors propose a methodology for measuring different noise
parameters, by using time-series methods, like extracting the trend, curve-
fitting or interpolation. Their research is focused for chip level analysis tools,
by looking at the noise induced by coupling capacitance. However, the overall
idea can be used for log file analysis. Specifically we use the same main idea
of glitch modeling by examining both glitch hight and width to accurately
analyze the noise in the signals.
We characterize what is the normal shape of the noise, the behavior that
the signal has most of the time, and when the signal frequency or inten-
sity changes. For this reason, we will transform our signal to a mixture of
time and frequency domain and apply different signal processing methods to
extract anomalies. The algorithm decomposes our data set in chunks of over-
lapping time intervals, then apply FFTs on each interval in order to create
the frequencies of the signal over time. Figure 4.7 presents the spectrogram
for one event type occurring on the Blue Waters system in one month. Fre-
quencies are represented on the vertical axes, time on the horizontal one and
the intensity of each frequency is given by the color of each point. We also
use a couple of filters that act as either an averaging filter or one that pro-
duces details depending on the characteristics of the signal that highlight the
normal behavior [89].
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Figure 4.7: The spectrogram of ECC warnings on Blue Waters
4.2.3 Anomaly detection
In this section we focus on the faulty behavior for each of the signals. This
step is done oﬄine as a prerequisite for both the proposed filtering method
and short-term prediction. Knowing what is the normal shape of the signals,
we will now investigate changes in the frequency and intensity. For some
signals an increase in the frequency of the messages could indicate a problem,
while for others a lack of notifications should be taken into consideration.
Intensity is of equal importance, so we are also investigating the total number
of messages generated in a single time unit.
A time series spectrogram can be considered as a combination of two com-
ponents: the set of frequencies and their intensity. The components influence
the trend and seasonality of signals. It is important to determine whether
trend and/or periodicity exist in a series in order to choose appropriate mod-
els and methods for descriptive or forecasting purposes. Exploring the char-
acteristics of a signal is enhanced by suppressing one type of pattern for
better visualizing the other patterns. For example, suppressing the changes
in intensity can make a modification in the normal frequency rate more vis-
ible.
Feature extraction
Transforming the input data into the set of features is called feature extrac-
tion which involves simplifying the amount of elements required to describe
a large set of data accurately. In general, the more features we have, the
better we will be able to distinguish different spike shapes. The spectrogram
represents a M × N matrix where M is the number of features that might
appear in a signal and N represents time. The result of the feature extraction
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step is a K × N matrix, where K is the number of extracted features. We use
the classical technique of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce di-
mensionality from M to K. Figure 4.8 shows the amount of information given
by each frequency. In this example, we could reduce the dimensionality to
2 components since these first two components are giving over 90% of the
information needed to characterize the signal. All the analysis is done of the
reduced matrix.
Figure 4.8: Applying PCA on a noise signal
Changes in the frequency
First we identify shifts by looking at the frequency with which the system
generates messages. After inspecting all the signals from both systems, we
observed that the only concern we need to analyze is an increase in the
frequency. For events that stop generating notifications in case of errors,
the frequency does not progressively decrease, but rather drops to 0 in a
short amount of time. This case is analyzed in the next paragraph and
is considered a decrease in the intensity of the signal. Here, we will only
focus on increases in the signal frequency. We can use the same method for
all three signal types, after we apply a filter to modify the original event by
enhancing the difference between the normal frequency and the moments with
an increase rate and after we transform the signal into the frequency domain
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and reduce its dimensionality. For the first step, we use the moving average
technique. In signal analysis, a moving average is a type of finite impulse
response filter used for analyzing a signal by creating a series of averages
of different subsets of the full data set. Basically, this method smooths the
signal by simply replacing each data value with the average of neighboring
values. After applying the filter, the new signal presents unknown patterns
on areas with a high frequency of messages and known values otherwise.
Changes in the intensity
In the second case we focus on identifying changes in the total number of mes-
sages generated by the system per time unit. For silent signals, the changes
in the normal intensity are seen as peaks at different points in time. However
for random and periodic signals we investigate either bursts of messages or
a decrease in the normal intensity of the signal.
The signal is modified so that the intensity anomalies are more visible
for the extraction algorithm. We are applying two filters, one for putting
emphasis on large values in order to enhance the difference between peaks and
the normal behavior, and the other on abnormal small values for enhancing
the deviation of time units with decreasing intensities from normal. In both
cases, we apply a filter for skewing the signal after which we applied the same
methods for transforming the signal to frequency domain and for reducing
the dimensionality. Anomaly extraction algorithms are then applied in order
to find moments of time where there are unknown patterns in the reduced
spectrogram.
Figure 4.9 presents the methodology for identifying the anomalies in the
signal.
4.3 Filtering methods based on signal analysis
Even though none of our analysis requires a filtering step, other studies on
failure analysis [9, 62, 83] use it extensively in their analysis and this step
influences the final results considerably. Since log files have a large dimension,
most data mining algorithms require a step that compresses the logs, while
still keeping intact information about all failures and events generated. For
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Figure 4.9: Anomaly extraction methodology
this purpose, event occurrences need to be identified and only redundant
information needs to be filtered.
We show in this section how analyzing log files as a collection of signals
is a flexible and useful way for widely used event log analysis methods. We
use the modules described previously in a pipeline manner by applying suc-
cessive filters to the initial signals, modifying them so that they enhance the
information we need to extract. Specifically, we implement a filtering algo-
rithm that can be used as a preprocessing step for a multitude of tasks. We
show the use of signal processing concepts allows us to automate this step
completely and gives better or similar results compared to recent filtering
techniques.
Most research in the area of failure data analysis is using a step for filtering
out entries that are not useful or that are redundant error entries from any
log file. As stated previously, a fault, once triggered, can generate multiple
errors that propagate within the system, so most current analyzing algo-
rithms require a preprocessing step where these multiple entries for an event
are filtered. A widely used strategy for filtering the entries in the log is by
using a time window.
Current research is analyzing the entries produced by the system belong-
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ing to a specific error category, for example memory or network, separately.
In [83], the authors show that simplistic filtering methods that just use a
fixed time window loose around 10% of the messages that should be ana-
lyzed independently. However, when the logs are analyzed at a finer grain,
by looking at each type of events and not only at general error categories,
the difference is much lower [58]. In our previous work, we found filtering
each event type results in the previous algorithm still loosing around 5% of
the events.
Usually the entries that need to be analyzed are triggered by either a
fault in the system, whose effects propagate between different locations or by
two independent faults on different locations that occur coincidentally and
generate notifications at the same time. The messages triggered in both cases
could involve multiple event types. The filtering method we propose follows
this idea and uses the modules described in the previous section.
Firstly, we only group error events that correlated. This means that if two
messages of separate types occur frequently together, in a small time window,
there are high chances that we are dealing with one cause. Otherwise, we
consider the two notifications separately.
In the next step, we investigate each event type, by extracting the signals
for each possible location and correlating these signals between each other.
We found that signals on multiple locations for the same event type, share the
same characteristics in terms of normal and faulty behavior with their base
signal. For example, a silent signal analyzed per location will generate silent
signals for each of the analyzed nodes. Correlating these signals will give a
good statistical information about the propagation behavior of the event. If
there are location signals that are generally correlated one to another, we
consider that the event type has a propagation behavior.
We are grouping the event types related to the same fault manifestation so
that our results are significant to the needs of the analysis methods described
in the chapter 2. Consequently, we group events that need to be analyzed
together and statistical information about the propagation behavior of each
of them. The entire methodology of our filtering technique is presented in
Figure 4.10. Previous algorithms have a parameter to decide on the length
of the filtering window. For our analysis, this parameter is implemented
into the sampling rate used to extract the signals. After identifying the
groups of related events and the statistic information about the propagation
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Figure 4.10: The filtering methodology
behavior, the filtering process is straightforward. For all events that do not
have a propagation behavior, our method merges the signals from different
locations as one. Also, all event types that are in one group will be merged
as one. At the end a filter is applied by trimming all signals to a value of 1
in all the sampling units that had at least one occurrence.
This is, basically, equivalent to merging messages that occur together in a
filtering window, given by our sampling window. Events merged are always
statistically related to the same error cause and, either happen in the same
location or have a statistical propagation behavior, in case the messages
appear on different nodes. In all other cases, the two messages are analyzed
independently.
For comparing the filtering approaches, we use the same measuring unit
as in [83]. This paper has the objective of quantifying the extent of the
distortion introduced by filtering out events that should have been analyzed
independently. According to previous studies [50, 25, 55], choosing a time
window of 240s is a reasonable choice for most of large-scale systems, so we
will use the same value for the sampling rate of our systems. We then test
the influence of different sampling rates around this value on the final results.
The results are summarized in Table 4.5, where T represents the number of
messages left in the log after filtering with the previous classic method, and
T+ the number obtained with our method. If we analyze the percentage of
how many independent events were filtered with the classic method (column
5 in the table), it is visible that for a time window of 240 seconds, used
widely in current research, there is a 12% difference for the LANL systems
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Time window T+ T Diff Percentage
LANL system
160 1,450 1,344 106 7.3%
200 1,323 1,194 128 9.7%
240 1,212 1,068 143 11.8%
280 1,171 1,028 143 12.2%
Mercury
160 12,872 12,189 682 5.3%
200 12,732 12,006 726 5.7%
240 12,644 11,720 923 7.3%
280 12,591 11,596 994 7.9%
Table 4.5: Filtering results
and over 7% for Mercury. Also, it can be observed that the number of filtered
independent events increases as the time window increases.
Grouping the error entries related to the same fault manifestation is cru-
cial to obtain realistic measurements. By analyzing events separate for each
specific type we were able to extract the set of events that frequently occur
together and filter them together. However, since other methods are doing
this filtering for all failures at once, they filter failures that occur close in
time even though they might refer to two/multiple separate problems. The
”Diff” column in Table 4.5 show the number of such cases not identified by
simple filtering methods and that are identified by ours. Without manual
inspection, the exact number of independent events in a system is not known
we cannot show how close to the optimal filtering our method is. We believe
that even our method filters some failures that might describe two indepen-
dent problems. However, it preserves 7-13% more failures that other used
techniques.
Our results are similar to the ones presented in [83], however we do not
require any preprocessing step where a system managers identify the groups
of messages relevant to different error types. Our process is completely auto-
matic. Furthermore, once the initial signals are extracted, our algorithm is
applying recursive filters to transform the signals in the final form, making
the process efficient and flexible. If we need an additional step we can just
add one more filter in the pipeline. Moreover, our approach allows replacing
or removing one or multiple steps for an easy change of the scope and results
of any process.
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4.4 Failure analysis
In this section we analyze the faults and failures of the HPC systems pre-
sented in chapter 3 and we highlight the similarities and differences be-
tween each. We are looking at root causes as identified manually by system
managers and statistical information as well as inter-failure correlations and
propagation characteristics. On average, in the analyzed timeframe, for the
biggest system, there was a failure of any type every 6.7 hours, while the
system suffered system-wide outages approximately every 160 hours. The
MTBF has decreased from once every couple of months for LANL systems
to every several hours for the Blue Waters system. Moreover, the time to
restart the machine and the applications after a system wide outages is tak-
ing longer times for larger machines. The frequency of failures and the sys-
tem complexity is making the task of failure detection and prediction much
harder. In this section we open the hood, analyze the behavior of failures,
and highlight the properties that can be used by a failure predictor.
4.4.1 Location propagation
In general, 12-25% of failures affect more than one node (without considering
system wide outages). For prediction purposes each node affected by a failure
is a potential false positive or negative. For example, on the Blue Waters
system, failures in the voltage converter module (VRM) of the mezzanine, or
problems with the cabinet controller, affect a whole blade consisting of four
nodes. From a prediction perspective, these are 4 failures. All nodes failing
as part of a multi-node failure represent more than a quarter of total failures
affecting the system.
Large-scale systems contain nodes that are organized in an hierarchy. For
example for the BlueGene systems, nodes are gathered into midplanes and
multiple midplanes form a rack. After a closer analysis, we observed that the
propagation path for different error types follows closely the way components
are connected in the system. For example, if a fan breaks, all nodes sharing
the same rack will be affected. In general, sequences of events following a
failure do not propagate on different locations and if they propagate they
affect a small number of nodes, only around 22% of sequences extracted for
Mercury and 25% for BlueGene/L show any kind of propagation.
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Between 80% and 85% of the sequences that show a propagation behavior
affect less than 10 nodes. The rest, which represents less than 2% from the
total number of correlations, influence a large number of nodes. An example
of such a failure can be seen on the Mercury machine, when we investigated
NFS (network file system) problems. The event ”rpc: bad tcp reclen d+ (non-
terminal)” indicates the network file system unavailability to any requests
for a node. In applications using the network file system this could cause
file operations to fail and the application to quit. Also all nodes from which
the application tries to access the network file system will be affected by this
problem. This failure usually occurs nearly simultaneously on a large number
of nodes.
To get a more realistic view of the behavior of sequences, we analyzed
the initial pair of correlated events for the BlueGene/L machine and broke
down the propagation on racks, midplanes and nodes. Figure 4.11 shows
that around 75% of correlations show no propagation at all and only around
2.16% propagates outside of the same midplane.
From our observation, in the Mercury system network failures can occur
nearly simultaneously on multiple nodes. For example, the event ”ifup: could
not get a valid interface name: -> skipped” represents an unexpected node
restart caused by unexpected hardware failure, and propagates across differ-
ent nodes. In general, errors in memory or processor caches do not show the
same behavior. On the other hand, in the BlueGene/L system we observed
that some memory errors propagate to different node cards in a midplane.
For example, the sequence
d+ ddr errors(s) detected and corrected on rank 0, symbol * bit *
total of * ddr error(s) detected and corrected
occurs frequently together and refers to a ddr memory error that was de-
tected and corrected in a certain locations and in most of the cases affects
multiple nodes in the same midplane in a short period of time.
On the other hand, errors related to node cards do not propagate on mul-
tiple locations. For example the sequence:
can not get assembly information for node card
linkCard power module * is not accessible
no power module * found found on link card
gives information about a node card problem that is not fully functional.
Events marked as ”severe” and ”failure” occur about one hour after the first
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Figure 4.11: Percentage of sequences propagating on different racks,
midplanes and nodes on Blue Gene/L
Category Blue Waters Blue Gene/P LANL systems
Hardware 43.12% 52.38% 61.58%
Software 26.67% 30.66% 23.02%
Interconnect 11.84% 14.28% 1.8%
Facility/Environment 3.34% 2.66% 1.55%
Unknown 2.98% - 11.38%
Heartbeat 12.02% - -
Table 4.6: Percentage of different failure types
message and report that the link card module is not accessible from the same
midplane and that the link card is not found. The sequence is generated by
the same node for all its occurrences in the log.
For 75% of correlations containing messages that do not appear on multiple
nodes, the analysis and prediction system does not need to worry about
finding the right location that is affected by a failure. However, for the
other 25% that propagate, a wrong prediction will lead to a decrease in both
precision and recall. For the Blue Waters system, the complexity of the
propagation behavior increases since we have more sources of notification,
thus more failure data than for other systems. We will further analyze this
behavior in Chapter 5
4.4.2 Failure statistics
We divided all failures in 5 main categories that can be encountered in all
systems: hardware, software, network or interconnect, facility and unknown.
Figure 4.12 presents the percentage of failures of each type and table 4.7
shows the average number of failures for one month of production. Both
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Figure 4.12: Percentage of different failures
Figure 4.13: Percentage of main hardware failures
tables consider the categories that were identified by system managers for
each system.
Hardware represents the majority of failures for all systems, with the lowest
percentage of 43.12% for the Blue Waters system and 61.58% for the LANL
systems. As shown in figure 4.13, the majority of hardware failures were
memory and processors errors. Moreover, failures with hardware root causes
were limited to a single node in 96% of the cases, or a single blade consisting
of 4 nodes in 99.3% of the cases. In over 90% of the correlation chains (46
out of 51 total correlation chains), precursor events appear on the same node
where the failure occurs. For this reason, the mis-predictions caused by not
offering the correct location are rare for hardware failures.
On the Blue Waters system, each node receives a periodical heartbeat re-
quest that triggers a number of specific tests. If the tests fail or the heartbeat
is not received by the system management console, the node is marked as
down. The test is automatically repeated, by default, every 60 seconds for
35 minutes following a failure. We use this information to filter out messages
that refer to the same problem and what is left is reported in Figure 4.12.
In general, failures labeled as heartbeat failures have a separate root cause,
either hardware, software or network.
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Figure 4.14: Percentage of main software failures
Category Blue Waters Blue Gene/P LANL systems
Total 118 56.5 40.9
Hardware 55.4 (std 6.3) 27.5 (std 4.1) 26.3 (std 3.2)
Software 27.1 (std 5.82) 17.4 (std 3.7) 7.2 (std 2.4)
Interconnect 14.1 (std 3.1) 8.9 (std 1.3) 0.5 (std 0.4)
Facility/Environment 2.9 (std 1.2) 4.2 (std 2.9) 0.4 (std 0.3)
Unknown 2.7 (std 1.7) - 6 (std 2.3)
Heartbeat 15.3 (std 2.43) - -
Table 4.7: Average number of failures per month for each type (with the
standard deviation)
Software errors represent over 30% of total failures for the Blue Waters sys-
tem, while for the LANL system they represent only 23%. For the systems
presented in this study we can observe that current generation suprecom-
puters present a higher percentage of software failures while the hardware
failures represent a smaller percentage compared to older systems.
Figure 4.14 presents the main causes of software failures. The main ones
are filesystem problems (Lustre for the Blue Waters system, GPFS for BGL
and several for LANL: Cluster File System, Parallel File System, NFS,
Scratch FS and Vizscratch FS); failures of the job scheduler and operating
system problems. On the Blue Waters system, 12% of the software failures
caused system wide outages (SWO) and represent over 75% of all causes that
triggered SWO. Moreover, software failures, when not causing a system-wide
outage, propagate to more than one node in 15% of the non SWO failures.
The correlation chains are also more complex than for hardware failures, over
67% (49 out of 73) of chains having at least one precursor on a different node
than the predicted failure, and almost 37% having all precursors on different
nodes.
65
Blue Waters Blue Gene/P LANL systems
Hardware
RAM 33.12%
CPU 27.04%
L1 data cache parity
error 35.27%
CPU 21.81%
Memory 16.72%
CPU 41.35%
DIMM 20.08%
Software
FS 27.2%
Scheduler 18.9%
OS 62.11%
FS 36.02%
Other software 21.89%
OS 20.99%
DST (Distributed stor-
age) 21.02%
FS 12.33%
Table 4.8: Main specific failure types
Environmental failures include power-outages, failures related to temper-
ature, cooling hardware problems and others. Most of the failures in this
category are predictable when performance metrics are added in the predic-
tion methodology so we will take a closer look at this type of failures in the
following chapters.
Table 4.8 presents the primary failure types for each main category for
each system. The table presents the terms used by system managers from
each data center when annotating the failure logs. The same term might
refer to slightly different errors depending on the system. For example, CPU
for Blue Waters and the LANL systems include L1 cache errors while for
Blue Gene/P the two are separate types.
4.4.3 Failure correlation
In the second part of our study we focus on correlations between failures.
This study focuses on the results for the Blue Waters system and only briefly
discusses the differences for all other systems. As a starting point, we calcu-
late the daily probability of a node failure. For this we compute the number
of locations that fail in one random day (as the mean of all days in our time-
frame). We then compare this result against the probability of a node failing
during a day following another failure (in a 24h time window). For example,
if we consider two days, and one of them had a SWO where all nodes failed,
the results would suggest that, on average, almost 13,000 nodes fail per day
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(a) Probability of a node having a failure
of any type after it had failure of type X
(b) Probability of failure of type X
following another failure of any type
Figure 4.15: Correlations between failures on the Blue Waters system
within a time window of one hour
(and a probability of node failure of 50%). Since SWOs skew the results, we
compute the same probabilities after filtering out SWOs.
We found that the unconditional probability of a node failure within one
day is 0.63% when filtering out SWOs and the daily failure probability is
higher during the day following a previous failure, namely 1.19%. This cor-
responds to roughly a 2X increase, which suggests that failures are correlated
in the system. We also extracted the same data per failure type. We look at
the probability that a node will fail within 24 hours following a failure of a
particular type. At the same time we are looking at the percentage of cases
when a node failure of any type follows a particular type of failure within
an hour window. The percentage of cases when a failure of a particular type
follows any failure within a one hour time window is also investigated. The
results are presented in Figures 4.15.
Figure 4.15a shows what types of failures are good precursors for other
failures and Figure 4.15b shows the types of failures that have precursors.
Many failures seem to follow environmental and network failures. Also, by
looking at Figure 4.16, we observe that these failures in general affect a large
number of nodes which suggest they propagate not only in time but also
space. Software errors have many precursors in other failures (37% of failures
have a previous failures within an hour time window), more than hardware
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Figure 4.16: The probability that any node-failure follows a failure of type
X on the Blue Waters system
failures. One explanation is that failed hardware is often shut down, while
a software error does not shut off failed components, which means that our
correlations reflect not only intrinsic properties of failures, but also recovery
actions performed. This result might also indicate that a failure that was
assigned to a software cause had, in reality, a different root cause. The
prediction for hardware failures, however, has the potential of having better
results because hardware failures have more non-failure precursors in the log
files that could make the prediction more successful.
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Chapter 5
Failure prediction
Over the years, different methods have been developed that deal with failure
prediction in the HPC community [6], methods that have been used exten-
sively on different HPC systems and that present a variety of results. A
widely used strategy for extracting information for all these algorithms is to
correlate events. However, the correlation is most of the time a statistical
observation and does not take into consideration the diversity of events be-
havior. Furthermore, most of the studies build their analysis on a pre-process
step where events are filtered to decrease the total size of the log. As shown
in the previous chapter these methods have limitations that affect the overall
accuracy of the analysis module.
In the previous chapter, we introduced the concept of signal analysis in the
context of event analysis, which allowed us to characterize the behavior of
different events and to identify anomalies. Our own analysis of inter-failure
correlations and propagation behavior, as well as current related work have
shown that failure prediction is a theoretical viable solution for future fault
tolerance techniques.
A large fraction of experiments and results for failure prediction methods
used in the literature have been the result of the analysis of different HPC
systems in simulated online environments. We call simulated online predic-
tions the predictions obtained by methods that manually tune the parameters
used in the oﬄine phase in order to achieve the best possible results in the
studied online phase. While these methods show prediction results that could
theoretically be achieved in real scenarios, they do not reflect the reality of
running in realtime and predicting failures using best local parameters.
In this chapter, we present an analysis of failure prediction on different
HPC system and we introduce a new method for predicting failures based on
signal analysis concepts. Firstly, we analyze this method in simulated online
environments in order to compare the results of our implementation with
69
other state of the art methods. Second, we will investigate the feasibility
of online failure prediction methods on a petascale machine by looking at
a online approach on the Blue Waters system. Our method does not use
”simulate online” approaches by automatically choosing parameters for the
online phase. With a sustained performance of 1 Petaflop on a range of real-
world science and engineering applications, the Blue Waters supercomputer
is representative of todays large scale systems and provides new insights into
the performance of current fault predictors.
5.1 Failure prediction based on signal analysis
In the previous chapter, we introduced signal analysis concepts in the context
of log file analysis. We observed that a fault does not have a consistent
representation in the logs. For example, a memory failure will cause the
faulty module to generate a large number of messages. Conversely, in case of
a node crash the error will be characterized by a lack of notifications. Data
mining algorithms in general assume that faults manifest themselves in the
same way and in consequence fail to handle more than one type of behavior.
For example, even though silent signals represent the majority of event
types, data mining algorithms fail to extract the correlation between them
and other types of signals. This affects fault prediction in both the total
number of faults seen by the method and in the time delay offered between
the prediction and the actual occurrence of the fault.
Signal analysis methods can handle all three signal types, and thus provide
a larger set of correlations that can be used for prediction. However, data
mining algorithms are more suited in characterizing correlations between
different high dimensionality sets than the cross correlation function offered
by signal analysis. Data mining is a powerful technology that converts raw
data into an understandable and actionable form, which can then be used to
predict future trends or provide meaning to historical events.
Additionally, outlier detection has a rich research history in incorporating
both statistical and data mining methods for different types of datasets.
Moreover, it is able to implicitly adapt to changes in the datasets and to
apply threshold based distance measures separating outliers from the bulk
of good observations. In this chapter, we combine the advantages of both
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Figure 5.1: Methodology overview of the hybrid ELSA approach
methods in order to offer a hybrid approach capable of characterizing different
behaviors resulting from events generated by a HPC system and provide an
adaptive forecasting method by using latest data mining techniques.
In the following sections we present the methodology used for preprocess-
ing the log files and extracting the signals and then we introduce the novel
hybrid method that combines signal analysis concepts with data mining tech-
niques for outlier detection and correlation extraction. An overview of the
methodology is presented in figure 5.1.
In the next sections we will build on the signal analysis methods in ELSA,
described in section 4 and add data mining prediction functionalities. We
will refer this combination of signal analysis with data mining as the hybrid
version of ELSA.
5.1.1 Analysis modules
Outlier detection
All analysis modules are novel hybrid modules that apply data mining tech-
niques on the previously extracted set of signals and their characterization.
Since the oﬄine phase is not run in real-time and the execution time is not
constrained, we did not optimize this step. For outlier detection in the online
phase, we use as input the adapted set of signals and apply a simple data
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(a) Original data (b) Signal after filtering
Figure 5.2: Online outlier detection
cleaning method for identifying the erroneous data points.
We implement this step as a filtering signal analysis module so that is can
be easily inserted between signal analysis modules. The transformation was
intuitive since the data mining algorithm is based on a causal moving data
window that is appropriate to realtime applications: the observed data point
yk is compared to the median y
m
k of past data points, both the erroneous
and the replaced ones. If the distance between these points is large relative
to a threshold based on the normal behavior of the system, yk is declared
an outlier and a replacement with a more reasonable value yck is proposed.
Figure 5.2 presents a synthetic noise signal in its original form and after
applying the online outlier detection with replacement for the erroneous data
points.
For a window of N points, the analyzed list of points for the current yk is:
Vk = {yck−N , ..., yck−1, yk−N , yk−N+1, ..., yk}
out of which the median is extracted ymk . For our experiments we use an N
value of two months.
We use predefined thresholds for each signal, specified automatically in
the preprocessing step based on knowledge about the normal behavior of the
event type and how this was affected by outlier in the oﬄine phase.
The replacement strategy decreases the influence of severe outliers on sig-
nals by saving both the initial value and one that is more consistent with
the rest of the dataset. At the same time it minimizes the effects of a large
number of faults hitting the same signal for a larger period of time.
Having a low execution time is a requirement for the online modules. The
on-the-fly filter makes the process faster than what is proposed in the pre-
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Figure 5.3: Correlation example between three signals
vious chapter. We will show in the experiment section the number of faults
missed because the outlier detection and prediction took too long to notify
the applications.
Signal correlation
Gradual itemset mining [90] is used in the data mining community for ex-
tracting patterns of the form ”the more/less X1, .. , the more/less Xn”. The
goal of the algorithm is to discover frequent co-variations between different
attributes. This method has the advantage of extracting multiple event cor-
relations instead of only pairs like the output of the signal cross-correlation
function. A large number of data mining algorithms divide the logs into
chunks and extract sets of failures that frequently occur together in these
chunks. This method is called itemset mining. Gradual itemset is a slightly
more advanced form of itemset mining in the sense partitioning the logs is no
longer necessary. The algorithm searches for shifts in the data and creates
automatic snapshots with the state of all events at that particular time. Af-
terwards, frequently occurring patterns inside these snapshots are extracted.
We use the sequential GRITE algorithm presented in [91] by adapting it to
work with our signals. Since the purpose of our method is to predict faults,
we are only correlating signals depending on the occurrences of outliers in
each of the signals. For this, we filter out the normal behavior and leave
only the outliers. In order to simplify the correlation process, we replace
each point in the signal with 0 in case of normal behavior and 1 for outliers,
no matter on the real representation in the log. For example, if a failure is
manifested as a lack of notifications, then the portion of the signal with value
0 will become a 1. At the same time some failures are represented by bursts
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of messages, like the second and third signal in Figure 5.3). In this case, the
highlighted moments in the figure become 1s in the final signal and the rest
will be set at 0. This representations makes all signals uniform and thus, it
allows to represent signals as attributes that can be handled by the gradual
itemset mining algorithms.
The sequential algorithm relies on a tree-based exploration, where each
level is built by using information from the previous level. In its original
form, the first level of the tree is initialized with all attributes. However
in our case, the initial level is composed of the 2-pair correlations obtained
with the signal cross-correlation function. Gradual itemset mining is a very
complex and computationally expensive data mining algorithm so sequential
methods cannot yet scale to large datasets. By merging it with a fast signal
analysis module we were able to guide the extraction process toward the final
result and so reducing the complexity of the original data mining algorithm.
Recently, research on gradual itemset mining has focused on proposing par-
allel methods that are able to use multi-core architecture for the extraction
of itemsets [90]. We plan to investigate the use of such methods online in
order to adapt correlations to changes in the system.
Itemsets from the L level are computed by combining frequent itemsets
siblings from the L-1 level by using a procedure for joining two itemsets
into a larger one. Candidates which are more frequent than a pre-defined
threshold are retained in level L and are further used in the next level.
In its usual form, gradual itemset mining algorithms look for patterns
that take place at the same time in a subset of attributes. For example, the
pattern (0→1, -, 0→1) related to Figure 5.3 describes the fact that frequently
in the analyzed time frame, the first signal experiences an anomaly at the
same time as the third, while the second signal can have any state. For our
purposes, we are interested in associating signals that have a fixed delay one
from another. For example, if one event type usually occurs T time units
after another event type, these two signals will be shifted with T time units
one from the other (as an example, in figure 5.3 the last two signals have a
time delay of one minute, with the third signal following the second one).
The correlation module must be able to capture this scenario.
We modify the initial algorithm to check different delays between signals
by shifting one of the signals with the corresponding delay and applying the
gradual itemset mining algorithm. To optimize the process we choose a small
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time window for the delay values based on the results given by the initial
cross-correlation function.
The general gradual mining algorithm uses a comparison operator in {≥
,≤}, meaning that it identifies when a signal changes its state either from
normal to anomaly or the opposite. However in our case we only care about
the decreasing patterns (if an outlier occurs in S1, we want to find all other Si
signals where an outlier occurs with a fixed delay). We change the algorithm
to only search for the ≥ operator. This means we are only looking for 0->1
moments when a signal goes from normal behavior to anomaly. For a better
understanding of our hybrid approach we will present an example in the next
paragraph that goes through all the steps used by the method.
Given a table set of signals S, a gradual item is a pair (Si, θi) where Si is
an attribute in S and θi represents a delay in the signal. A gradual itemset
G = {(S1, θ1), ..., (Sk, θk)} is a set of gradual items of cardinality greater than
or equal to 2.
In the example illustrated in figure 5.3, the initial set of gradual itemsets
which is given by the cross-correlation function between all combinations of
signals, is SGinit = {{(S1, 0), (S2, θ12)}, {(S1, 0), (S3, θ13)}, {(S2, 0), (S3, θ23)}}.
This means that signal S1 is correlated with S2 and S2 occurs θ12 time units
after S1.
The join function used in GRITE will return the merge between the sets
in SGinit and create:
SG1 = {{(S1, 0), (S2, θ12), (S3, θ13)}, {(S1, 0), (S2, θ12), (S3, θ12 + θ23)}, ...},
with different delays. In case all delays are consistent, for example if
θ13 = θ12 + θ23, SG1 will have only one element. The testing part is left
almost unchanged from the gradual itemset mining with the difference that
we only use one operator.
We use two different thresholds in order to decide what patterns occur
frequently and what patterns are sub-frequent, meaning they do not have
enough appearances in the analyzed time frame, but have the potential of
becoming frequent in the future. We keep both sets of patterns, but only use
the frequent ones for prediction. The sub-frequent patterns are monitored as
time goes by and their count is updated. If it exceeds the ”frequent pattern”
threshold they are upgraded and moved in the frequent set.
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Location correlation
Large-scale systems contain a large number of nodes that are organized in
an hierarchy. For example for the Blue Gene systems, nodes are gathered
into midplanes and multiple midplanes form a rack. When analyzing differ-
ent errors that might affect a HPC system we investigated the propagation
behavior of each of them. Our observation show that some errors influence
multiple nodes, depending on their location in the machine.
After a closer analysis, we observed that the propagation path for different
error types follows closely the way components are connected in the system.
For example, if a fan breaks, all nodes sharing the same rack will be affected.
For a better understanding of the behavior of different event types, we an-
alyzed the logs generated by Blue Gene/L and Mercury systems, and later
by the Blue Waters system. We show that it is important to consider the
topology of the network when modeling the propagation behavior of failures.
The heuristic used to extract location correlations is based on the of-
fline correlation chains extracted in a previous step. We parse the logs
and monitor each occurrence of a correlation Gi = {(S1, θ1), ..., (Sk, θk)}.
Based on it we extract the list of possible locations for each chain Loci =
{(L11, .., L1k1), ..., (Lm1, .., Lmkm)}, where (L11, .., L1k1) is a list of unique lo-
cations where events in the chain have occurred and m is the number of
occurrences for the corresponding sequence of events. In case of a correla-
tion that does not propagate events from one node to another, the list of
locations will be composed of only one element for each occurrence: Loci =
{(L1), (L2), ..., (Lm)}.
5.1.2 Dissecting event correlation
Our first set of experiments are made mostly on the BlueGene/L machine.
Most modules from our framework are platform independent and so are easy
to adapt to run on different machines. To demonstrate this and to compare
the results from different systems, we made additional experiments on the
Mercury system.
In this section we focus on analyzing the correlations we were able to
extract with our method. First, we were interested to understand what type
of patterns our method is able to extract in general. Table 5.1 presents
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Memory error
correctable error detected in directory *
after 6 time units (one minute)
uncorrectable error detected in directory *
capture first directory correctable error address..0
after 1 time unit
DDR failing data registers: * *
number of correctable errors detected in L3 EDRAMs.*
parity error in read queue PLB.*
Node card failure
midplaneswitchcontroller performing bit sparing on * bit *
after 44 time units
linkcard power module * is not accessible
after 4 time unit
problem communicating with service card, ido chip: * java.io.ioexception:
could not find ethernetswitch on port:address 1:136
after 6 time unit
prepareforservice is being done on this part * mcardsernum(*) * * mtype(*) by *
Multi-line messages
general purpose registers:
lr:* cr:* xer:* ctr:*
Component restart sequence
idoproxydb has been started: $name: d+ $ input parameters: -enableflush
-loguserinfo db.properties bluegene1
ciodb has been restarted.
bglmaster has been started: ./bglmaster –consoleip 127.0.0.1 –consoleport
32035 –configfile bglmaster.init –autorestart y
mmcs db server has been started: ./mmcs db server –usedatabase bgl –
dbproperties * –iolog /bgl/bluelight/logs/bgl –reconnect-blocks all n+
Table 5.1: Sequence of correlated events
several examples returned by our method. At a first look, we observed that
the method was capable of detecting sequences of events that lead to a failure
but was also able to capture the relationship between informational messages.
For example, multi-line messages are identified by HELO as multiple event
types. However, they have the exact same behavior so our correlation was
able to cluster them together.
Messages generated during the installation of a component or during a
restart are another example of informational messages. Our tool characterizes
their behavior as silent signals since most of the time they do not appear
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in the log. Every time there is a restart, these event types’ occurrences
are regarded as outliers. This allows our system to correlate these signals
with every other event type and extract the complete restart sequence. At
the same time, these sequences do not give any benefit to our prediction
since they do not affect an application’s execution in any way. As a natural
consequence, we investigated what is the percentage of correlations that are
not useful in the prediction phase. This turned out to be a complex task since
some messages might indicate harmless events in some contexts and indicate
failures in others. At this point we only eliminated the obvious non-error
sequences and analyzed the rest separately, as described in the prediction
section of this paper.
We observed that only around 23% of sequences do not have any potential
of predicting a problem in the system. We did this only for the Blue Gene/L
machine because it offers a severity field that helped us in determining if a
event type could be a failure in at least one context. We eliminated these
sequences for the rest of the analysis. For the Blue Gene/L system this
was done automatically by eliminating all sequences that contain only event
types with INFO severity messages. For other systems, a system manager
identifies which templates represent failures. This information can be used
to filter correlations that do not contain at least one failure.
In-depth Analysis
First, we investigated how many events are in average part of a correlation
chain. For this, we plotted the distribution of the event types that compose a
sequence in figure 5.4. The figure shows that in general the sequences contain
a small number of event types, the average length of the chain being 4 for
both systems. However, there are some correlations containing more event
types, 20% of them containing more that 8 events.
Next, we analyzed the time delay between correlations offered by our sys-
tem. First we analyzed simply the pair of initial correlations and then the
complete sequences. We observed that 33.7% of the correlations have less
than 10 seconds delay between events, the majority (56%) having delays be-
tween 10 seconds and one minute and the rest having time delays of more
than one minute. For both systems, about 2.5% of the sequences have more
than 10 min between events. For a better understanding of how this large
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percentage of correlations affect the final prediction, we analyzed the com-
plete sequences as well.
We plotted the time delay distribution between the first message indicating
the beginning of a sequence and the last visible symptom. Figure 5.5 on
page 80 presents the results only for Blue Gene/L but Mercury has a very
similar distribution. Only 12.8% of the sequences do not offer any prediction
window larger than 10s, 48.4% correlations offer between 10 seconds and one
minute and there is a significant percentage for which the delay is larger
than one minute. Moreover, the correlation system is able to extract some
sequences with hours time delay between the first symptom and the final
failure message.
We also observed that there is a relatively simple pattern between the
confidence of a sequence and the delay between the first and last event in
the sequence. The confidence of a correlation represents how frequent the
sequence has been seen occurring before a failure type over all occurrences
of this failure type. In general, for delays larger than 5 minutes, the larger
the delay the lower the similarity degree between the signal and so the lower
the confidence. Sequences with a confidence of over 95% usually contain the
correlations between events that are generated close in time, in the order of
seconds. However, there are some node card failure sequences that have high
confidence and offer more than one hour prediction window.
In the following section, we look into closer detail for failures that have
extreme time delays. In general, we observed that node card failures offer
sequences with longer time delays. This should be reflected in a larger pre-
diction window for these kind of errors, and as a consequence more time for
fault avoidance strategies. For example, the node card failure presented in
table 5.1 offers around 9 minutes (the equivalent of 54 time units) between
the first and the last event in the sequence. Other node card examples show
even one hour after the first symptoms occurs. The memory errors detected
with our system, like the one presented in table 5.1, usually offer in average
a one minute prediction window.
The Blue Gene/L system has a separate process, CIODB, that runs on
service nodes and handles the job loading and starting. This process starts
and monitors jobs, and updates the job table as the job goes through the
states of being loaded, started and terminated. We observed that sequences
or events related to CIODB usually have a very short time delay between
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Figure 5.4: Sequence size distribution
Figure 5.5: Time delay distribution between events in sequences
them, the majority happening almost at the same time.
In all our experiments, we used logs that offer less than 10 months of
activity. Thus, there was no reason to implement any correlation updating
modules since the changes in such a short time are not relevant to the whole
lifetime of a system.
5.1.3 Dissecting prediction
Figure 5.6 shows an overview of the prediction process. The observation win-
dow is used for the outlier detection. The analysis time represent the over-
head of our method in making a prediction: the execution time for detecting
the outlier, triggering a correlation sequence and finding the corresponding
locations. The prediction window is the time delay until the predicted event
will occur in the system. The prediction window starts right after the obser-
vation point but is visible only at the end of the analysis time.
In the next section we analyze the prediction based on the visible prediction
window.
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Figure 5.6: Prediction time window
Analysis
In the online phase the analysis is composed of the outlier detection and the
module that triggers the predictions after inspecting the correlation chains.
We computed the execution time for different regimes: during the normal
execution of the system and during the periods that put the most stress on
the analysis, specifically periods with bursts of messages. If the incoming
event type is already in an active correlation list, we do not investigate it
further since it will not give us additional information.
The systems we analyzed generate in average 5 messages per second and
during bursts of messages the logs present around 100 messages per second.
The analysis window is negligible in the first case and around 2.5 second in
the second. The worst case seen for these systems was 8.43 seconds during an
NFS failure on Mercury. By taking this analysis window into consideration
we examined how many correlation chains are actually used for predicting
failures and which failures are we able to detect before they occur.
The results on LANL systems showed 43% recall and 93% precision by
using a purely signal analysis approach. However, at that time, we did not
attempt to predict the location where the fault would occur. In this chapter,
we focus on both location and the prediction window. We compute the results
for the Blue Gene/L system.
We analyzed the number of sequences found with our initial signal analysis
approach, the data mining algorithm described in [50] and the present hybrid
method. Signal analysis gives a larger number of sequences, in general having
a small length, making the analysis window higher. Also, the online outlier
detection puts extra stress on the analysis making the analysis window exceed
30 seconds when the system experiences bursts. Due to our data mining
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Prediction method Precision Recall Seq used Pred failures
ELSA hybrid 91.2% 45.8% 62 (96.8%) 603
ELSA signal 88.1% 40.5% 117 (92.8%) 534
Data mining 91.9% 15.7% 39 (95.1%) 207
Table 5.2: Precision and recall for different methods
extraction of multi-event correlation we were able to keep only the most
frequent subset making the online analysis work on a much lighter correlation
set. On the other extreme, the data mining approach looses correlations
between signals of different types, so even if the correlation set is much smaller
than our hybrid method, the false negative count is higher.
Table 5.2 shows the precision and recall obtained with three methods: i)
ELSA signal, a purely signal analysis method by using cross-correlation to
extract the failure patterns; ii) ELSA hybrid, the method described in this
chapter and iii) Data mining, the GRITE based method described in this
chapter applied on the raw log file before applying signal analysis. The recall
value for the signal analysis method is lower than in our previous findings.
This can be explained by the location prediction since now there is room for
errors in this part as well. What is interesting is that the precision value
for the data mining approach is higher than the other methods. This can
be explained by the fact that the low number of sequences found by the
data mining method are mostly the ones that do not show a propagation
behavior. When running ELSA hybrid without checking the location we
obtain a precision of around 94%. The results show that the hybrid method
combines the precision given by the data mining approach with the recall of
the signal analysis method.
We analyze in detail the results by breaking down the predicted events on
different categories. The results are presented in figure 5.7, where each bar
represents how often a certain type of error appears in the log as a percentage
to all errors reported in the system. The dark portion of every bar represents
the correctly predicted cases out of the total occurrences. We observed that
the node card errors were the type that our system detected with a high rate,
more than 80% of the occurrences were predicted. This is explained in the
high confidence sequences obtained for this type in the oﬄine section. We
plan to analyze in the future the reason why there is such a low percentage
in detecting network and cache failures.
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Figure 5.7: Recall breakdown on different categories
The total number of error messages in the log represent 18% of everything
that is recorded in the log. An interesting thing we observed after this
analysis is that even though the large majority of correlations are used at
least once, there is a small set that is used frequently. More exactly, 3.12% of
sequences are never used for prediction (the events occur only in the training
set) and 23.4% are used in the majority of the cases.
We also analyzed the visible prediction window offered by the sequences
used in this process and observed that around 85% of the prediction offer
more than 10 seconds after the analysis window ended, out of which more
than 50% offer one minute or more and around 6% more than 10 minutes.
This means that fault avoidance techniques that take a checkpoint or mi-
grate a process in less than one minute could be applied on 42% of the total
predicted failures on Blue Gene/L, respectively 20% of total failures. When
using a fast checkpointing strategy, like the one from [65] the total number
of failures for which avoidance techniques could be applied increases to 40%.
5.2 Parameter influence on the results
5.2.1 Preprocessing parameters
HELO generates templates that consist of constant words and variables.
Variables identify manipulated objects or states for the program and are
replaced by wildcards. In case constants are mistakenly replaced by wild-
cards the template becomes too general and, when variables are identified
as constants by HELO, we call the corresponding templates too specific. In
order to compute HELO’s accuracy, we analyzed the Blue Gene/P system
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MTBF Failure distribution Nodes System lifespan Propagation Lead time
1day Weibull 40960 one year Yes Weibull
scale=8116.7 20% of failures mean=50s
shape=0.387,187
Table 5.3: System parameters
which offers error codes for every message line in the log file. The following
line:
26124022 KERN 080A KERNEL bgp unit ddr bgp err ddr SSE count
WARN 2009-01-05-00.41.28.758978 - 0 - ANL-R45-M0-512 R45-M0-
N11-J17 DDR controller 1, chipselect 0 single symbol error count 19747
is an example message that appears in the log generated by this machine.
The string bgp unit ddr represents the error code and ”DDR controller 1,
chipselect 0 single symbol error count 19747” represents the message descrip-
tion that will be used by HELO for extracting the templates.
We plotted the ratio of general and specific templates generated by HELO
compared to the error codes of Blue Gene/P in Figure 5.8a and how these
differences affect the final prediction in Figure 5.8b. Cluster goodness rep-
resents the similarity threshold that defines when two messages are part of
one single events. Depending on the cluster goodness, there is a 2 to 30%
difference between the template set generated by HELO and the error codes
of Blue Gene/P. However this is translated into a much smaller difference
when looking at the impact on prediction, the highest impact showing a me-
dian difference of only 5% for recall and 3% for precision. Only for extreme
values the impact is higher. We argue that this step affects in a small way
the final prediction so automatic processes provide great benefits compared
with human interaction without significantly affecting the final results.
5.2.2 Prediction parameters
All modules implemented in ELSA have online phases where they update
the data generated in the training phase. In general, current research is not
updating the correlations found oﬄine and thus have limitations when they
are using a short training set. We believe this limitation makes the prediction
unrealistic when used on real production systems. To study the impact of
not adapting the correlation set on the prediction’s result, we used the data
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(a) Percentage of incorrect templates
(b) Precision/Recall decrease
Figure 5.8: The influence of the HELO ”cluster goodness” parameter on
the template list and on the prediction results
collected by ELSA during the training phase to predict the next 9 months of
Blue Gene/L and plotted the recall for each month in Figure 5.9a. We have
similar results when using the synthetic logs, however due to space limitation
we did not present this figures.
It is clear that the prediction keeps a high recall value only for the first
couple of months and then decreases dramatically. We argue that by adapting
the correlations and signal characterization over time we were able to keep
the recall value almost constant throughout the entire studied life cycle of
the system.
For some fault avoidance techniques the cost of predicting a failure that
does not appear in the system is low compared with experiencing an un-
predicted failure. This is, for example, the case of object migration with
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(a) Recall on different months
without updating the correlation list
(b) Recall/Precision when varying
the ”correlation threshold” parameter
Figure 5.9: The influence of ELSA’s parameters on the prediction result
Charm++ [66]. Therefore, we did a study of the recall/precision trade-off
in Figure 5.9b. These values represent the precision/recall from analyzing
all 9 months of log data and using updates every 3 months. In general, the
recall increases when using low threshold values for deciding when a correla-
tion is strong. Interestingly, the maximum recall value reached by ELSA is
63% which is close to what we observed in the previous section as being the
amount of predictable failures. However, the cost in precision is really high,
making more than 70% of ELSA’s predictions wrong. It is also noticeable
that the precision decreases at a higher rate than the increase in recall. De-
pending on the fault avoidance technique different values might be the best
option.
5.2.3 Discussion
Accurate predictions are necessary for proactive fault tolerance solutions.
These solutions have the benefit of reducing the overhead due to fault toler-
ance actions and the amount of lost work due to predicted failures. However,
an extra overhead is added due to wrong predictions. The trade-off between
this overhead and the benefit is highly influenced by the predictors recall and
precision as well as by the cost of the fault tolerance action. We believe that
understanding current prediction methods and their limitations is crucial in
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designing failure avoidance techniques for exascale systems.
The correlation extraction method has the highest impact on prediction
results. Therefore the choice of the methodology is the most important part
of the prediction. We plan in the future to analyze various algorithms and
study their results on large-scale production systems to get a better under-
standing of their limitations. Data mining algorithms have particularly poor
results on noise and periodic signals. Our observation that failures do not
affect in the same way the system and are represented in different ways in
system logs allowed us to analyzed failures differently and, in the end, offer
more accurate predictions.
Adapting the set of correlations and behavior characterization is a necessity
when working on real systems. Correlations using the last couple of months
become unusable after less than one month of predictions. Since patterns
are no longer useful after only a couple of months and since new patterns are
added throughout the lifetime of a systems due to upgrades or configuration
changes, it is no longer viable for system managers to manually tune the
patterns extracted.
With the implementation of more accurate failures predictors there have
been developed a number of mathematical models [60, 92] that deal with
characterizing the benefit of merging predictors with current checkpointing
protocols. We further look at analyzing the benefit of a hybrid preventive
and proactive checkpointing strategy in the following chapter.
5.3 Online failure prediction
The prediction methods used in literature, as well as the one presented in
the previous sections, follow the same general design. The historic log files
are divided in two parts: training and testing. Predictors use a variety of
methods in the testing phase in order to learn patterns and correlations
between different events in the system. This phase usually uses 10% of the
whole log and can take between a couple of weeks [9] to months [57]. These
patterns are then used in the second phase of the analysis by applying them
on the second part of the log in order to predict failures. Based on the actual
failures from this part, recall and precision values can be computed for a
given method.
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Figure 5.10: Failure prediction: simulate online
Figure 5.11: Online failure prediction
Every step in the training method contains parameters used to decide when
a pattern is reliable enough to be used in the second phase. As shown in the
previous section, these parameters have a high influence on the final results
of a predictor. Depending on the results obtained on the testing part of the
log, the parameters can be tuned and the training analysis can be redone in
order to increase the accuracy of the final results.
Choosing and tuning the parameters is usually a manual process and can be
done using domain knowledge about the system or using previous experiences
with other similar systems. Repeating the prediction for the same testing
piece of log until obtaining the best possible results is a good way of analyzing
the limitations of a predictor. However, it is not a valid methodology when
deploying a predictor to work online on a real system since it does not provide
a way of preparing for unknown events. Moreover, any manual process is
unrealistic when dealing with supercomputers at petascale size.
The solution we propose is presented in figure 5.11 and is currently imple-
mented in the ELSA toolkit. For online prediction there is a historic log file
and a stream of events that are generated as the system continues to run.
The historic log file is divided in two parts as before, one for training and
one for testing. The training is done automatically in order to achieve the
best results on the second part of the log, either by implementing rules as
to how parameters modify the precision and recall ratio or by a brute force
strategy. By best results, we mean tuning the parameters in order to obtain
either the best possible precision, recall or a ratio between the two. We call
this process simulate online, because the methodology takes advantage by
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the fact that the testing phase can be redone multiple times.
After the best results have been reached, the process stops and the param-
eters are used online on the incoming stream of events. The methodology can
be tested on a historic log, by dividing the log into 3 parts, one for training,
one for simulate online and the rest for online predictions. The best param-
eters are chosen based only on the training and simulate online parts either
manual or automatic, then online predictions are made on the third part of
the log only once and the results of this one time execution defines the recall
and prediction values.
In time the learned patterns used for prediction become less and less accu-
rate because of new updates in the system and so both precision and recall
decrease over time. Values for this degradation can be found in the previ-
ous section. Our online methodology (figure 5.11) deals with this problem
by triggering a new session of training and simulate online in parallel with
the online prediction each time the precision or/and recall decrease below a
threshold.
We replace the manual process with an automatic algorithm. This on-
line methodology can be applied to any failure predictor that works with a
predefined set of parameters. The historic log file is divided in three parts,
one for training, one for validation, and one for testing. The training and
validation phases are repeated by an automatic supervisor that is using a
different parameter mix each time. The testing phase is done only once after
the automatic algorithm has finished finding the best set of parameters for a
given goal.
The automatic algorithm works on a couple of input files that need to
be provided by the user. These files contain information specific to the
failure prediction method that will be used. In this chapter, we use the
ELSA predictor [92] to demonstrate how online failure prediction can be
achieved, but any other predictor can be used as long as the files needed by
our algorithm are provided. In the current format of our online methodology
there are three files needed. The first one is an xml file that describes the
parameters used by the predictor with a range of values that need to be
inspected. The second file contains information about how the executables
are using the parameters that are described in the first file. The last one
describes the objectives of the validation process. A snapshot of these files
is presented in Table 5.4.
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Example parameter description
< parameters >
< param name=’correlation threshold’ >
< range >
< min > 50 < \min >
< max > 100 < \max >
< step > 5 < \step >
< \range >
< \param >
...
< \parameters >
Example file describing executables
< rule >
< executable > elsa preprocessing < \executable >
< param name=’correlation threshold’ > $1 < \param >
< param name=’input log’ > bgl log < \param >
...
< \rule >
Example objective file
< objective >
< recall > MAX < \recall >
< precision > GT60 < \precision >
< \objective >
Table 5.4: Input file entries required by the online methodology
In our example, the correlation threshold parameter is used by the pre-
processing modules of ELSA (specifically the elsa preprocessing executable
is using it as its first input parameter). This specific parameter describes
the minimum threshold required by the pattern detection module in order to
consider two separate events as being correlated. The values that need to be
inspected for this parameter, begin from 50 (events that occur together 50%
of the time) and end with 100 in 5 unit increments. The objective of the
online methodology described in the last file is to find the maximum value
for the recall, while preserving a precision of more than 60%. At the time of
this paper, we implemented the basic objective functions: MAX, GT (greater
than) , GE (greater or equal). In the future it might be desirable to be able
to specify a ration between the precision and recall or any cost function as
an objective function.
The online methodology uses the provided files to search the space of
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results offered by different parameter mixes, in order to chose the best one
for a given objective. Due to failure predictors generally having a very large
search space, we implemented a data mining algorithm used to find pattern
and trends between the parameter values and the precision and recall values
obtained for them. We use the GRITE algorithm [91], a specialized data
mining algorithm that extracts complex order patterns in the form ”The
more/less X1,X2,... the more/less Y1, Y2”, where Xi represent parameters
and Yi represents recall and precision. We store every entry containing the
set of values used as input parameters and their corresponding precision and
recall into a data structure. We apply the data mining algorithm on this
data structure and save the generated patterns into a separate structure.
These patterns are used to decide what mix of parameters to use in the next
iteration. We apply the classical sequential GRITE algorithm (see [91] for
the detailed algorithm) every time there is an entry that does not correspond
to the patterns already extracted. We call this method a guided space search,
since not all parameter combinations are tested. The experiments done with
the ELSA predictor over the Blue Waters system have shown that less than
15% of parameter combinations were necessary to reach a solution. One
example of such a pattern is the ratio between the correlation parameter
and recall seen in Figure 5.9b on page 5.9b. Specifically, each time the
correlation threshold is increased, the recall decreases. This pattern guided
the online methodology to start with low values for this parameter and go
up until the precision reached the 60% limit.
After the results best fitting the given objective have been reached, the
process stops and the parameters are used online on the testing phase or on
an incoming stream of events if the predictor is running as a daemon in the
system.
5.3.1 Results
We tested our method, first onto the same Blue Gene/L log used in our
previous studies and on the Blue Waters system. For the training phase, we
chose to tune the parameters in an automatic way with a hybrid version of
domain knowledge and brute force. There are three categories of parameters
in ELSA’s testing phase, one in the classification phase, two in the outlier
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Figure 5.12: Precision and recall for simulate online and online
identification phase and two in the correlation extraction phase. The previous
section presented a few of the most influential parameters. Some parameters
have a direct relation with both precision and recall (for example, it is clear
from Figure 5.9b on page 86 that an increase in the threshold parameter
decreases the recall and increases the precision). For the second type of
parameters there is no straightforward relation. Our method starts with all
parameters in brute force mode by trying all possible values. After computing
values for the first few tries, our method uses a regression algorithm in order
to find relations between thresholds and recall/precision values. If a relation
is found, a guided search is used for the rest of the threshold values.
The first experiment was done on the Blue Gene/L log which was down-
loaded from the computer failure data repository [93]. In the previous section
we focused on offering the best precision possible because we desired to have
as few wrong predictions as possible. There are fault avoidance techniques
for which the overhead of a misprediction is higher than the benefit of cover-
ing a larger set of failures in which case highest precision is the best solution.
In the next chapter 6, we investigate the impact of combining our prediction
method with a multi-level checkpointing strategy and we observed that a
decrease in recall has a higher impact on the benefit of this hybrid fault tol-
erance method than precision. For this reason, in this chapter we remade our
previous experiments on Blue Gene/L focusing on both best precision and
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best recall. Figure 5.12 shows the precision and recall for different scenarios.
The left part of the figure shows the results when focusing on obtaining the
best precision possible and the right side focuses on best recall.
The first column in each bar set (the blue column) shows the results for
the manual simulate online method. In this case, we divide the log in two
parts (training and testing) and manually change the parameters used in the
testing phase in order to get the best results on the testing phase. The second
column from the left (the red one) in each bar set represents the results when
using the automatic script for finding the best parameters. For computing
the first two bars, the first part of the log is used for extracting patterns and
the last part is used for computing the recall and precision value. The other
two experiments compute these values also using the last part of the log but
using the first two parts for training as described in figure 5.11 on page 88.
This way all four experiments compute the recall and precision by predicting
failures only on the online part of the logs and by using only data from the
training phase. The online methodology uses the simulate online part of the
log only to tune the parameters and to optimize the correlations found in
the training part. If a correlation cannot be found in the training part and
its present in the simulate online part our predictor will not see it.
The results using the automatic script are very similar to the ones obtained
by manual tuning. For the best recall values, the automatic method gives
a better recall, however, paying the price of having a lower precision. The
variations happens because the automatic algorithm goes through a larger
set of parameter combinations. Overall, the difference is less than 1% which
shows that the manual process can be completley replaced by our automaic
method.
The third column (green column) presents recall and precision values for
the online methodology when no updates are being made and the last col-
umn shows the results when there is one update after one month of exe-
cution. When no update is made, the recall and precision values both are
much smaller than in the simulate online case, having a difference of almost
5% compared to the manual process. However, after one update the values
become again very similar.
The results on Blue Gene/L shows that the online methodology gets similar
results by choosing automatically the parameters that otherwise should be
manually tuned and updated every couple of months. However, when we
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Figure 5.13: Precision and recall for the Blue Waters
applied the same strategy on the Blue Waters systems we observed a couple
of limitations. We will focus on analyzing these limitations and proposing
solutions in the next section.
5.4 Results on the Blue Waters system
Figure 5.13 presents the precision and recall of applying prediction on the
Blue Waters system. We focused on achieving the best possible recall, at the
same time trying to keep the precision at a reasonable value. Based on the
study from the next chapter, we chose this value to be 60% since it offers the
best results for balancing the overhead of a misprediction with the benefit of
covering a large set of failures for checkpointing strategies.
Figure 5.13 shows the precision and recall obtained for the Blue Waters
system for both manual tuning of the parameters (manual inspection bars)
for each individual month, and by using the online methodology with and
without updates (online bars). The manual and automatic methods give
similar results, which shows that the online methodology is a valid strategy
on larger systems. The automatic method gives a better recall value for
January 2014, however, paying the price of having a lower precision. The
variation happens because the automatic algorithm goes through a larger set
of parameter combinations. Overall, the difference is less than 1%, which
shows that the manual process can be completely replaced by our automatic
94
method.
The last two sets of columns present the recall and precision values for the
online methodology, when no updates are being made, and when there is one
update after the first month of execution. When no updates are made, the
recall and precision values are slightly smaller showing a difference of around
8% compared to the manual process (which was optimized for each month).
This difference corresponds to a power failure that propagated on multiple
nodes inside one of the cabinets. This failure was not predicted so all node
failures became false negatives. After an update, by including January in the
validation process, this failure was correctly predicted, which corresponds to
the 8% increase. We will analyze into detail all these correlations in the next
sections. In general, from our previous observations, an update is required
every few months, depending on the system.
We further investigate the reason for the low recall value obtained for the
Blue Waters system when compared to previous generation HPC machines,
like Blue Gene/L. For prediction purposes each node affected by a failure
is a potential false positive or negative. For example a fan malfunction can
bring a increase the temperature on a cabinet consisting of 96 four nodes.
Depending on how many nodes start presenting failures, a prediction will
have to identify multiple failures.
Figure 5.14: Breakdown precision and recall for different root causes
In general our method has good results for hardware and heartbeat failures
and less than desirable recall values for the software, network and environ-
mental category. We will analyze into more detail each category in the next
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Hardware Software Environmental Network
Memory 33.12% FS 27.2% Fan Tray Assy
27.02%
Gemini Lane
66.41%
CPU 27.04% Scheduler 18.9% XDP Valve
21.62%
Cabling 8.39%
Table 5.5: Most frequent types of failures
section.
5.4.1 Detail breakdown of prediction results
In order to better understand the prediction results, we further break them
down on more specific failure types. Table 5.5 presents the most frequent fail-
ure types for each category: hardware, software, environmental, network. We
correlate these specific types with log messages and analyzed their behavior.
An analysis similar to the one in the previous subsection shows that mem-
ory failures are preceded by other failures in 21.9% of the cases and act as
precursors for other failures in 20.8% of the cases. This happens because
we discovered that memory failures are self-correlated. When looking at all
events and not only failures, memory failures have precursors in 72.4% of
the cases. We investigated the message in the log file describing the Memory
Error Check and observed that the message is self-correlated in 87.31% and
is preceded by Correctable Memory Errors in 69.5% of the cases. However,
from the event’s perspective, Correctable Memory Errors lead to a Mem-
ory Error Check in less than 10% of the cases. The signal analysis outlier
detection modules implemented in ELSA caught the fact that, even though
Correctable Memory Errors happen frequently and without causing any fail-
ure, when their frequency increase in a short time interval it leads to Memory
Error Check in over 75% of the cases. When our predictor is only considering
cabinets and not node predictions, memory errors can be predicted with a
53% recall. The complexity of error propagation (85% of following memory
failures are on different cabinets than the precursor) is making the prediction
reach only 31% recall when node prediction is required. We will analyze this
further in the next section.
Node Heartbeat Faults messages are self correlated in 98.66% and their
location propagation is constrained within the same cabinet. Moreover, in
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98% of the cases they are preceded by a Blade Power Failure message 400 to
800 seconds in advanced. With a recall of 62% and over 72% precision, this
type of failure has the best results. Moreover, 7.1% job crashes in the system
follow a node heartbeat failure so these predictions could be also useful at
the application level.
Lustre failures are very complex and in general have many, but low con-
fidence, correlations. Most of Lustre failures are not predicted, with some
exceptions. OST Write Operation Failed is self correlated in 91.1% cases
and has a precursor event in 89.2% of cases. This precursor refers to a Write
Operation Timeout. In over 75% of the cases the failure occurs on the same
cabinet as the precursors. While this type of failure does not cause applica-
tion crashes it does lead to a MDT Failure within the next 45 to 950 seconds,
failure that causes job crashes in 23% of the cases. Both these failures were
correctly predicted by our method.
In general, network failures have few precursor events in the log. The Gem-
ini Routing Table corruption for example has no precursors in other failures
or in other events. System administrators are still working to understand the
root cause of this failure. However, it is visible from our correlations that
it leads in 72.41% of the cases to a Network Quiesce Error. For this reason
this second failure can be predicted with lead times of over one minute. In
general, we observed that network failures need different types of precursors
since logs files are not sufficient for predicting it. Our preliminary work in-
dicates that performance metrics could predict network failures, improving
the prediction. In the future we will focus more on network failures.
Environmental failures are in general in strong relation to basic perfor-
mance metrics, like temperature, power or fan speeds. We created log mes-
sages each time we see an anomaly in the following metrics: PCB tempera-
ture, INLET temperature, XDP air temperature and fan speeds. We use the
ELSA signal analysis module to detect outliers. The new introduced mes-
sages seemed good precursors for a large percentage of the environmental
failures. After this step, the recall value for the environmental failures has
increased to almost 40% having the same precision as before (when predicting
cabinets and not node failures).
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Figure 5.15: Errors propagating in the same cabinet. Predicted failures are
marked with orange and unpredicted failures with blue
5.4.2 Location propagation
One of the main problems brought by the complexity of Blue Waters is the
fact that the patterns between precursor events and failures are now more
complicated. Often, precursors from one node location indicate a failure on
a completely different node. Moreover, some problems, like the majority of
Lustre failures, although they have precursors on the same set of Sonexion
nodes, they crash applications running on sets of compute nodes. In this
section we will analyze the relation between the location of precursors and
their corresponding failures.
On Blue Waters, the locations for compute nodes have the following for-
mat: c0-0c0s0n0 which represents the cabinet id, cage id, slot id and node id.
The location prediction used by ELSA keeps a structure with learned cor-
relations between locations based on the correlation chains between events
and failures. Our first optimization to this method uses a simple algorithm
that finds patterns between different locations using the location ids. We
investigate, for each of the correlation chains that contain events appearing
on multiple locations, if they are propagating beyond the same node/slot etc.
If, for example a precursor and its error are always on the same slot but not
necessary on the same node, the prediction engine could use this information
and predict that the whole slot will fail.
This new methodology uses a hierarchical algorithm for locations predic-
tion. It basically over-predicts the number of nodes that fail in order to
increase the true positive base. Figure 5.15 presents an example of a heart-
beat failure caused by a power failure that affected 17 nodes in cabinet c2-10
(out of the 96 total nodes). Only 25% of locations are predicted correctly. If
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the prediction could predict the whole cabinet then all failures will be cap-
tured. We implemented this methodology in ELSA and after running it on
Blue Waters we obtained the results from figure 5.16. We observed that 87%
of the correlation chains contain events that appear in the same cabinet, out
of which 43% appear in the same cage (from the same cabinet), 48% in the
same slot and 71% on the same node. In Blue Waters, a slot has 4 nodes,
a cage has 8 slots (32 nodes) and a cabinet has 3 cages (96 nodes). This
number gives the upper bound on the recall improvement when considering
the new method (when all failures propagating are corrected predicted) and
a worst case over node estimation (for example when a cabinet is predicted
but only one node failed, the method has a mis-prediction of 95 nodes). The
prediction module is using the hierarchical location method by predicting dif-
ferent location classes (node level, slot level, etc.) depending on the chains
used to trigger the future failure event. A true positive in this scenario rep-
resents a prediction for which, firstly, the failure occurred, and, also, the set
of locations affected by the failures is a subset of the predicted locations.
In order to make the location propagation method even more general, we
mapped the location ids of each compute node on the 24x24x24 3D torus
network used by the Blue Waters system. We looked at patterns at this level
rather than just in the location ids. In chapter 3, we presented the topology
used by the Blue Waters system in figure 3.2 on page 36.
The algorithm used for extracting patterns in the torus looks at relations
between precursors in a chain and the predicted failure, and also at location
propagation patterns for the same failure. For this paper, we implemented
a simple neighbor regression algorithm that looks for mathematical relation-
ships between nodes on each of the three axes. We use the method from [94]
that extracts repeatedly occurring shape structures from a set of solid models
for design-rule mining, and model data compression. Basically after elimi-
nating outlier nodes, the algorithm extracts a 3D shape of minimal dimension
that captures all the active nodes (nodes where failures are occurred).
We recomputed the precision and recall values considering the new hierar-
chical prediction method with its corresponding definitions for true positives.
Figure 5.17 presents these results. The heartbeat, hardware, and network
failure types present very little improvement compared to the initial results,
each for a different reason. Network failures did not have many high ac-
curacy correlations to begin with, so the main reason for the low results is
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Figure 5.16: Location propagation results
not location mis-prediction, but a lack of precursors events in the logs. 85%
of network failures that were mis-predicted because of wrong location were
transformed into true positives with the new method. This accounts for the
1.2X improvement factor from figure 5.17b. The heartbeat failures, on the
other hand, had a high recall value from the beginning, because most of the
failures were correctly predicted even without using the new methodology.
Cases like the one presented in figure 5.15 are rare and account for the 1.04X
improvement factor. Hardware failures do not propagate on more than one
node in over 90% of the cases, so the lack of improvement was to be expected.
Software and environmental failures had the most improvement since they
are the top failure types that propagate in the system. With the new lo-
cation propagation method, the predictor was able to forecast 41.8% of all
environmental failures and 39.7% of software failures. Moreover, almost half
of failures reported as heartbeat errors (49.24%) were correctly predicted,
which corresponds to a total recall of 35.5%. This means that more than a
third of the failures on Blue Waters were correctly predicted both in time and
space. Moreover, our analysis indicates a couple of potential future directions
for improving even further this result.
5.5 Comparison Blue Waters results with smaller
systems
Similar to section 4.4.2 in chapter 4, we are comparing the results on different
systems side by side in order to better understand the differences that cause
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(a) Precision and recall (b) Improvement factor
Figure 5.17: Prediction results when using the location propagation method
for 70% precision
Category Blue Waters Blue Gene/P LANL systems
Hardware 40.9% 45.7% 49.1%
Software 28.2% 49.2% 53.1%
Network 22.3% 41% 43.1%
Facility/Environment 26.1% 31.4% 32.7%
Total 32.9% 47.3% 49.8%
Table 5.6: Recall of different failure types for different systems
the gap in recall values. We are using the automatic online method in ELSA
to find the best recall while keeping the precision value as close to 60% as
possible. Following the structure given in table 4.6, we show in table 5.6 the
recall obtained for different general categories for each system.
Hardware recalls are higher for smaller systems compared to Blue Wa-
ters. However, the recall values for this category is somewhat similar to all
three systems. When looking into detail at the results obtained for the main
hardware failures (Memory, CPU and L1 data cache), the recall for the Blue
Waters system is around 15% less for each of the failure types. Since the fail-
ures are more complex and the propagation behavior harder to predict, we
were expecting smaller overall recall values. We believe that having longer
training phases will decrease the gap between the systems.
Blue Waters and Blue Gene/L have similar percentage of network failures
and much smaller than software or hardware failures (Table 5.6). The recall
obtained for Blue Waters is half as much as for the other two systems and
it cannot be explained by the small training phase or by the size of the
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correlation chains. After manually analyzing the logs, we observed that there
are not a lot of precursors in the logs for this type of failures. Since the total
percentage of network failures is around 10-15%, by increasing the recall value
for these failures to what was obtained for the LANL systems, we would get
the overall recall to 35% (from the initial 33%). Therefore there is not much
to be gained from improving recall for network failures.
Facility failures have the lowest recall value for all systems. We believe
that including environmental and performance metrics into the analysis will
help prediction for this category of failures. However, they represent less
than 3% of all failures so improving the results will not influence greatly the
overall recall.
Software failures have increased in percentage as clusters increased in size.
Specifically, there are more and more complex filesystem and scheduler fail-
ures that could not be predicted. Figure 5.18 shows the recall value obtained
for the main software failures. We did not have information about scheduler
failures for the Blue Gene/L systems so they were not included in the study.
Considering the other two analyzed systems had low recall values for sched-
uler failures, we believe that including scheduler failures into the results for
the Blue Gene/L would negatively influence the overall recall.
Operating system failures represent a large percentage (over 60%) of soft-
ware failures affecting Blue Gene/L. The recall results for this type of failures
are the best for all systems. This explains the good results obtained for the
LANL and Blue Gene machines. For the Blue Waters system, the OS failures
represent only 22% of software failures while file system represent over 40%.
The low recall values for file system failures influence the total recall for Blue
Waters and we believe this is the area that needs more investigation. If we
could increase the recall for the file system failures to what is obtained for the
LANL system, the resulted total recall becomes 48% and if the file system
recall can be increased to 100% we would be able to predict 53% of all failures
that affected Blue Waters. We investigate creating specific detectors for the
types of failures that do not present precursors in the log files in chapter 7.
102
Figure 5.18: Recall for the main software failures
5.6 Prediction from the application’s perspective
Figure 5.20a shows the usage of the system for the analyzed period and the
number of failures in the analyzed time frame summarized per cabinet. In
general, we would expect higher failure rates with heavier workload. How-
ever, our results show no correlation between number of failures and the
average load of the corresponding cabinet. Moreover, a failure in the system
most of the time does not seem to impact a large numbers of jobs. At a
closer analysis, we observed that only around 44% of the failures led to at
least one application crash. The same analysis shows that 62% of the failure
types predicted by ELSA refer to failures that lead to application crashes.
Filtering out from the analysis all failures that have no effect on any of the
running applications corresponds to an increase in the recall value of 5%-15%
compared to failure prediction at the system level.
Location prediction gets a slightly new meaning when application crashes
need to be predicted instead of system failures. If our method predicts a
failure correctly in time, but the failure occurs on a different node, our previ-
ous method will give a false negative and a false positive in the final results.
However, if an application was running on multiple nodes, one of which cor-
responds to the predicted node, and the application takes global preventive
actions, the mis-predicted failure could be masked. Depending on the fault
avoidance strategy, a predictor that only looks at applications as a whole and
not as a set of running nodes could increase the recall significantly. By taking
the lead time and the new definition of location prediction into consideration
we recomputed the results and obtained 35% recall and 70% precision for
predicting application failures.
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5.6.1 Details statistics
We extracted information about applications running on Blue Waters for
6 months of production activity from May 2014 to October 2014. Our
dataset includes 1,051,353 user application runs of more than 1,500 code
bases, 396,178 jobs and 201,502,257 error events stored in over 2TB of logs.
During this time over 60% of the total user runs are XE applications and the
rest XK applications using CPU and GPU accelerators.
Many applications do not execute for a long time. During the analyzed
time frame around one third of the full-scale XE applications ran for less than
5 h, with a median of 1.2 h. In general, over 50% of the jobs used less than
one cabinet, or 96 nodes and over 80% use less than 10 nodes. Large-scale
applications that occupy close to 25% of the machines represent less than 5%
of all applications running on Blue Waters. Applications that take more than
50% of the machine are rare and represent less than 0.5% of all applications.
These percentages are obtained by looking at the count of the jobs. When
the same analysis is done from the node hours used on the machine, over
50% of the total time is allocated to jobs that run on over 2,000 nodes.
We analyzed all exit codes of applications and determined the cause of
their crash. Overall, in the analyzed time frame, three quarters of the ap-
plications are successful, 5% not completing within the allocated wall clock
time, 15% terminating abnormal caused by user-related problems. The left of
5% represent application instances that are terminated due to system-related
issues caused by any of the considered system errors.
Failures do not necessary crash applications. We observed that 38% of fail-
ures that experience at least one system error during their lifetime terminate
in a crash, and over 50% complete successfully.
We computed the ratio between the number of applications completing
successfully during a system error of different category to the total number
of applications experiencing this type of failure. We notice that smaller
applications present higher numbers for all types of failures than large ones.
A more visible decrease is presented for interconnect and system problems.
The ratio for small applications (<96 nodes) is relative constant for all failure
types, between 35-40%. Applications that take 25% of tha machine present
an uniform decrease of 15% for all failure types, while applications running
on more than 50% of Blue Waters nodes show values of 10-15% for lustre
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and node failures and 30-35% for Gemini and LNET errors.
The ratio for applications running at full scale are not uniform and depend
heavily on the failure type. This is because at full scale application, users
generally adopt many resiliency mechanisms to protect application against
variety of errors. Also, these applications usually run for only a few hours
which means that they will be limited in how many types of failures they
will encounter.
Operating system (OS) failures, like kernel panics, are very critical at any
scale. Although, they are not frequent they crash applications almost in all
cases. File system failures, on the other hand, are more likely to degrade
applications’ performance rather than crash them.
5.6.2 Details prediction
Our study in chapter 5 has shown that only around 44% of the failures on
the Blue Waters system lead to at least one application crash. The same
analysis shows that 62% of the failure types predicted by ELSA refer to
failures that lead to application crashes. We analyze, in this section, the
error/failure sensitivity and their influence on prediction of a variety of more
than 1 million of user applications launched during the analyzed data.
In average, there were 1,093 jobs per day on the Blue Waters system, with
a gross load (utilization) computed over 24h of around 70%. Overall, an
average job lasts for less than 10h (in 95% of the cases the average is 1.5h).
We consider that an application crashed if its exit code is different than 0.
Table 5.7 shows some examples of exit codes, their meaning and the number
of occurrences in 6 months of production in 2014.
Depending on the month, between 3-10% of all application crashes can
be correlated to different types of system failures. When looking at all ap-
plications that experienced an error during their lifetime, depending on the
month, between 35-40% of applications terminated abnormally.
Table 5.8 presents the correlation statistics between each type of failure
and application crashes on the Blue Waters system. For each failure type,
we show the ratio between the number of failures of the given type that leads
to application crashes over the total number of failures of the given type,
as well as the ratio of how many application crashes are correlated to this
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Failure reason No. app MTBF (h)
Assertion/Error Meassage (runtime bug) 235 18.4
Hangup/death controlling process 1093 2.1
Illigeal Instruction 35 110.1
job exec failed after files 99 30.6
job exec failed before files; no retry 25 185.6
Machine Problem 194 23.4
Possible Memory Leak 3 1658
Segmentation violation 118 38.6
Total 1.802 97
Table 5.7: Blue Waters application exit codes, their meaning and the
number of occurrences
Failure type % lead to app crashes % from total app crashes
Hardware 62 38
Software 18.3 32
Network 34.1 12
Facility/Environment 45.5 18
Total 44 100
Table 5.8: Correlation between different system failure types and
application crashes
type of failure to the total number of application crashes. It is clear that
hardware, network and facility failures have the most influence on applica-
tions while software seems not to lead to application interruptions. Note that
system wide outages were not included into this table. Out of the software
failures, operating system problems represent the large majority of applica-
tion crashes. When looking in detail for file system failures (which have the
worst prediction result), we notice that less than 10% of file system failures
actually crash applications.
The method used for finding correlations between failures and application
crashes is based on creating a window of time following each failure and
checking if during this time there are any application crashes with exit code
different than 0 and that does not represent a well known code for application
bugs. The window size was chosen empirically to be one hour.
File system failures, in general, degrade the performance of applications,
rather than crash them. For example, during an OST failure, when appli-
cations attempt to read or write to/from a failed Lustre target, they are
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Figure 5.19: I/O throughput decrease (percentage per application instance,
over 400 applications) on Intrepid.
blocked waiting for the OST recovery. An application does not detect any-
thing unusual, except that the I/O may take longer to complete. An analysis
of Intrepid, the Blue Gene/P system at Argonne, shows that congestion can
cause up to a 70% decrease in the I/O efficiency seen by an application
(Figure 5.19).
Rarely, when an OST is marked as inactive, the file operations that involve
the failed OST will return an IO error and the application might be termi-
nated. However, this process can take a long time, so our 60 minute window
might not be long enough to capture this behavior. Moreover, in most cases,
this degradation seen at the application level can cause the application to
exceed its maximum allocated time, which will make this scenario seem as
an unintentional termination and not a crash.
We use the Darshan tool [95], an application level I/O characterization tool
developed at Argonne, to capture the behavior of applications running on In-
trepid in order to extract their instances of degraded performance. There are
numerous reasons for application performance degradation, starting with re-
source exhaustion to network and file system problems. The Darshan tool
has just started working on the Blue Waters system. We plan to fully an-
alyze the causes of performance degradation on this system. We also plan
to investigate the correlations between performance degradation as well as
crashes at the application level and file system failures.
Table 5.9 presents the recall for application crashes due to different failure
types. Since file system, scheduler and some network failures do not crash
applications, overall the recall value for these types of failures is consider-
able better than for predicting system failures. Another interesting obser-
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Failure type Recall August Recall September Recall October
Hardware 52 67 58
Software 54 63 61
Network 50 60 55
Facility/Environment 43 53 49
Total 52 64 59
Table 5.9: Recall for predicting application crashes (Precision between
70-75%) for the Blue Waters system
vation from the table is that the prediction result is highly dependable on
the workload for the analyzed framework, recall values ranging from 52-64%
depending on the analyzed time frame.
5.7 Discussion
In general, the results show that the recall and precision depend greatly on
the failure type. Figure 5.20b shows the number of failures that occurred
in around 3 months of production, on each cabinet of the Blue Waters sys-
tem. Cabinets are order by the way they are arranged in the torus network.
Consecutive points in the figure represent adjacent cabinets on the OY axes
and points 12 spaces apart are adjacent cabinets in the OX axes. Blue parts
represent failures that were correctly predicted using the location prediction
method and orange parts are failures that were not seen by our method.
Since this figure shows only the compute node cabinets, every failure that
does not occur on these nodes will not be visible. This means that scheduler
and filesystem failures have been filtered. We observed that by removing
these failures, the overall recall value increased to 40.08% with a precision of
approximately 70%. When looking only at software failures, the new predic-
tor can correctly forecast over half of the software failures after file system
and scheduler failures have been filtered out. One visible example is the
LNET failure that refers to moments of low memory conditions when the
out-of-memory (OOM) killer kicks in and picks a process to kill using a set
of heuristics. This result shows that prediction is possible on the Blue Waters
system and can offer good results for some types of failures.
Another observation after examining figure 5.20b is that some cabinets are
more error prone than others, but this does not seem to influence the recall
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(a) Usage (node hours) per cabinet
(b) Number of failures per cabinet
Figure 5.20: Summary of per cabinet behavior
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value (some cabinets with a higher number of failures have low recall values
while others behave the opposite). Recall is also not influenced by usage. We
also examined the types of failures occurring on each cabinet. The analysis
showed the higher failure rate for some cabinets cannot be attributed to a
particular type of failure. However, the recall value per cabinets is strongly
correlated to the percentage of each type of failures on the corresponding
location. In fact, our observations show that the characteristics of each type
of failures is the main factor that explains recall values.
File system failures are one of the main reasons for the low recall obtained
for software errors. For example, the Lustre Metadata failures have very few
precursors and since most of them occur at the same time with the actual
failure, our method disregards the majority. Metadata servers for the Lustre
filesystem store namespace metadata, such as filenames, directories, access
permissions, and file layout. When applications detect an MDT failure, they
connect to the the backup MDT and continue their execution. Just in less
than 17% of the cases, applications having trouble connecting to the back-up
MDT fail. During an OST failure, when applications attempt to do I/O to a
failed Lustre target, these are blocked waiting for OST recovery. An applica-
tion does not detect anything unusual, except that the I/O may take longer
to complete. Rarely, when an OST is marked as inactive, the file operations
that involve the failed OST will return an IO error and the application might
be terminated. In general prediction from the application’s point of view is
more complex and differs in results compared to the one for system failures.
Similar to system failures, application failures caused by Lustre failovers have
low recall values, but for slightly different reasons. Lustre MDTs and OSTs
are stored on the Sonexion storage system and so they use different location
ids than the compute nodes. The Sonexion nodes are using a fat tree network
and comunicate with the compute nodes through Infiniband. Since applica-
tions are running on compute nodes, the prediction does not have enough
information to predict the exact applications that might suffer from a Lustre
failover. Even in the case of Lustre failures that cause system wide outages,
we observed that less than half of the applications that were running in the
system at the time of the failure are terminated. Information about what
files are used by an application is necessary in order to predict application
crashes. Better understanding of how and when filesystem and scheduler
failures occur and in what cases they cause application crashes would greatly
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benefit the prediction process.
Overall, the conclusion of our detailed analysis is that prediction is pos-
sible; the preliminary results are very promising. As a general observation,
it would be good to have more/better precursors in order to increase our re-
sults on the Blue Waters, either from the system level or from the application
level. For example, we observed that whenever a certain mix of application
runs concurrently in the system, in over 50% of the cases the system expe-
riences a MTD failover. Information about what applications are doing, in
general, might offer new failure precursors both at the system and application
level. Monitoring the I/O patterns of an application could help with location
prediction for application crashes caused by Lustre errors. Moreover, we ob-
server that filesystem performance degradation can often cause performance
degradation at the application level that can later lead to filesystem failures.
We plan to investigate all these directions in the future.
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Chapter 6
Combining failure prediction with
checkpointing
Future large scale HPC systems are expected to have a higher error rate
than current system. Most of the existing projections [19, 96] for exascale
systems consider that soft errors and in particular uncorrectable soft errors in
memory cells, latches and processor logic will significantly increase, leading
to a higher frequency of application interruptions. Several fault tolerance
techniques have been proposed and studied in the HPC community. The
most popular and widely used one is Checkpoint/Restart. Unfortunately,
classic periodic checkpointing, as used today, will be prohibitively expensive
at exascale because of the large amount of time that is required to dump the
checkpoint data into the remote Parallel File System (PFS) [97]. To decrease
this overhead, multi-level checkpointing [65, 98, 99, 100] has been proposed
with a large arsenal of techniques combined with new hardware devices and
it has successfully decreased the checkpoint-storing time drastically. How-
ever, multi-level checkpointing remains a preventive technique in which the
application is restarted from the last saved snapshot, after each application
failure.
The prediction performance presented in the previous chapter is good
enough to envision using failure prediction to reduce application execution
failures. For this purpose, failure prediction is useful only when coupled with
a proactive failure management that tries to apply countermeasures. The
decision to actually trigger a countermeasure may follow a complex process
involving (i) cost of the action, (ii) the confidence in the prediction and (iii)
the effectiveness and complexity of the actions [6]. The advances in failure
prediction precision and recall open the possibility to reduce drastically the
rework time by actually checkpoint right before the failure; a technique know
as proactive checkpointing.
However, proactive checkpointing alone, cannot systematically avoid re-
executing the application from scratch if failures are not perfectly predicted.
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Since executions on large scale HPC systems are very expensive (in time and
energy), taking the risk of long (potentially near to full) re-executions is un-
acceptable. Therefore, failure prediction and proactive checkpointing should
be combined with periodic checkpointing. Nevertheless, little is known about
the benefits of failure prediction and proactive checkpointing when combined
with periodic checkpointing. The objective of this chapter is to provide a bet-
ter understanding of this combination on execution performance, using state
of the art failure prediction and checkpointing techniques.
6.1 Analysis of prediction methods for failure
avoidance
6.1.1 Real Time Failure Prediction Challenges
Failure prediction methods have been exhaustedly analyzed in the previous
chapter. However, in order to create a failure avoidance technique, systems
need to couple failure prediction with some fault proactive tolerance tech-
nique; this involves three important challenges:
• The failure prediction framework needs to perform online detection of
propagation chains on the same compute nodes where the application is
running without imposing a too expensive overhead on the application
execution.
• In addition, it is critical to study the behavior of systems in the presence
of frequent false positives and verify whether the overhead involved by
the proactive schemes is acceptable or not.
• Moreover, the lead time observed for the most efficient prediction ap-
proaches is short (e.g. seconds), hence proactive techniques need to
be capable of reacting extremely fast to successfully finish before the
failure strikes.
To successfully couple failure prediction, proactive fault tolerance tech-
niques and preventive checkpointing, these three aspects need to be studied
and any implementation should demonstrate low overhead (even in the pres-
ence of false positives) and high reactivity.
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Figure 6.1: Lead time distribution between events in sequences for the BGL
predictions
6.1.2 Lead time distribution
We plotted the time delay distribution between the first message indicating
the beginning of a sequence and the last visible symptom. Figure 6.1 presents
the results for BlueGene/L.
In general, we observed that node card failures offer sequences with longer
time delays. This is reflected in a larger prediction window for these kind of
errors, and as a consequence more time for fault avoidance strategies. For
example, the node card failure presented in table 5.1 offers around 9 minutes
(the equivalent of 54 time units) between the first and the last event in the
sequence. Other node cards examples show even one hour after the first
symptoms occurs. The memory errors detected with our system, like the
one presented in table 5.1, usually offer in average a one minute prediction
window.
The Blue Gene/L system has a separate process, CIODB, that runs on
service nodes and handles the job loading and starting. This process starts
and monitors jobs, and updates the job table as the job goes through the
states of being loaded, started and terminated. We observed that sequences
or events related to CIODB usually have a very short time delay between
them, the majority happening almost at the same time.
For the purpose of combining prediction with checkpointing strategies, we
are including the lead time when triggering a prediction. Depending on the
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preventive action that the fault tolerance strategy might take, we only keep
the predictions that offer a large enough lead time. In case the prediction
lead time represents a window, with different probabilities on each moment
of time, we apply the same strategy. However, in this case we check the entire
window before triggering the preventive action or ignoring the prediction.
We analyzed Blue Waters as well and noticed that the lead time for the
extracted correlations are larger than for the Blue Gene/L system. For com-
puting the benefit of a hybrid checkpointing/prediction strategy we will use
the worst case scenario, which is given by the lead time offered for the Blue
Gene machine.
6.1.3 False negative distribution
In this section, we are investigating the time-varying behavior of failures in
large-scale distributed systems in the presence of a prediction module. Specif-
ically we are interested to see how the failure distribution changes when filter-
ing out all failures that are predicted. False positives, namely the predictions
that are not actually failures, pose additional overheads on fault tolerance
techniques. Even worse, failures that are not visible to the prediction mod-
ule (false negatives), are the failures that crash applications and require the
restart step in the classical checkpointing strategy. Thus, the mean time be-
tween two consecutive false negatives, as well as their distribution influence
the choice of the optimal checkpoint interval.
We analyzed all the failures that affected the Blue Gene/L as well as LANL
systems. We use the annotated failure information for the LANL systems,
provided in the additional failure file, and a filtered set of failures for the
Blue Gene machine.
For the LANL systems, the system managers divided the failure types into
the 6 categories studied in the previous chapters. For the Blue Gene/L, we
use the type of failure given in the header of each message log. Table 6.2
and 6.1 show the percentage of each type of failure for each system. Human
errors has no representation for the Blue Gene/L system because traces do
not give context information about the failures and so the actual root cause
is unknown.
In general, there is a large difference of coverage between different types
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LANL (MTBF 125h)
Category Percentage Recall/Precision
Facilities 2% 38% / 89.2%
Hardware 62% 45.1% / 93.8%
Human Error <1% 9.2% / 80.8%
Network 2% 42.8% / 91.2%
Software 23% 41.1% / 93.7%
Table 6.1: Precision results for LANL systems
Blue Gene/L (MTBF 24.4h)
Category Percentage Recall
Node Cards 16% 61%
Midplane switch 4% 45%
Memory 22% 15%
Network 17% 62%
APP IO 25% 41%
Table 6.2: Precision results for the Blue Gene/L system
of failures which indicates that certain failure types appear in patterns and
correlations more than others. Depending on the resources an application
might use, and so on which parts of the system are more stressed and prone
to failures, the overheads and benefits of preventive checkpointing techniques
might vary.
We investigate both the classical stochastic model that describes the inter-
arrival time between failures as well as the influence of failure prediction
on this model. The interval of time that separates two false negatives can
be later used either to compute the optimal interval between checkpoints
[101, 102, 103] (following sections) or to schedule jobs in order to maximize
the reliability [104].
Fitting methodology
Different methods are available to fit the empirical data to probability dis-
tribution functions. The most common methodology is to first select a set
of candidate distributions, after which to estimate the values of distribution
parameters based on the empirical distribution and keep the best one. We
conduct the fitting process using the commonly used distribution functions
to model failures in HPC systems [105, 32, 24], namely exponential, Weibull,
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log-normal, normal and gamma.
As a second step, we look for the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE)
[106] that will show what is the distribution that is more likely fit to the
empirical data. Technically, MLE aims to maximize the logarithm of the
likelihood function that corresponds to the closest distance between the em-
pirical distribution and samples from distributions with certain parameters.
We then use the Negative log likelihood value produced by the MLE to rank
the different distributions.
This still does not means that this given distribution is a good model for
the empirical data. Thus we check also the goodness of fit between the data
sample and synthetic sample. Literature describes dozens of goodness-of-fit
tests, but only a handful are used in practice. We use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov [107] test and the standard probability-probability PP plot as a
visual method.
Fitting results
Table 6.3 reports the fitting results with the best probability distribution for
each system. We note that the parameter µ is the mean in seconds for the
exponential distribution. For the weibull parameter a denotes the scale and
b denotes the shape parameter.
System name Failures False negative
Mean CV Best Fit KS Mean CV Best Fit KS
Blue Gene/L 1040.5 0.92 exponential µ = 62431.3 0.10 1888.1 1.10 exponential µ = 113289 0.79
LANL Sys 3 3595.1 1.1 exponential µ = 215705 0.98 6559.0 1.1 exponential µ = 393538 0.70
LANL Sys 4 3409.1 1.1 exponential µ = 204544 0.77 6187.0 1.1 exponential µ = 371218 0.99
LANL Sys 5 3294.5 1.1 exponential µ = 197671 0.95 6377.9 1.2 exponential µ = 382671 0.35
LANL Sys 6 16796.7 0.9 exponential µ = 1007800 0.81 31878.2 1.1 exponential µ = 1912690 0.99
LANL Sys 23 9288.2 1.3 weibull a = 509380 b = 0.846905 0.97 16272.3 1.2 weibull a = 895274 b = 0.851258 0.98
Table 6.3: Best fitting distributions (fitting parameters scale are in seconds)
It is visible that there is a relationship between the initial failure distribu-
tion and the false negative distribution. In fact, as it can been seen in table
6.3, the best fitted distribution for the data concerning the false negative
alerts is exactly the same distribution for the failures intervals, but having
different parameters. Hence, intuitively we can say that the failure prediction
process does not change the initial distribution and it affects only the scale
parameters of the initial distribution.
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Also, we can notice, for the exponential distribution, the ratio between the
initial parameter µu and the false negative parameter µy is given by µy/µu ≈
1 − r where r is the recall. For Weibull as well, we have approximately the
same shape parameter for both distributions and the scale parameter of the
false negative ay is approximately equal to au/(1− r). This means that the
failure prediction mechanism act as a scaling filter that affects only the scale
in terms of time. Therefore we can estimate the distribution of the false
negative alerts using just the recall and the initial failure distribution.
We note that the failure prediction process does not have an impact on the
variability of the data. As we can see in table 6.3 the coefficient of variation
(CV ) is almost the same for both data. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test values
(denoted by KS) in table 6.3 indicate that all the found distributions pass
successfully the test of goodness.
In order to asses the fitting results visually we report in figures 6.2a and
6.2b the probability plots. Figure 6.2a reports the pp-plot for the exponential
type distributions, while Figure 6.2b looks at the Weibull distribution. As
it can be seen the figures confirm that the exponential/Weibull distributions
present a good visual fitting.
Since the false negative distribution can be computed from the original
failure distribution and the recall values, we can simplify the model for com-
bining checkpointing with prediction in the next sections.
6.2 Implementation of the hybrid approach
In this section, we are coupling failure prediction with a fast proactive check-
pointing implementation. For this purpose, we have merged the ELSA
tool presented in the previous chapter, with the Fault Tolerance Interface
(FTI [65]) that provides fast multi-level checkpointing. This merging has
introduced multiple technical challenges that we have addressed in order to
achieve high efficiency and low overhead.
6.2.1 Adapting FTI to handle checkpoint requests
FTI is a multi-level checkpointing library that works in a distributed fashion
and applies erasure codes on the checkpoint data stored locally to guaran-
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tee checkpoint availability. FTI requires to spawn an extra thread per node
to encode the checkpoint files concurrently with the application execution.
This fault tolerance dedicated thread is called the Head of the node. In the
multi-level scheme implemented in FTI, L1 only checkpoint the data in local
storage, L2 stores in local and encodes the checkpoints using Reed-Solomon
(RS) and L3 stores the checkpoint data in the PFS. Between two consecu-
tive L2 checkpoints (and therefore encoding), one or multiple L1 checkpoints
might take place. Between two consecutive encodings the Head of the node
is idle and therefore, can execute extra actions. Hence, we have embedded
ELSA in the Head of the node, which introduced some other technical chal-
lenges that we have addressed. However, in this section we will see ELSA
as a black box that is interrogated frequently to know if there are predicted
failures.
FTI implements application-level checkpoint where the user calls the check-
point function every x iterations and then contact the Head of the node
trough the FTI API to start the encoding. In other words, the application
processes act as clients and the Head as a server. This communication pat-
tern in which the clients trigger the encoding does not match the proactive
checkpointing technique in which upon a failure prediction, the Head needs
to quickly order a checkpoint to all the application processes. However, inter-
rupting the application processes at any arbitrary point may not guarantee a
consistent state and may lead to save execution states of huge sizes. There-
fore, it is necessary to develop a scheme in which application processes can
be quickly checkpointed in a coordinated fashion, at execution points where
the state is small, upon a failure prediction communicated by the Head of
the node.
Our solution is to extend the FTI API to check at high frequency if the
Head has predicted a failure. This function calls should be placed in a inner
loop of the application that is executed at high frequency (1 second or less).
FTI will measure the duration of the inner loop and will decide how many
iterations (same for all processes) should pass before interrogating the Head
for predictions. For instance, if the optimal interrogation frequency is every
10 seconds and each iteration lasts 0.1 seconds, the application processes will
communicate with the Head every 100 iterations. It is important to notice
that the communications between the Head and the application processes
are intra-node communications that are usually optimized in most of MPI
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Figure 6.3: The hybrid implementation architecture
implementations. Furthermore, FTI can dynamically adapt the checking
window (i.e. number of iterations between two checkings) if the duration of
the inner loop iterations changes trough the execution.
6.2.2 Embedding ELSA into FTI
Figure 6.3 presents the merged architecture of ELSA with FTI. In the current
implementation, ELSA is embedded into each FTI Head process, which forces
the prediction to be called by FTI at a fixed interval instead of running
continuously. This poses a number of challenges that will be discussed in this
section. First, by distributing the prediction process on each node where FTI
is running, the access to the generated log events is limited to the context
of each node, forcing ELSA to analyze only per-node predictions and so to
loose failures that affect multiple-nodes. Depending on the system, the new
methodology might have a higher number of undetected failures [92], thus in
the future we plan to focus on improving this limitation. However, Tsubame
2.0, the system we used in our experiments, does not present many correlated
failures across multiple nodes [64, 65] so the results are not influenced by this
limitation.
Another challenge is represented by disrupting the continuous execution
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of ELSA. FTI interrogates the prediction engine at a fixed interval and feeds
the entire set of events generated in the corresponding time interval. This
gives a more general view of the state of the node and increases the accuracy
of the prediction. However, this reduces the prediction’s lead time. We will
show in the experiment section that by tuning the time interval at which FTI
pulls predictions, we can keep the impact of the prediction window on the
application wasted time due to failures and the proposed protocol negligible.
However, discontinuity in the prediction process makes it harder to keep
the correlation set updates. Past suspicious events and predictions are saved
and verified each time ELSA is triggered and in case a prediction is wrong
it is straightforward to adapt the correlations accordingly. However, when
the prediction is correct and the corresponding node experience a failure,
the information about past predictions is reset with the application’s restart,
making it more complicated to have positive updates on the correct corre-
lations. One possible positive way of updating the correlation set that is
incorporated in ELSA is described in the following paragraphs.
Based on the predictions made by ELSA, the FTI Head requests proactive
checkpoints to the application processes running on the same node. However,
in practice, not all predictions are beneficial and it is ELSAs responsibility
to filter the predictions forwarded to the FTI Head. There are two categories
of filtering rules, the first one for prediction that cannot be used by the fault
tolerance protocol and the second for predictions that cannot be used in the
current moment but that have the potential of being useful in the near future.
Predictions that do not leave enough time to take a checkpoint or that
happen just after a checkpoint has been taken are both represented by the
first category. In the second case, we use a simple mathematical model to
decide when the overhead of taking a checkpoint is greater than the overhead
of loosing the work made since the last checkpoint.
Predictions with low confidence values and with high lead time are part of
the second type of filtering rules. In this case the predictions are added in
the suspicious list and are monitored and triggered when they give a higher
benefit. In the first case, for low confidence values, the log is monitored for
further symptoms that might increase the confidence. A confirmed suspicious
prediction gives ELSA a way of positively updating the correlation set. For
predictions with high lead time, it is more beneficial to take the checkpoint as
close to the predicted moment as possible. For this reason, these predictions
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are added in another list and the prediction is triggered later when the waste
due to an application crash is minimal.
6.3 Hybrid implementation overhead
Our first set of experiments shows the overhead of our preventive check-
point implementation on a real large-scale system and computes its overhead
compared to the time to execute an application without any fault tolerance
protocol for failure free scenarios. Tsubame 2.0 is a supercomputer deployed
at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. Details about Tsubame 2.0’s configu-
ration can be found in [108].
The applications we considered are part of the Gadget2 Code [109] for
cosmological N-body/SPH simulations on massively parallel computers. The
same code can be used for studies of isolated systems, for simulations of
the cosmological expansion of space or for other fluid dynamics simulations.
Gadget2 was used for the Millennium Run, one of the largest N-body simu-
lation ran to investigate how matter in the universe evolved over time. We
used two different applications, the Blob test [110] and the Kelvin-Helmholtz
test [111], that are both used for testing the evolution of multiphase flows in
smoothed particle hydrodynamics. The Blob test simulates a spherical cloud
of gas that is placed in a wind-tunnel with periodic boundary conditions and
the Kelvin-Helmholtz test records the evolution of mixing two fluids in pres-
sure equilibrium with opposing velocities when the interface between them
is perturbed. Both applications have around 100 MB checkpoint size per
process, are using MPI and were modified in order to incorporate the FTI
library for fault tolerance.
Overheads
We computed the overheads for FTI before the modifications and for FTI
with ELSA for failure free executions considering different scenarios and dif-
ferent checkpointing intervals. The extracted overheads include the preven-
tive and proactive checkpoint waste and also protocol specific overheads for
example due to the communication between FTI and the application pro-
cesses. Moreover, the measured overhead includes the overhead of dedicating
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(a) KT12 Overhead (b) Blob Overhead
Figure 6.4: Overhead of the proactive checkpoint implementation
1 extra thread per node for FTI. Figure 6.4 presents the results for the Blob
test and the Kelvin-Helmholtz test (KH12) when tuning the number of nodes
the application executes on or the number of threads in each node.
The first analysis examines the overhead when increasing the number of
threads per node. In this scenario the total number of nodes does not change,
so FTI will start the same number of Head processes, keeping the same
inter-node communications constant. Also, the checkpoint size per node
will not change from one case to the next. However, there is more intra-
node communications that could increase the overhead when the number of
threads per node increases.
In general, for KH12 the difference between the execution time with our
current FTI and ELSA implementation and the version without checkpoint
stays almost the same, so it is normal to see a slight increase in the overhead
with more number of threads per node. However, for the Blob test this
is not true, the results show no pattern in the overhead. One cause for
this is that Blob is an irregular application in the sense that iterations have
different execution times. This forces FTI to adapt and change the interval
for checking the predictions. This overhead will affect more the cases with
a higher execution time since FTI will need to adapt multiple times. This
is the reason for the high overhead for small number of threads and why
the overhead decreases until 6 threads when the irregularity does not change
significantly. From this point Blob behaves as KH12. Overall the overhead
for FTI in its original form is around 6%, our current implementation of FTI
and ELSA has min 10% and max 15% of overhead.
For all the experiments we also tested the case when ELSA has a false
positive. For the extreme case, ELSA will generate a prediction on one node
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Figure 6.5: Overhead for different checkpoint intervals
each time FTI checks. We used an interval of 10 seconds and observed an
additional overhead of around 2% in this case.
Figure 6.4 presents also the overhead results when the number of threads
per node are kept the same and the total number of nodes are changed. Since
there is one FTI Head per node, increasing the number of nodes also increases
the inter node communication. However, since we made experiments for the
same number of total particles in all applications, the checkpoint size per
node decreases for more nodes. Figure 6.4 also shows that the false positives
affect slightly less the overhead when the number of nodes is increased. The
node that predicts a false positive every 10s and that saves its checkpoint
on another nodes has a smaller amount of memory to save, accounting for
around 1.5% overhead.
Blob shows a similar pattern as in the case of modifying the number of
threads per node. For KH12 the difference between the execution time for
FTI with ELSA and the execution of the application without any checkpoint
slightly increases when the number of nodes increases. This is probably
because even though the per-node checkpoint size decreases, overall the whole
application needs to save the same amount of data or event more due to local
variables in each thread. Thus, the overall overhead increases.
Figure 6.4 also shows that the false positives affect slightly less the overhead
when the number of nodes is increased. The node that predicts a false positive
every 10s and that saves its checkpoint on another nodes has a smaller amount
of memory to save, accounting for around 1.5% overhead.
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Overall, both the figures presented above show that, in general, the over-
head differs depending on how the processes are divided on the processing
units. The same number of total processes divided in more nodes with less
number of threads per node will induce a lower overhead.
Figure 6.5 plots the overhead for the same number of total processes but
for different checkpoint intervals. The lower the checkpoint interval, the
higher number of checkpoints the application will take during its execution
which as a consequence increases the total overhead. Interestingly, when the
application is executed with FTI and ELSA, but no checkpoints are taken,
the overhead is around 5.44%. This represents the lower bound overhead
of our implementation and reflects its internal communications, metadata
management and the fact that one thread per node has been dedicated for
fault tolerance. The overhead for FTI without prediction is with 2 to 6
percent lower in all cases, the protocol overhead alone representing 2.87%.
The difference of 3% represents the overhead of the multi-level checkpoint
when combined with prediction, compared with the classical strategy.
In order to understand the impact of the prediction parameters on the
overhead, we analyzed the degree at which the correlation and template
set used by ELSA influence the results. In general, we observed that if the
analysis of the correlation is shorter than the interval at which FTI is checking
the predictions, there is no extra overhead due to ELSA. As an example, for
the Tsubame 2.0 system, the analysis takes in average 2 seconds and FTI
checks prediction every 10 seconds, thus for our experiments there is no
visible impact.
Checking interval
The observations made in the previous subsection show the overheads for
FTI with ELSA and allow us to predict the overhead of a large-scale applica-
tion when running longer periods of time. We investigate what is the impact
of the checking interval on the number of usable predictions made by ELSA
(which influences the recall value and so the benefit of the protocol). We
first allowed ELSA to monitor the activity of the system in real time without
being interrupted by FTI and use the results as a baseline. Afterwards we
executed FTI with ELSA with different checking intervals and compared the
results with the base line. For Tsubame 2.0, we observed that the benefit for
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Figure 6.6: Checkpoint Restart mechanism
our chosen time interval of 10 seconds shows a similar result as the baseline,
having recall differences of less than 1%. However, for larger checking inter-
vals we observed significant differences in the recall and the benefit value,
since some of the predictions will require shorter lead time and will be fil-
tered out. It is important to tune this parameter for the configuration of
each system.
6.4 Simplistic model to compute the protocol’s benefit
In this section we derive an analytical model for the impact of prediction on
adaptive checkpointing strategies in order to highlight the benefit brought
by our method. We will modify the formula used to compute the optimal
checkpointing interval [71] in order to consider ELSA’s prediction.
If no failure prediction is available, then fault tolerance mechanisms must
use periodic checkpointing and rollback recovery. We start from the model
from [71] that computes the waste of a coordinated checkpointing strategy
when no prediction is offered and then integrate the impact of precision
and recall on this model. Figure 6.6 presents the variables used in creating
the model. With T, we represent the checkpoint interval, W represents the
percentage of wasted time and MTTF the mean time to failure for each
node. We also assume a task of a job running on a node can be checkpointed
locally on that node in C seconds, and the checkpoint can be loaded back
into memory in R seconds. The downtime of a node and the time to restart
the application on a different node or the same node in case of rejuvenation
is D seconds.
We assume that we are able to predict a fraction N of the failures with
127
a precision of P, with N,P[0, 1]. We assume the failure distribution for the
non-predicted failures remains exponential and that preventive actions are
taken before the failure occurs for all predicted failures. This is a realistic
assumption since the empirical data from the previous section has shown
that the false negativ distribution follows the initial failure distribution, with
different parameters.
In case of no prediction, we start with the following model:
W =
C
T
+
T
2mttf
+
R +D
mttf
(6.1)
with the assumption that T mttf .
The formula accounts for the lost of C seconds every T seconds for taking
checkpoints, the lost due to faults that occur every mttf seconds and lose an
average of T
2
time-steps each time and in the last term for the lost due to the
recovery time that is taken for every failure.
The optimal checkpointing interval can be used to compute the minimum
waste and it is given by Young’s formula.
Toptimum =
√
2Cmttf (6.2)
We now introduce the prediction model. First we assume having a recall of
N and perfect precision. In this case the mttf of the unpredicted events will
become mttfnew =
mttf
1−N . For example if 25% of errors are predicted, the new
mttf is 4mttf
3
. The rest of the failures are predicted events and have a mean
time between them of mttf
N
seconds. We showed in the previous section that
the exponential distribution of failures is preserved for unpredicted failures.
By applying the new mttf for the unpredicted failures to equation 6.2, the
new optimal checkpoint interval becomes
Toptimum =
√
2C
mttf
1−N (6.3)
The first two terms from equation 6.1 need to change to consider only the
unpredicted failures since for all the others preventive actions will be taken.
By adding the first two terms and incorporating the value for the checkpoint
interval from equation 6.3, the minimum waste becomes:
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W recallmin =
√
2C(1−N)
mttf
+
(R +D)
mttf
(6.4)
The last term from equation 6.1 will not change since for all failures, both
predicted and unpredicted, the application needs to be restarted. Additional
to the waste from 6.4, each time an error is predicted, the application will take
a checkpoint and it will waste the time execution between this checkpoint
is taken to the occurrence of the failure. This value depends on the system
the application is running on and can range between a few seconds to even
one hour. However, for the systems we analyzed, in general, the time delay
is very low and for our model we consider that is negligible compared to the
checkpointing time. We add the waste of C seconds for each predicted failure,
which happens every mttf
N
seconds. After adding this waste equation 6.4
becomes:
W recallmin =
√
2C(1−N)
mttf
+
(R +D)
mttf
+
CN
mttf
(6.5)
In the ideal case, when N=1, the minimum waste is equal to the time
to checkpoint right before every failure and the time to restart after every
failure. The formula assumes a perfect precision. In case the precision is
P, the waste value must also take into consideration the cases when the
prediction is wrong. The predicted faults happen every mttf
N
seconds and
they represent P of total predictions. This means that the rest of (1-P) false
positives predictions will happen every P
1−P
mttf
N
seconds. Each time a false
positive is predicted, a checkpointing is taken that must be added to the
total waste from equation 6.5:
W recallmin =
√
2C(1−N)
mttf
+
(R +D)
mttf
+
CN
mttf
+
CN(1− P )
Pmttf
(6.6)
As an example, we consider the values used by [71] to characterize cur-
rent systems: R = 5, D = 1 in minutes and study two values for the time
to checkpoint: C=1 minute and from [65] C=10 seconds. We computed the
gain from using the prediction offered by our hybrid method with different
precision and recall values and for different MTTFs. Table 6.4 presents the
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C Precision Recall MTTF for the whole system Waste reduction
1min 92 20 one day 9.13%
1min 92 36 one day 17.33%
10s 92 36 one day 12.09%
10s 92 45 one day 15.63%
1min 92 50 5h 21.74%
10s 92 65 5h 24.78%
Table 6.4: Percentage waste improvement in checkpointing strategies
results. The first 4 cases present numbers from real systems and checkpoint-
ing strategies. Interestingly, for future systems with a MFFT of 5h if the
prediction can provide a recall over 50% then the waste time decreases by
more than 20%.
We use the same model for the Blue Waters system, with the prediction
results presented in the previous chapter, and considering FTI as the chek-
pointing strategy used. This scenario assumes a MTBF of 8 hours, 10 seconds
checkpoiting time, around 70% precision and 40% recall. The gain of such
a scenario gives 14.7% gain compared to having the checkpointing strategy
alone. Even in the worst case month, where we obtained only 30% recall,
with 70% precision, our implementation still gives us a benefit of 10% com-
pared to checkpointing alone. The overhead of our method when the optimal
checkpoint interval is used for the Blue Waters scenario is between 3-4% over
the overhead given by FTI running alone. According to our model, on av-
erage, we optimize the fault tolerance protocol with 8-10% even on current
petascale systems and when using a state of the art checkpointing strategy.
The predictions for future systems shows an even larger improvement.
Moreover, when looking at prediction from the application’s perspective,
we have shown in chapter 5 that we can predict up to 60% of the failures.
When considering applications crashes the results are showing around 25%
waste reduction on petascale systems.
Since the model used is simplistic, it does not consider the optimizations
done in our implementation. For example, not taking checkpoints when the
last one was done close in the past to where the prediction was triggered,
or restarting the chekpointing interval after each triggered checkpoint. In
order to better study the impact of this hybrid approach on future exascale
systems, we look, in the next section, to more complex models.
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6.5 Evaluation of the hybrid strategy benefit
We will also present, in this section, a set of simulations to investigate the
impact of precision and recall values on the benefits that we can obtain by
using the proposed combination of failure prediction, proactive checkpointing
and preventive checkpointing in actual and future HPC systems. To provide
the simulation results, we developed a discrete event simulator. We consider
the following inputs to feed the simulator with failures and prediction alerts:
• Randomly generated failure times using an exponential distribution.
Numbers are generated using the GSL[112] random number generator
library.
• As failures are randomly generated, true positive alerts are raised by
generating uniformly a number between [0,1] each time a failure is
happening. Then, if the generated number is lower than r (i.e. re-
call), this failure is considered as correctly predicted since this event
is supposed to be a true positive alert. Otherwise this failure hits the
application. Similarly false positive alerts are generated during the ex-
ecution such that the ratio between the number of false positive alerts
(fpositive) and true positive alerts (tpositive) verifies the following inequal-
ity fpositive/tpositive ≤ p/p.
• To feed the simulator with lead time intervals, we use actual data col-
lected from BlueGene/L system located at Los Alamos National Cen-
ter. In this failure log, we have 235 failure occurrences and it covers
a period of 6 months, from June 3rd to December 8th 2005. Using
ELSA we extract 113 failure alerts with the corresponding lead time.
Then to estimate the parameter s in our model that depends on the
distribution of the lead time the lead time distribution is used. This
distribution is obtained by fitting the current date to probability dis-
tribution functions. In our case, the best fit distribution is the Burr
Distribution with the following parameters k = 0.5189, a = 2.3798 as
a continuous shape and b = 10.873 as a continuous scale. We point out
that the obtained P-values are 0.1968 using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test and 0.12602 using Chi-Squared test. One outcome of this analysis
is that the lead time distribution should be modeled carefully and the
exponential distribution can not be chosen arbitrarily to represent it.
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Before investigating any model, we set the parameters that characterize
current systems as well as future exascale systems. The used parameters are
presented in table 6.5. For petascale systems, we take as references the Jaguar
system installed at ORNL and other systems of the 10 Petaflops class based
on commodity microprocessors, including the Blue Waters system. These
systems have typically a MTBF between 24h to 6h. Checkpointing the full
memory to the PFS takes about half an hour. There are some variations:
some systems may take less time (15 minutes), while others, may need sev-
eral hours for this operation. We consider intermediate system the machines
that have a sustained performance of 100 Petaflops. We consider a reduction
of the MTBF to 6h or 4h for the full system. This is consistent with a sig-
nificant increase of the number of nodes compared to 10 Petaflops systems
and an increase of the error detection and correction mechanisms at hard-
ware level. We assume that in such systems, the checkpoint size per node is
between 100GBs and 200GBs and the writing speed is about 350MB/s. The
preventive checkpoint cost in such systems is in the range of several minutes.
For optimistic exascale system, we take a value discussed during a DoE ICIS
workshop on resilience in summer 2012 [113], namely 2h. In [96], the ex-
pected MTBF is more in the range of 30 minutes. We take this last value for
the pessimistic exascale system. exascale systems are expected to have be-
tween 32 and 64 petabytes of memory, divided by 100k nodes makes several
hundreds of GBs per node, thus we can assume a checkpoint size per node
between 200GBs and 500GBs. Also by 2018, we should have technologies,
like non volatile RAM (NVRAM), Phase Change Memories (PCM) and 3-D
circuit staking that are supposed to improve drastically the writing band-
width to GB/s (for the optimistic scenario we consider a writing bandwidth
of 3GB/s and 1GB/s for the pessimistic scenario). Hence, the checkpointing
times could remain in the order of several minutes. The proactive check-
point time is estimated from the amount of memory per node to move over
a 10-40GB network interface. We estimate the proactive checkpoint time in
these conditions between 1 to 5 seconds. For recovery from checkpointing,
we consider a down time of 1 minute after a failure happens. This time
corresponds to the killing of all remaining processes after the detection of a
failure, the allocation of enough resources to restart and the re-scheduling of
the application processes on the allocated nodes (we assume that the job is
not re-queued but immediately relaunched after the failure). We also con-
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sider that the time to retrieve a checkpoint image from storage is the same
as the checkpoint time. This implies that the restart cost is equal to the
checkpoint cost.
petascale Intermediate exascale exascale
Paramters Jaguar, 10PF 100PF Optimistic Pessimistic
MTTF 24h to 6h 6h to 4h 2h to 1h 30 min
Preventive Checkpoint time 30 min 10 min 2.5 min 10 min
Proactive Checkpoint time 10 to 5 sec 5 to 1 sec 5 to 1 sec 5 to 1 sec
Table 6.5: Computing platform configuration
We constructed a mathematical model for our hybrid implementation. De-
tails about this model can be found in [72]. In our simulations, we compare
the performance of the failure prediction associated to an optimal proac-
tive checkpointing and preventive checkpointing protocol with two strategies.
The first is the classic periodic checkpointing strategy based on Young’s in-
terval [101] without proactive actions. The second is the simplistic model,
presented in the previous section, that uses the classic periodic checkpoint-
ing strategy for the unpredicted failures and the online method to perform
proactive checkpoints for each prediction triggered. The second method is
called ”Optimal” in the following figures.
In the first set of simulations, we investigate the impact of the recall r
on the application performance. We plot in figure 6.7a the improvement in
terms of computing efficiency that we can obtain using the optimal or the
sub-optimal comparing to the classic periodic checkpointing alone.
These results show clearly that the proposed strategy outperforms the
classical periodic strategy and the sub-optimal as well. Moreover, we can see
that the recall parameter has an important impact on the improvement. It
is important to notice that figure 6.7a demonstrates that with a prediction
recall value corresponding to the best known prediction approach (i.e. 50%),
the proposed fault tolerance strategy improves the computing efficiency. This
improvement ranges between 10% and 20%. Moreover, this figures shows that
we can improve the computing efficiency of the application up to 30% with
a prediction recall of 90%.
The results of these simulation, when varying the precision value, are de-
picted in figure 6.7b for a prediction recall of 50%. This figure shows that
the precision has minor impact on the percentage of improvement that we
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Figure 6.7: Variation of the improvement percentage versus the variation of
the prediction recall (a) and the prediction precision (b).
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can obtain using the an optimal strategy. This is explained by the fact that
the cost of the of the proactive checkpointing is bounded. However, in the
pessimistic exascale case, a precision value less than 40% can have an impact
of more than 10% for the hybrid strategy. These two figures, each focusing
on one of the recall and the precision values, suggest that our future research
on failure prediction will focus on improving the recall.
The figures show that the benefit of our predictor in its present form gives
a decrease in the waste of the checkpointing strategy of around 10% for the
Blue Waters system and over 20% for Blue Gene/L. Considering the extra
3-4% overhead induced by the initial hybrid approach, we expect to get over
15% benefit for the Blue Gene/L system, around 7% for Blue Waters, and
20% for future exascale systems compared to classical checkpointing.
Since checkpointing is applied at the application level, not all failures are
important for this study. Only those that lead to application crashes should
be analyzed since the rest are tolerated withing the application. The recall
for application crash prediction is around 52-64% while keeping a precision
of around 70-75%. The benefit for our hybrid approach in this case is over
15% for the Blue Water system and up to 30% for future exascale systems.
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Chapter 7
Future work
7.1 Application level
7.2 Specific predictors: File systems
In this section, we are investigating the benefit of adding performance and
environmental metrics into the analysis in order to better understand and
predict file system failures. This is an on-going work, in collaboration with
the system administrators at NCSA. Thus, in this section, we will present
the preliminary results and the future work in this direction.
7.2.1 Metrics
Blue Waters system administrators gather 256 metrics across all levels of the
system. For our problem we only focused on file system and network metrics,
since these components give the most frequent problems for Lustre (as shown
in chapter 5). We analyze OS-level and network-level performance metrics,
without requiring any modifications to the file system, the applications or
the OS. In Blue Waters these performance metrics are made available in a
database in time units of 20 to 60 seconds depending on the metric.
We have collected data at the OSS, OST, MDS and network levels (as
we are primarily concerned with performance problems due to storage and
network resources, although other kinds of metrics are available) as shown
in table 7.1.
We only had access to performance metrics for 3 weeks in September 2014.
Blue Waters experienced a total of 14 failures attributed to Lustre in the
first 2 weeks that we used for training and 6 more in the last week. We
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MDS cpu CPU utilization (in percentage) for the MDS
MDS mem Memory utilization (in bytes) fot the MDS
OSS cpu CPU utilization (in percentage) for the OSS
OSS mem Memory utilization (in bytes) for the OSS
QOS write Quality of Service - The amount of time (in ms) it takes
for one write to each OST
QOS read Quality of Service - The amount of time (in ms) it takes
for one read to each OST
OST write The amount of data (in bytes) written to each OST
OST read The amount of data (in bytes) read to each OST
OST cpu CPU utilization (in percentage) for the OST
OST mem Memory utilization (in bytes) for the OST
Net prec/ptrans Packets received/transmitted per second
Net brec/btrans Bytes received/transmitted per second
Table 7.1: Metrics used in the analysis
analyzed LBUG problems (a panic-style assertion in the storage node kernel),
the unavailability of the Object Storage Target (OST) or of the metadata,
configuration problems. About 14% of Lustre failures in 2014 were due to
hardware problems, but these problems did not occur during the analyzed
time frame.
7.2.2 Anomaly detection
In general, we are interested in correlating anomalies moments on different
metrics with failures since we observed that failures change the behavior
of metrics. We are making the assumption that metrics present a fault-free
behavior most of the time. For OST, we also compare the behavior of multiple
OSTs at the same moments in time. Since clocks are not synchronized, we
shift the timestamps up to one minute before and after a failure in order to
find the most relevant correlations.
There is one MDS, 180 OSS and 1440 OSTs in the Blue Waters on-line
storage. There are moments in time when only one or a few OST have
degraded performance and there are moments when multiple OST perform
degraded simultaneously. For example, figure 7.1 shows several QOS per
OST for different interesting time units. It is visible that there are moments
of time when up to 160 OSTs degrade at the same time, but most of the
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time all OSTs have relatively small, similar values.
The maximum number of OSTs that an application can access is 160, so
whenever an application takes a checkpoint that is stretched on the maximum
number of OSTs it is normal to see a spike in the QOS for these 160 OSTs.
Since information about what applications are doing at all moments in time
is not available to us, it is clear that looking at anomalies in one metric is
not enough.
Figure 7.1: Quality of service for 100 OST for 100 time units
We gathered all the metrics relevant to each OST into one big matrix
(OST * metrics, the metrics related to the OSS that contains the analyzed
OST and the MDS metrics). Because each metric has different values and
anomalies have a different behavior, we first extract anomalies for each line
of the matrix. We use the same methodology as described in chapter 5 by
using the signal analysis anomaly detection algorithm. Figure 7.2 presents
the original signal for the QOS write for a random OST, its spectrogram and
the anomalies plotted against the signal.
Next, we looked at the behavior of all OSTs at each moment of time. We
used the exact same method as before to detect anomalies, but this time on
the columns of the matrix, keeping the metric and timestamp constant and
analyzing the differences between OSTs.
Our first observation, and most trivial, is that whenever a failure occurs in
the system at least one metric in one OST presents an anomaly. We couldn’t
find any failure that occurred when all metrics where in their normal state.
However, the inverse does not hold. There are many moments when there
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Figure 7.2: Signal and spectrogram for OST ID 101
are anomalies in the metrics of one or several OSTs and/or MDS when there
is no failure in the system.
Another observations is that QOS anomalies can be caused by anomalies
in the OST write/read metric or by MDS anomalies. When an application
is trying to write a large amount of data (which is seen as an anomaly in
OST write) the amount of time it takes to make one write increases. We
filter out the moments when there are correlated anomalies in these two
metrics. We afterward use the correlation method described previously in
chapter 5. There are several patterns extracted that we are in the process
of analyzing and understanding. For example, we notice a correlation be-
tween a decrease in the IO throughput in for large number of OSTs without
having any anomalies on the metadata server or in the OST Write with a
Luster problem caused by additional IO traffic that creates contention for
disk access. In most cases, the problem was given by an accumulation of
hung I/O threads on the file server from disconnected clients, which caused
the file server to eventually crash.
Even though the patterns are seen each time a particular failure occurs,
the reciprocal is not true. The same pattern could occur multiple times when
the failure does not occur. Thus, we are able to use these observations post-
failure to decide what the problem was, but not for prediction. We believe
we need to include more metrics and to combine them with log notifications
in order to find patterns that can be used for prediction. We plan to focus
on this topic in the future.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Overview of the thesis
According to recent studies, current fault tolerance mechanisms will not be
able to cope with the increasing rate of failure with the future exascale sys-
tems. This thesis has focused on offering ways of reducing the overhead
induced by fault tolerance strategies, by combining them with failure avoid-
ance methods. Failure avoidance deals with predicting the occurrence of a
fault and triggering preventive measures. In order to offer a realistic alter-
native to current fault tolerance techniques, fault predictors must be able to
accurately detect faults’ precursor effects in the system. This thesis aims to
propose an accurate and novel failure prediction method that can be com-
bined with several failure tolerance protocols.
The research done in my first year resulted in a clustering engine that
identifies frequently occurring messages with similar syntactic patterns from
log files. These message templates are essentially regular expressions that
describe a set of syntactically-related messages that refer to the same system
event. By taking advantage of the characteristics of log files, our algorithms
are computational efficient, accurate and are able to keep up with rapidly
changing environments.
This thesis shows that different system components exhibit different types
of syndromes, both during normal operation and as they approach failure.
The key observation is that errors are often predicted by changes in the
frequency or regularity of various events. For this purpose, the thesis in-
vestigates the linkage between signal processing concepts and data mining
techniques in the context of failure analysis for large-scale systems. By shap-
ing the normal and faulty behaviour of each event, and of the whole system,
we were able to propose appropriate models and methods for descriptive and
140
forecasting purposes. Multiple experiments on different production HPC
systems, from Argonne’s Blue Gene systems, to NCSA’s Mercury and Blue
Waters and Tokyo Institute of Technology’s Tsubame2, have been made.
The results show that conventional signal processing techniques can create
clear markers for changes in events behavior. Moreover, machine learning
techniques become much more efficient when applied to the derived markers,
rather than to the original signal. Consequently, the thesis is proposing the
first hybrid fault tolerance implementation that combines proactive with pre-
ventive checkpointing methods based on the signal analysis predictor. Our
method improves the performance of classical fault tolerance techniques when
dealing with failures in petascale systems and the results show the potential
of using such an approach on future exascale systems.
8.2 Summary of contribution
We present, in this section, the list of contributions of this thesis. Each was
covered in one of the chapters and future work has been identified:
1. Characterizing the behavior of events generated by HPC systems
• We characterize the normal behaviour of HPC systems and the
effects of failures. For this purpose, we demonstrated the value of
combining signal processing concepts and data mining techniques
in the context of failure analysis for large-scale systems.
• We made experiments on different production HPC systems, in-
cluding Argonne’s Blue Gene systems, NCSA’s Mercury and Blue
Waters systems. Our results show conventional signal processing
techniques can create clear markers for changes in events behavior.
• We developed a fingerprinting algorithm that characterizes set of
events that frequently occur together. This set of events can be
used to give a summary report of events that happen during an
application run or to improve the prediction algorithm by moni-
toring outliers in events’ fingerprints.
2. Failure prediction methods for HPC systems
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• We developed a hybrid methodology by combining data mining
and signal analysis for online failure prediction based on a pattern
extraction algorithm specifically designed for streams of data with
multiple dimensions. We showed machine learning techniques,
in general, become much more efficient when applied to derived
markers given by outliers, rather than to the original signal.
• We did experiments on small and large production system from
the Blue Gene/L and systems at LANL to NCSA’s Blue Waters.
The experiments focus on the difference between the two types of
systems and detailed observations are provided.
• In order to improve the results on the Blue Waters system, we
developed a location propagation algorithm specifically designed
for the 3D torus architecture used by the Blue Waters system.
3. Proactive checkpointing coupled with periodic multi-level checkpoint-
ing
• We developed a prototype implementation of proactive check-
pointing coupled with periodic multi-level checkpointing by com-
bining our failure predictor with FTI [65].
• We experimented using Tsubame 2.0 logs and we show that failure
prediction, proactive checkpointing and periodic multi-level check-
pointing can be coupled successfully, imposing only 2% to 6% of
overhead in comparison with a preventive checkpoint execution
only, giving a total of 10-12% total overhead.
• In order to compute the benefit of our method, we use different
mathematical models of failure prediction combined with proac-
tive and preventive checkpointing. These models capture the
checkpoint cost, the failure distribution, the precision and recall of
the failure prediction and the probability of success of the proac-
tive action. We add to these models the overhead of the prediction
method and study the theoretical benefit of the hybrid fault tol-
erance method depending on the prediction results.
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8.3 Future work
There are several topic directions that can be investigated in the future re-
lated to fault tolerance and performance degradation for HPC systems. The
question that first needs an answer is ”How frequent do we need to snapshot
the state of different components in order to extract meaningful precursor to
different failures?” The preliminary results after analyzing file system failures
and performance degradation show there are clear markers in several metrics
(for example network and disk throughput) that indicate problems at the file
system level. However, since metrics are usually gathered in an aggregated
form, every minute (or several minutes), these markers cannot be used on-
line, but rather in a post-mortem manner. We noticed that increasing the
frequency of taking snapshots for different metrics could identify anomaly
moments that lead to failures with enough time in advance for applications
to take checkpoints (or other action). However, the space needed to store
all metrics at a frequent snapshot rate becomes unrealistic for exascale sys-
tems (even for current petascale systems). Dynamically choosing the rate to
gather each metric could solve this problem. This is a short term research
that has the potential to shape the way we store and deal with performance
and system metrics for future systems.
As a long term research direction, one topic focuses on the analysis of the
effects of different type of failures on applications and the design of novel
fault tolerance protocols that consider the type of failures that might affect
the application. The effects of failures on applications can also be included
into the predictor which later can be combined with different fault toler-
ance protocols. For example, for failures that affect the memory used by the
processes of one node, saving the state of that particular node in another
nodes memory might be enough; for failures that degrade the performance
of one node, migration of the entire node might be a better solution; and so
on. Some of these solutions could be implemented at the programming lan-
guage level (for example, in MPI). Moving to more specific observations, file
systems can experience performance problems that can be hard to diagnose
and isolate. Often, the most interesting and trickiest problems to diagnose
are not the outright failures, but rather those that result in a degraded but
not failed system, where the system continues to operate, but with degraded
performance. Understanding file system performance degradation and how
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it propagates to the application level and modeling this propagation could
give useful guidelines to be included in future monitoring systems and have
the potential to bring advances in handling and diagnosing storage systems.
Another topic of interest comes from the positive preliminary results ob-
tained for the specific precursor for Lustre. We believe we can improve the
results for each failure type as long as we create a specific predictor for each.
For example, [114] proposes a new OS-based approach that proactively avoids
memory errors using prediction by focusing the analysis just on memory fail-
ures.
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